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Abstract
This thesis studies two characteristics of the Mexican labour markets: informality and 
migration to the United States. Chapter 1 studies the impact of NAFTA on informality 
and wages, the former measured in a reduced form through the fraction of workers 
without any social or health coverage (unregistered workers). Using data on Mexican 
and U.S. import tariffs with the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour (ENEU), I 
find that reductions in tariffs are related to reductions in unregistered labour. 
Unregistered labour decreases less in high import-penetration industries and more in 
export oriented ones. The Mexican tariffs are also negatively related to real wages, 
while the U.S. tariffs are negatively related to the registered-unregistered wage 
differentials. Chapter 2 is a joint work with Arturo Ramirez. It uses two Mexican tax 
reforms to test whether the unregistered sector is sensitive to changes in the tax burden. 
The first is the 1989 implementation of an asset tax, and the second is the 1999 
elimination of accelerated depreciation allowances. The data comes from the ENEU, 
from which estimates of unregistration are derived; and the Annual Industrial Survey 
(EIA), from which the differential effects of the 1999 reform on each region and 
industry are implied. It is found that the response of unregistered labour to changes in 
taxes is heterogeneous, depending both on the economic sector and the nature of the tax 
policy. Lastly, chapter 3 studies the effect of temporary migration to the U.S. on labour 
market outcomes of Mexican workers. It uses panel data from the 1994-2002 ENEU, 
which is ideal for minimizing self-selection biases common to other sources. Fixed- 
effects estimation indicates that temporary migrants obtain higher earnings in the U.S. 
labour market during the period of migration. They also work longer hours and face a 
higher likelihood of non employment. Finally, the gains from migration are lower for 
more skilled workers and for those migrating from the most distant regions, relative to 
the U.S.
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General Introduction
This thesis studies two very important characteristics of the Mexican labour markets: 
informality and migration to the United States. Informality is normally defined as the 
set of economic activities often, but not exclusively, carried out in small firms or by the 
self-employed, which elude government requirements such as registration, tax and 
social security obligations, as well as health and safety rules (Roberts, B.R. (1989)). 
According to the World Bank (Maloney, W.F. (1999)), between 30 and 40% of the 
Mexican labour force works in the informal sector. The importance of this phenomenon 
is thus evident, as it implies that a very large fraction of workers are unprotected. It also 
means that the corresponding proportion of labour income does not generate fiscal 
revenue, which directly affects the quantity and the quality of the public goods and 
services provided by the state. In addition, informality disproportionately affects the less 
favoured groups, such as the low-skilled workers. Finally, informality does not seem to 
shrink with economic growth, and it is also an important characteristic of the labour 
markets in other developing countries.
On the other hand, Mexican migration to the United States has been a very important 
issue throughout the twentieth century, and its relevance has reached unprecedented 
levels during the last two decades. Apart from being the hottest topic in the bilateral 
agenda, it has also become a very important component of the economic relation 
between the two countries. From the Mexican point of view, remittances of Mexican 
workers account for approximately 2% of the GDP, which makes them one of the most 
important sources of income for the economy. It has been estimated that remittances are 
responsible for 2 0 % of the capital invested in micro enterprises throughout urban 
Mexico (Woodruff, C. and R. Zenteno (2001)). From the U.S. point of view, Mexicans 
account for approximately 8 % of total employment, and illegal immigration has been 
constantly generating debates among different groups of interest, leading to the approval 
in 2006 of a budget of 1 , 2 0 0  million dollars for the construction of a 1 , 1 2 0  kilometers 
fence along the U.S.-Mexico border.
The objective of the present work is to make three original contributions to the existing 
literature on both topics. The first one, in chapter 1, consists on analyzing whether trade 
liberalization leads to an increase or a decrease in the rate of informality, the latter 
measured empirically in a reduced form through the fraction of workers without any 
social or health coverage (unregistered workers). Specifically, it studies the impact on 
unregistration and real wages in Mexico of the North American Free Trade Agreement
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(NAFTA), which came into effect on the 1st of January, 1994, and which general 
objective was to create a free-trade zone, through the establishment of clear and 
permanent rules for commerce, so as to help increasing trade volume and investment, as 
well as generating new employment opportunities and better living standards. Using a 
dynamic industry model with firm heterogeneity, it is predicted that import tariff 
elimination could reduce the incidence of informality by making more profitable to 
some firms to enter the formal sector, forcing the less productive informal firms to exit 
the industry, and inducing the most productive formal firms to engage in trade. The 
model also predicts market share reallocations towards the most productive firms, and 
an increase in real wages due to the increased labour demand by these firms. Using data 
on the Mexican and the U.S. import tariffs together with the Mexican National Survey 
of Urban Labour (ENEU), it is found that reductions in the Mexican import tariffs are 
significantly related to reductions in the likelihood of unregistered labour in the tradable 
industries. Also, unregistration decreases less in industries with higher levels of import 
penetration, while it decreases more in industries that are relatively more export 
oriented. Finally, the study confirms that the elimination of the Mexican import tariffs is 
related to an increase in real wages, and that the elimination of the U.S. import tariff has 
contributed to the expansion of the Registered-unregistered wage differentials.
The second contribution, in chapter 2, studies the relationship between taxes and 
informality in Mexico. In the recent theoretical literature, when modelling the informal 
sector it is generally assumed that there exists a direct relationship between the tax 
burden and regulations faced by firms and workers, and the likelihood of informal 
employment in the economy. However, the related empirical literature available to date 
indicates that there is still mixed evidence on this issue, and only a few studies have 
been able to link corporate and individual decisions. To fill this gap in the literature, two 
tax reforms that took place in Mexico during 1987-2002 are used to test the hypothesis 
that the size of the unregistered sector is sensitive to changes in the tax burden. The first 
is the introduction of an asset tax in 1989, with which the Mexican government tried to 
reduce tax evasion. The second is the elimination of accelerated depreciation allowances 
in 1999. Identification comes from the cross-sectional variation in the effect that these 
tax reforms had on different sectors and regions of the Mexican economy. The data used 
comes from two sources: the ENEU, from which estimates of unregistration are derived; 
and the Mexican Annual Industrial Survey (EIA), from which the differential effects 
that the tax reforms had on each region and industry are implied. The econometric 
analysis suggests that the positive relationship between taxes and unregistration
13
generally assumed in the theoretical literature not always holds, and that whenever it 
does the response of the likelihood of unregistered employment to changes in the level 
of taxes is rather heterogeneous, depending both on the particular economic sector and 
the nature of the tax policy in question. Thus, for the case of the asset taxation the 
estimates indicate no significant effect on unregistration, while for the case of the 
elimination of the optional accelerated depreciation scheme there are significant effects 
in some of the manufacturing industries.
The third and final contribution in chapter 3 presents new evidence on the effect that 
temporary migration to the United States has on the earnings of Mexican workers. To 
date, there is a huge body of literature that analyses many different aspects of this 
phenomenon, such as the characteristics of the migrants, the factors that influence 
migration, the quantification of legal and illegal migrants, the interconnectedness 
between international and regional migration in Mexico, or the economic performance 
of Mexican migrants with respect to the U.S. labour market. However, the economic 
performance of migrants with respect to the Mexican labour markets has received far 
less attention, and this the area in which this work attempts to contribute on. It uses data 
from the ENEU for the period 1994 to 2002. Among other advantages, the panel 
structure of the survey is ideal for minimizing the problems of self-selection bias that 
are common in most of the alternative data sources, such as population censuses. Fixed- 
effects estimation indicates that Mexican workers that migrate temporarily to the United 
States obtain significantly higher earnings in the U.S. labour market than in the Mexican 
one during the period of migration. They also tend to work longer hours and face a 
generally higher likelihood of non employment during the period of return migration. 
Lastly, the gains from temporary migration are lower for more skilled workers and for 
those migrating from the most distant regions in Mexico, relative to the United States.
A final section of general conclusions summarizes the most important results of the 
present work.
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Chapter 1. The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Informality 
and Wages: Evidence from Mexico
1.1. Introduction
Over the last 25 years many Latin American countries have abandoned their import- 
substitution strategies in order to embrace free trade. While it has been found that this 
change in policy helped the region to recover from the 1980s period of stagnation and 
crises by increasing exports, investment, productivity and growth, there has not been 
any sign of beneficial effects from trade liberalization on the allocation of labour 
between the formal and the informal sector, the latter defined as the set of economic 
activities often, but not exclusively, carried out in small firms or by the self-employed, 
which elude government requirements such as registration, tax and social security 
obligations, as well as health and safety rules (Roberts, B. R. (1989)). Under the 
absence of unemployment benefits and a well developed social insurance system, one 
could think of working in the informal sector as the best alternative for a worker who 
loses his formal job and is not able to return to the formal sector, either temporarily or 
permanently, because going into unemployment would leave him receiving no income 
at all. In fact, one can think of the informal sector as a competitive sector with relatively 
free worker entry. It is not difficult to find examples of free entry to the informal sector: 
just think for example of a worker that loses his or her job and becomes a street vendor 
or opens an informal food stand in his own house. The investment required in both 
cases is minimal and in general there are no “bureaucratic” or similar kinds of barriers 
to do so1.
This chapter focuses precisely on analyzing whether trade liberalization leads to an 
increase or a decrease in the rate of informality, the latter measured empirically in a 
reduced form, through the fraction of employed workers without any social or health 
coverage (unregistered workers). It adds to the existing literature by analyzing the 1990s 
Mexican experience. The North American Free Trade Agreement came into effect on
1 Cases in which there could be “bureaucratic” barriers to entry are those activities that are controlled by 
an informal, clandestine union. An example is perhaps car washing in Mexico City. The only investment 
a person needs to make in order to enter the business is a bucket and a cloth, but it is well known that this 
activity is usually controlled by a person or a group that decides if  the new car washer will be allowed to 
work or not, and it normally depends on paying a regular “fee”. However, even though this is common 
practice, the power of these groups is often limited to a small zone or a particular neighbourhood, and the 
new entrant can always choose to move to another one or to join a more convenient group.
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the 1st of January, 1994 and, according to the legal text, its general objective was to 
create a free-trade zone, through the establishment of clear and permanent rules for 
commerce, so as to help increasing trade volume and investment, as well as generating 
new employment opportunities and better living standards2. The impact that NAFTA 
and other trade liberalization processes have had on the Mexican labour market 
outcomes and living standards has been previously studied by a number of researchers. 
Among others, Revenga, A. (1995) analyzes how Mexico’s 1985-87 trade liberalization 
affected average employment and earnings; Hanson, G. H. (1994) studies the effect of 
economic integration with the United States on state-industry employment growth in 
Mexico. In another paper (Hanson, G. H. (2003)) he examines the impacts of trade and 
investment liberalization on the wage structure of Mexico. Finally, Nicita, A. (2004) 
performs an ex-post analysis of the effects of the trade liberalization process in Mexico 
between 1989 and 2000 on labour income and welfare. However, none of these previous 
studies has dealt with the effect of trade liberalization on the size of the informal sector. 
Recent estimates by the World Bank (Maloney, W. F. (1999)) suggest that between 30 
and 40% of the Mexican labour force works in the informal sector. From here, the 
importance of this phenomenon is evident: First, it implies that a significant fraction of 
Mexican workers are unprotected, which puts them in a vulnerable bargaining position 
with their employers. Second, it also means that the corresponding proportion of labour 
income in the country does not generate fiscal revenue, and this is directly reflected in 
the quantity and the quality of the public goods and services provided by the state. And 
third, informality disproportionately affects the less favoured groups, such as the low- 
skilled workers. This intensifies the problems of inequality and poverty for the country 
as a whole. Furthermore, the informal sector does not seem to shrink with economic 
growth. In the case of Mexico, while real GDP grew at an average quarterly rate of 
3.17% between 1990 and 2002, the unregistration rate also increased and, as estimated 
in this chapter, it passed from about 47% to approximately 49% of total employment. 
Informality is also an important characteristic of the labour markets in other developing 
countries. Goldberg, P. K. and N. Pavcnik (2003) analyze the cases of Brazil and 
Colombia, two countries that joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and where the rates of informality are approximately 35% and 50% of the 
labour force, respectively. They conclude that trade liberalization did not have any 
significant effect on the size of the informal sector in these countries. Currie, J. and A. 
Harrison (1997) study the effect of trade reforms on capital and labour in Morocco
2 NAFTA Secretariat, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx
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during the 1980s, and they find that state-owned firms increased employment by hiring 
low-paid temporary workers. Even though these previous studies suggest a null or 
positive effect of the elimination of barriers to trade, the study of the 1990s Mexican 
experience could provide more conclusive evidence, given that it involves a free trade 
agreement with the largest economy in the world, which means the bilateral elimination 
of import tariffs and at the same time a privileged access for the Mexican firms to a 
much wider market.
The present study uses a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms to analyse 
the possible implications of trade liberalization on the rate of informality. By making 
more profitable to some firms to enter the formal sector rather than the informal sector, 
forcing the less productive informal firms to exit the industry, and inducing the most 
productive formal firms to engage in trade, the model predicts that it is possible for 
trade liberalization to reduce the incidence of informality. Both the exit of the least 
productive firms and the additional export sales gained by the more productive firms 
reallocate market shares towards the more productive firms and contribute to an 
aggregate productivity increase. The increased labour demand by the more productive 
firms (due to their larger market shares) will tend to increase more the real wages in 
industries that experience larger tariff cuts.
These implications seem to be confirmed by the econometric analysis, which mainly 
relates data on both Mexican and U.S. import tariffs to the Mexican National Survey of 
Urban Labour (ENEU) for the period 1989 through 2002. To preview the results, 
reductions in the Mexican import tariffs are found to reduce significantly the likelihood 
of unregistration in the tradable sectors: a 1-percentage point decline in the Mexican 
import tariff reduces the probability of unregistration in a given industry by 0.392 
percentage points. Combining the trade data with information from the Mexican input- 
output matrices available to date, an import tariff is also mapped to the non-tradable 
sectors. The corresponding estimates indicate that the reduction in this weighted tariff, 
even though positively correlated with, has not have a significant impact on the rate of 
unregistration, meaning perhaps that the beneficial effect of trade liberalization has not 
spread outside the tradable industries. Also, when the import tariffs are interacted with 
different measures of exposure to trade for the manufacturing sectors -which are 
constructed using data from the Mexican Annual Industrial Survey (EIA), it is found 
that for a given reduction in the Mexican import tariff, unregistration decreases less in 
industries with higher levels of import penetration; while for a given reduction in the 
U.S. import tariff, the rate of unregistration decreases more in those industries that are
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relatively more export oriented. Finally, analyzing the effect of trade liberalization on 
the industry employment shares and the composition of unregistration within industries, 
it is found that reductions in the U.S. import tariffs are related to an increase in the 
proportion of workers in a given industry, that reductions in the Mexican import tariff 
generate a decrease in the fraction of unregistered self-employed, and that the 
elimination of the U.S. import tariff seems to have a reallocation effect within the 
unregistered labour force, from salaried to either self-employment or unpaid work. 
Regarding the predictions for the wage distribution, this study confirms the conclusions 
by many other previous studies, in the sense that the elimination of the Mexican import 
tariff has contributed to increase wages. Industries with larger tariff cuts experienced 
larger increases in real wages. Finally, the effect of trade liberalization on the wage gap 
between registered and unregistered workers is also analyzed here, and it is found that 
the elimination of the U.S. import tariffs on Mexican products has contributed to the 
widening of this wage differential in the tradable industries.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the theoretical 
framework. Section 1.3 provides some background on the Mexican trade liberalization 
process. Section 1.4 gives a description of the main datasets used. Section 1.5 presents a 
preliminary analysis of the relationship between trade liberalization and the rate of 
unregistration. Section 1.6 develops the corresponding econometric analysis. Section 
1.7 studies the parallel implications for wages. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2. How Could Trade Liberalization Affect Informality?
In order to give an answer to this question, three things must be considered: first, it is 
necessary to model the decision process of firms facing the option of producing either in 
the formal or the informal sector. Second, it is also necessary to incorporate a 
framework that is able to explain how trade liberalization affects the performance of 
firms. And third, these two points have to be put together. Under these considerations, a 
dynamic industry model with firm heterogeneity like the one in Melitz, M. J. (2003) can 
be used to describe the way in which trade liberalization could affect the rate of 
informality. The original model shows how the exposure to trade induces only the more 
productive firms to export while simultaneously forcing the least productive firms to 
exit. Both the exit of the least productive firms and the additional export sales gained by 
the more productive firms reallocate market shares towards the more productive firms
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and contribute to an aggregate productivity increase. Profits are also reallocated towards 
more productive firms. This model does not consider different sectors within an 
industry in which firms could produce, but as shown below, it is relatively easy to 
include this possibility.
1.2.1. The decision o f becoming formal.
To begin, as in the original model, assume that the preferences U of the representative 
consumer are given by a C.E.S. utility function over a continuum of goods indexed by 
a) . As shown by Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1977), in such a case consumer behaviour can 
be modelled by considering the set of varieties consumed as an aggregate good Q = U 
with an aggregate price P. Optimal consumption and expenditure decisions for 
individual varieties can then be defined as:
q(a>) = Q 
r(m) = R
p H
P
p(o})~ < U >
where p(m) is the price for variety <o,P is the aggregate price, R is the aggregate 
expenditure, and a  refers to the constant elasticity of substitution between any two 
goods. There is a continuum of firms in the industry, each one producing a different 
variety. The only factor of production is labour, inelastically supplied at level L, an 
index of the economy’s size. The cost function exhibits constant marginal cost with a 
fixed overhead cost. Labour used is thus a linear function of output q:
/ = /  + , /  > 0  and common to all firms in a sector
<p> 0  different accross firms
where /  represents the fixed overhead cost, and q> is a productivity parameter. Each 
firm in the domestic market faces a residual demand curve with constant elasticity cr 
and thus chooses the same profit maximizing mark-up equal to cr/(cr - 1) = \ j p . Under 
these assumptions, the profits of a particular firm can be expressed as the difference 
between its revenue and the cost of labour:
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x{<p) = p q - w  f  + 2- 
K <PJ
(1.3)
where w is the real wage, common to all firms in a particular industry. Substituting p  
from (1.1), maximizing (1.3) with respect to q , and using the resulting expression for 
the profit-maximizing level of output back in this same equation leads to:
the maximum level of profits as a function of the productivity parameter, <p. In the 
Melitz, M. J. (2003) model, there are two types of firms: exporters and non exporters. 
Non-exporters derive profits only from their sales in the domestic market, and these 
could be represented by a function like the one in (1.4). Exporters instead get their 
profits both form their sales in the domestic and the foreign markets. Selling in foreign 
markets implies incurring an extra marginal cost r  of shipping product units abroad, as 
well as a fixed cost f x of entering the foreign markets. Therefore, the total profits of an 
exporting firm can be expressed as the sum of the typical profit function for a non­
exporting firm and another function that represents the profits obtained from exports:
n x (<p) = k(p /tw)pI^ ~p  ^-  wfx . In the present context, apart from these differences 
between traders and non traders, there might be differences in the profit functions of 
firms in the formal sector with respect to firms in the informal sector. Consider first the 
characteristics of the informal firms. Because of their informal status, firms in the 
informal sector cannot take advantage of any of the trade promoting programs 
conducted by governmental institutions such as the Secretariat of Finance, the 
Secretariat of Economy, or the National Bank for Foreign Trade (BANCOMEXT)3, and 
it is more difficult for them to import machinery and equipment than for formal firms, 
since importing would imply exposure to the customs authority and, therefore, to the 
government. Thus, assume that informal firms cannot import nor export. Also, given 
that firms in the informal sector evade taxes, every period they face a positive
3 For a review o f the main governmental programs and instruments for promoting Mexico’s exports, see 
M a t t a r ,  J. (1998): "Export Promotion in Mexico," Integration and Trade 4/5. Institute fo r  the 
Integration o f  Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank.
(1.4)
1 \ |
where k = (pPQ — — and P0 = Q aP . Equation (1.4) is a general expression for
I  P
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probability y  of being caught by the government. If this happens, the government may 
force them to pay a fine equal to a fraction s  > 0 of its profits. On the other hand, firms 
in the formal sector pay taxes and worker benefits over wages, so they do not need to 
hide from the authorities. They can also get involved in trade and thus have access to 
more intermediates and are in general more productive than firms in the informal sector. 
In the present framework, for a partition of firms between formal and informal sectors 
to exist in equilibrium, and in order to get the bigger and more productive firms being 
formal, the marginal costs of production in the formal sector are modelled as being 
lower than those in the informal sector, but the fixed overhead costs in the former are 
assumed to be higher, so that the combination of both ends being higher than the fixed 
overhead cost in the informal sector. Regarding the marginal costs, the above can be 
interpreted as saying that the fact that formal firms do not need to hide away from the 
authorities, that they have access to better intermediates, and that they are generally 
more productive, more than compensates for having to pay taxes and worker benefits. 
As for the higher fixed overhead costs, it represents the fact that opening a business in 
the formal sector implies complying with a number of regulations that the informal 
sector avoids (e.g. registration, bureaucracy, and corruption). Furthermore, as described 
above, whenever a formal firm gets involved in trade, it has to pay taxes on imported 
inputs and exports (per-unit costs), and there is also a fixed cost of entering a foreign 
market, that does not vary with the volume of exports (i.e. they have to find and inform 
prospective clients about their products, leam about the practices and rules in the new 
market, comply with foreign regulations and standards, and set up new distribution 
channels). As before, for a partition of the formal sector between traders and non-traders 
to exist in equilibrium, trade costs have to be relatively higher than formality costs.
Thus, to put the above discussion more formally, let 0 < a  < 1 represent the taxes and 
worker benefits paid by the formal firms over wages, let f$ represent the fraction by 
which productivity is higher in the formal sector relative to the informal sector, and let 
f j  and f F represent the fixed overhead costs in the informal sector and the formal 
sector, respectively. It is assumed that a  < ft  and that f F > f }. Also, as in the Melitz, 
M. J. (2003) model, let t  be the increased marginal cost of serving the foreign market 
(i.e. tariffs), and let f x represent the fixed costs of entering the trading sub-sector. 
Given that access to trade increases the variety and quality of intermediate goods 
available for the formal firms, one could think of ft  as being affected by the degree of
exposure to trade. In particular, p T< 0. For a partition between traders and non-traders
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within the formal sector to exist, it is assumed that the trade costs relative to the 
overhead production cost in the formal sector are above a threshold level, or that 
r a~{ f x > f F. The per-unit trade costs are modelled in the standard iceberg formulation, 
whereby r > 1 units of a good must be shipped in order for 1 unit to arrive at 
destination.
At the margin, the decision of a firm of whether to become informal or formal will be 
based on the comparison of the profits that it could make in the informal sector and the 
profits that it could make in the non-trading formal sector only. Using equation (1.4) 
together with the above assumptions leads to the following profit functions for these 
two types of firms:
n(p) =
x,(<p) = k 
(<») = *
£
w
\ - p
-w fj if informal
(i+iV
(l + a)w
P
\ - p
(1.5)
(l + a)wfF if non - trading formal
A firm will choose to become formal whenever its expected profits in this sector are 
higher than the expected profits in the informal sector; this is n eF((p)> n](<p). Recalling 
that firms in the informal sector face a positive probability of being caught by the 
government and of paying a fraction of their profits as a fine, this condition defines a 
cut-off productivity level for firms entering into the formal sector, <p*F:
i - p
(1.6)
where B - i + l  
1 + a
\ - p
-  (l -  ys) . Any firm with a productivity parameter above <p*F will
prefer to produce for the formal sector. In equilibrium, (p*F determines the share of firms 
in the formal and the informal sectors. Similarly, a firm drawing productivity (p 
produces in the industry if at least the expected revenue from operating in the informal 
sector covers the expected fixed overhead costs of production, i.e. n]((p)> 0. This 
defines an overall zero-profit productivity cut-off for the industry, (p*. Finally, a firm 
operating in the formal sector will choose to engage in trade whenever its productivity
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parameter is such that the extra profits from trade are nonnegative, n x (<p) > 0. This also 
defines a cut-off productivity level for the trading sub-sector, <px .
1.2.2. The effects o f trade liberalization.
In the Melitz, M. J. (2003) model, trade liberalization comes through a reduction in the 
per-unit trade costs. A decrease in z would increase the cut-off productivity level for 
the industry <p*, and at the same time it would decrease the cut-off productivity level for 
the trading sub-sector, <px . This forces the least productive firms to exit and at the same 
time it generates entry of new firms into the trading sub-sector. There is also a
reallocation of market shares and profits from the least productive to the most
$
productive firms, which contributes to an aggregate productivity gain. Finally, the 
expanded exposure to trade offers new profit opportunities only to the more productive 
firms who can cover the entry cost f x , and it also induces more entry of new firms to 
the industry, as prospective firms respond to the higher potential returns associated with 
a good productivity draw. These two effects together increase the labour demand and 
therefore tend to bid up the real wages in the industry.
To see the implications of this mechanism for the formal/informal decision, note that 
the cut-off productivity level for formality depends on PQ through k , and P0 in turn
depends on the aggregate productivity level in the industry. q>F is also a function of real 
wages, w , and the productivity differential between the formal and informal firms 
(through B), J3. In the present framework, these are the three channels through which 
trade liberalization could affect the decision of a firm of whether to become formal or to 
stay in the informal sector.
First, if there is no effect on /?, then the only channel in which trade liberalization 
affects informality is through wages. As in the Melitz (2003) model, a decrease in z 
increases the cut-off productivity qf and the aggregate productivity level in the 
industry. As shown in appendix 1A, PQ would not change, and given that trade
liberalization increases the labour demand of the new trading firms and the new 
prospective entrants to the industry, then the real wages in the industry will also tend to 
increase. As can be seen in equation (1.6), <p*F is an increasing function of wages, 
hence:
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Proposition 1. I f  trade liberalization reduces t , then: 1) real wages in the industry will 
increase; 2) qfF will increase, inducing less firms to enter the formal sector; 3) (p* will 
increase, forcing the least productive informal firms to exit the industry; 4) (p*x will 
decrease, inducing more formal firms to enter the trading sub-sector and increasing 
their employment share; and 5) there will be an ambiguous effect in the employment 
share o f the informal sector, (proof: see appendix IB)
The effect of trade liberalization on wages has been extensively studied by different 
researchers. For example, Hanson, G. H. (2003) examines the impact of trade 
liberalization on the wage structure of Mexico during the 1990s. He finds that the policy 
reforms resulted in an increase of wage dispersion due to an increase in the demand of 
skill, a reduction of the rents in industries that prior to the reform paid their workers 
higher wages, and a larger premium for workers in states sharing a border with the 
United States. Hanson, G. H. and A. Harrison (1999) study the effect of trade 
liberalization on Mexican wages for the pre-NAFTA period. Using data on Mexican 
manufacturing plants from 1984 to 1990 and from the Mexican industrial census for 
1965-1988, they find that the reduction in tariff protection in 1985 disproportionately 
affected low-skilled workers. Cragg, M. and M. Epelbaum (1996) also analyze the 
Mexican case for the 1987-1993 period, and find that the wages of urban workers with 
completed primary education fell relative to the wages of those with higher levels of 
schooling. Finally, Attanasio, O., P. K. Goldberg and N. Pavcnik (2003) investigate the 
effects of the 1980s and 1990s tariff reductions on the wage distribution of Colombia. 
They identify the increasing returns to college education, the changes in industry wages 
that hurt sectors with initially lower wages and a higher fraction of unskilled workers, 
and shifts of the labour force towards the informal sector as the main channels through 
which trade liberalization affected the wage distribution in that country. Thus, although 
the effect of trade liberalization on wages has been widely studied before, section 1.7 of 
this chapter will present new evidence on this subject that confirms the impprtant 
relationship between trade policy and labour income, and it will also contribute to the 
existing literature by analyzing the effect of trade liberalization on the wage gap 
between the formal and the informal sectors, which has not been studied before.
On the other hand, there might be an effect on the productivity differential, J3. This 
could be so because firms in the formal sector may benefit more from trade 
liberalization than firms in the informal sector, given that they can get involved in trade 
and therefore have access to better and more intermediates coming from abroad. Thus,
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Proposition 2. I f  trade liberalization increases productivity in the formal sector, then: 
1) points 1, 3, and 4 in proposition 1 will still hold; 2) there will be an ambiguous effect 
on (p*F; and 3) there will be an ambiguous effect in the employment share o f the 
informal sector, (proof: see appendix 1C)
Intuitively, if the productivity differential between formal and informal firms increases, 
then the profits of the formal firms relative to those of the informal firms will also be 
larger than before. Formal firms will tend to get bigger and at the same time informal 
firms will tend to get smaller, which will bid up the real wages and could increase the 
employment share of the formal sector. To date, there is plenty of evidence on the fact 
that trade liberalization helps, in increasing productivity. To mention some examples: 
Fernandes, A. M. (2003) explores Colombian trade policy from 1977 to 1991. Using a 
panel of manufacturing plants, she finds a strong positive impact of trade liberalization 
on productivity. Ferreira, P. C. and J. L. Rossi (2003) analyze the Brazilian trade 
liberalization process of 1988 to 1990. Using industry level data, they find large and 
widespread productivity improvements across industries after trade barriers were 
reduced. Pavcnik, N. (2002) investigates the effects of liberalized trade on plant 
productivity in Chile. Using plant-level data on Chilean manufacturers, she finds 
evidence of within plant productivity improvements that can be attributed to trade 
liberalization for the plants in the import-competing sector. Harrison, A. (1994) 
measures the relationship between productivity and trade reform using a panel of firms 
from Ivory Coast. She finds a positive association between more open trade policies and 
higher productivity growth. The pre-NAFTA Mexican case has also been analyzed 
before. Tibout, J. and M. Westbrook (1995) examine the effects of trade liberalization 
on productivity for the period 1984 through 1990. Using plant-level data provided to 
them by the Mexican Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development (nowadays 
the Secretariat of Economy), they find that average costs in most industries fell with 
trade liberalization. For importables, the authors find that the cost reductions were due 
partly to improvements in relative productivity, whereas for exportables they seem to be 
due to favourable changes in relative prices (imported intermediate goods becoming 
cheaper).
Overall, the model presented in this section opens the possibility for the effect of trade 
liberalization on informality to be negative; that is, more trade liberalization leading to a 
lower rate of informality. In the context of the Mexican experience under NAFTA, the
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previous propositions could translate in the following hypotheses regarding the bilateral 
elimination of the import tariffs:
a. A lower Mexican import tariff allows firms in the formal sector to obtain cheaper 
inputs, machinery and equipment from the United States, which leads to an increase 
in their productivity. This effect would contribute to the reallocation of profits and 
labour from the less efficient informal firms to more efficient formal ones, increasing 
the employment share of the formal sector.
b. A reduction in the Mexican import tariff cuts down the costs for U.S. firms of 
operating in Mexico, in the sense that it now becomes cheaper to open a plant in 
Mexico and import intermediate inputs and materials from the U.S. These new, more 
productive entrants will increase labour demand in the formal sector and this could as 
well reduce informality.
c. A lower U.S. import tariff benefits the Mexican producers by allowing them to 
access the U.S. market in a cheaper and easier way. This would generate new profit 
opportunities, particularly for the more productive firms in the formal sector that are 
able to export, leading to an increase in their labour demand and raising real wages.
At the end, after liberalization, one could then observe lower informality rates and 
higher wages in more productive industries, and perhaps higher informality rates in less 
productive ones.
1.3. Trade Policy Background
The beginning of the Mexican trade liberalization process can be traced back to 1986, 
when the country became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and stopped its import-substitution industrialization strategy. According to 
Kate, A. t., C. Macario and G. Niels (2000), and Revenga, A. (1995), the main 
consequences of these changes in trade policy were: (a) a reduction in the coverage of 
import license requirements from 100% of the domestic production in 1982 to 25.4% by 
December 1987, and to 16.5% in 1993; (b) a reduction in the maximum import tariff 
from 100% in 1985 to 20% in 1988; (c) a reduction of the average import tariff in the 
manufacturing sector from 23.5% in 1985 to 11% in 1988; and (d) a reduction in the 
coverage of reference prices in the manufacturing sector from 18.7% in 1985 to 0% in 
1988.
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In 1993 the country expanded its trade liberalization process by signing the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada, which 
took effect on the 1st of January 1994, and that aims at the total elimination of import 
tariffs by 2008. The agreement sets up a trade liberalization calendar that classifies 
products and by-products in 5 different groups, according to the date and way in which 
the corresponding import tariffs were going to be eliminated4:
-  Group A: products and/or by-products for which tariffs were completely eliminated 
on the 1st of January 1994.
-  Group B: products and/or by-products for which tariffs were gradually eliminated in 
5 equal annual stages, starting on the 1st of January, 1994, and finishing by the 1st of 
January, 1998.
-  Group C: products and/or by-products for which tariffs were gradually eliminated in 
10 equal annual stages, starting on the 1st of January, 1994, and finishing by the 1st 
of January, 2003.
-  Group C+: products and/or by-products for which tariffs were gradually eliminated 
in 15 equal annual stages, starting on the 1st of January, 1994, and finishing by the 
1st of January, 2008.
-  Group D: products and/or by-products for which there were no tariffs before and 
after NAFTA.
Apart from tariff elimination, NAFTA also contemplates the partial elimination of many 
barriers to trade in services and to cross-border investment.
After 1994, Mexico signed other trade agreements with several countries, such as 
Colombia and Venezuela (1995); Costa Rica (1995); Bolivia (1995); Nicaragua (1998); 
Chile (1999); the European Union (2000); Israel (2000); El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras (2001); Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland (2001); Uruguay 
(2004); and Japan (2005). Nevertheless, NAFTA remains the most important event for 
the Mexican trade policy in the last 20 years, as the United States is by far the largest 
trading partner of the country5.
4 The text of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the calendar for Mexico’s tariff elimination 
process can be found at the Mexican Secretariat o f Economy’s website: http://www.economia- 
snci.gob.mx/sic_php/ls23al.php?s=502&p= 1 &1= 1
5 According to data published by the Mexican National Institute o f Statistics, Geography and Computing 
(INEGI), FOB imports from the U.S. represented on average 69% of total Mexican FOB imports between 
1990 and 2005. See http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe/Consultar.
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1.4. Trade and Labour Data
The present study focuses on trade liberalization under NAFTA, and specifically on the 
import tariff elimination part of the agreement. It uses data on both Mexican and U.S. 
tariffs. The Mexican data covers the 1988-2002 period and was collected directly from 
the Law of General Import and Export Tariffs (TIGIE), published by the Mexican 
government in the Official Journal of the Federation (Diario Oficial de la Federation). 
During this period the TIGIE was totally modified in February 1988, December 1995 
and January 2002. It was also subject to several partial modifications between these 
years: 84 between 1988 and 1995, and 46 between 1995 and 2002. Among these 
changes are those regarding NAFTA and its liberalization calendar, starting on January 
1994. The data includes ad-valorem tariffs only. Regarding the U.S. tariffs, the data 
comes from the NBER U.S. Tariff Database, constructed by Robert C. Feenstra, John 
Romalis and Peter K. Schott6, and which is based on the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of 
the United States (HTS). It includes ad-valorem, specific and estimated ad-valorem 
equivalent (AVE) tariffs based on the MFN rate of the HTS. The file also indicates 
products that are eligible for tariff preferences under free trade agreements such as with 
Canada and Mexico, and indicates products eligible for any preferential programs such 
as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). This database covers the period 1989- 
2 0 0 1 , and was complemented with the year 2 0 0 2  for the present study, using the 
original documents of the U.S. tariff schedule published by the United States 
International Trade Commission7. Both the Mexican and the U.S. tariff schedules are 
based on the International Harmonized System, the global system of nomenclature that 
is used to describe most world trade in goods. The annual production-weighted average 
tariffs and their standard deviations are reported in table 1.1. The trade data is linked to 
individual level data from the Mexican National Survey of Urban Employment 
(ENEU), carried out by the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Computing 
(INEGI) since 1983. It provides information about the state of the Mexican labour 
market, the main socio-demographic characteristics of the household members aged 1 2  
and above, and housing in the principal urban areas of the country. Among other things, 
the ENEU provides information about employment status, duration of unemployment,
6 See: F e e n s t r a , R. C., J. R o m a l is , and P. K. S c h o t t  (2002): "U.S. Imports, Exports and Tariff Data, 
1989-2001," NBER Working Paper Series. The database is freely available at 
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/iohn.romalis/research/
7 These documents can be found in PDF format at http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/archive/index.htm.
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Table 1.1: Production-Weighted Average Import Tariffs 1989-2002
Mexican Tariff on U.S. 
Imports (% ad valorem)1 
Mean S.D.
U.S. Tariff on Mexican 
Imports (% ad valorem)2 
Mean S.D.
1989 14.03 0.24 2.87 0.27
1990 13.81 0.27 2.92 0.26
1991 13.96 0.26 2.47 0.26
1992 13.88 0.25 2.53 0.27
1993 13.99 0.26 2.41 0.26
1994 7.43 0.30 1.07 0.15
1995 6.40 0.25 1.63 0.19
1996 5.30 0.22 1.01 0.12
1997 4.24 0.20 0.77 0.09
1998 3.13 0.18 0.58 0.07
1999 2.42 0.14 0.41 0.06
2000 1.93 0.12 0.40 0.06
2001 1.42 0.10 0.40 0.07
2002 0.95 0.09 0.11 0.03
C alculations by  the author. W eights equal to  the  share o f  M exican  sector 
production  on  national GD P. 1 Source: D iario  O fic ia l d e  la  Federacion  (M e x ico ) .2 
Source: N B E R  U .S. T a riff  D atabase.
job characteristics (position, size of workplace, social security coverage, industry 
affiliation, etc), hours worked, quality of job, and job search. The social security 
coverage data is used to generate an indicator for the unregistered workers which, even 
though is a reduced-form measure of informality, it is one of the few measures that can 
be constructed from employee data from a household survey. A person is classified as 
working in the unregistered sector if he or she runs a firm of 6  or less employees and 
does not have any kind of social or health insurance (unregistered self-employed), if he 
or she works for a firm of any size and does not have any kind of social or health 
insurance {unregistered salaried), and if he or she works without receiving any kind of 
payment {unpaid workers). This definition is similar to the one suggested by Maloney, 
W. F. (1999). The main socio-demographic characteristics covered by the survey are 
age, gender, kinship, marital status, schooling, place of birth, number of children, and 
migratory status. Regarding housing, the ENEU obtains information about type of 
dwelling, ownership, size, services, and construction materials.
The survey is carried out on a quarterly basis. The sample is divided in five independent 
panels (waves), and each one of them stays in the sample for five consecutive quarters. 
From 1983 to 1984 it covered only the three main cities in Mexico (Mexico City, 
Guadalajara and Monterrey). From 1985 to 1991 its coverage was expanded to 16 cities, 
including also the main cities at the US-Mexico border (Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros,
29
Table 1.2: Labour Data. Sample Characteristics by Year
Year Observations TradableIndustries
Non-tradable
Industries Cities Covered
U nregistered/T otal 
Employment1
1989 60,334 238 96 16 47%
1990 62,441 237 94 16 46%
1991 63,082 237 92 16 46%
1992 114,637 243 94 32 47%
1993 123,460 245 96 35 49%
1994 126,976 244 95 37 50%
1995 130,054 246 95 39 52%
1996 138,384 242 99 41 53%
1997 147,271 247 101 43 52%
1998 153,622 245 95 44 50%
1999 173,095 250 96 45 50%
2000 183,999 248 95 45 49%
2001 190,405 246 99 48 49%
2002 184,229 238 93 48 50%
Maximum 190,405 250 101 48 53%
Minimum 60,334 237 92 16 45%
Average 127,520 243 96 35 49%
Source: M exican National Survey o f  Urban Em ploym ent (ENEU), INEGI. C alculations based on  sam ples restricted to  employed 
people. 1 Estimated as the fraction o f  em ployed people that are (a) patrons in a firm  w ith  less than 6 em ployees and that do not have 
social o r health insurance, (b) em ployees in a firm  o f  any size and that do not have social o r health insurance, and (c) em ployees that 
do not receive payment.
Nuevo Laredo and Tijuana). In 1992 other 18 cities were included in the survey, and in 
the subsequent years another 14 cities were added. By the fourth quarter of 2000 there 
were 48 cities covered by the ENEU (and approximately 51.2% of the total population 
of the country was living in these cities by that time). This study uses mainly the April- 
June interviews for each year between 1989 and 2002. Only employed people are 
included in the sample. Matching the ENEU industry codes with the tariff codes yields 
an average of 243 tradable industries and 96 non-tradable industries per year. Table 1.2 
reports some of the main characteristics of the sample for each one of the years covered 
here, and table 1.3 summarizes worker characteristics in the registered and the 
unregistered sectors for the 1994 April-June interview. From the latter it can be seen 
that hourly wages, years of schooling and the fraction of married workers tend to be 
higher in the registered sector. The likelihood of being unregistered also appears to be 
lower for the heads of the household. Regarding the geographic characteristics, the table 
suggests that unregistration rates are higher in places closer to Mexico City than to the 
Mexico-U.S. border8, and lower in places with high exposure to globalization, as
8 The fraction of people living closer to Mexico City than to the U.S.-Mexico border is estimated with a 
variable that takes the value 0 if the road distance (in kilometres) from a particular city to the closest 
major U.S.-Mexico border crossing is shorter than the road distance between that city and Mexico City. It
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Table 1.3: Registered and Unregistered Workers 1994
Registered Unregistered
Personal Characteristics
Hourly wages 8.718 6.172
Male 0.639 0.650
Age 33.229 34.888
Experience 17.366 21.329
Schooling 9.865 7.563
Married 0.556 0.498
Cohabitating 0.044 0.064
Head of household 0.487 0.453
No. of children 1.325 2.427
Geographic Characteristics
Living closer to Mexico City 0.647 0.727
High exposure to globalization 0.296 0.245
Low exporsure to globalization 0.239 0.293
Job Characteristics
Self-employed 0.030 0.430
Work in less than 6 person establishment 0.115 0.801
Work at home 0.235 0.314
Receive annual bonus 0.867 0.053
Paid vacations 0.811 0.035
Receive credit for housing 0.269 0.006
Health insurance 0.961 0.000
Weekly hours worked 42.261 39.033
Has a second job 0.038 0.026
Source: author's calculations based on the Mexican National Survey o f  Urban Labour 
(ENEU) INEGI.
measured by Hanson, G. H. (2004)9. At first glance this might appear to be redundant, 
as one may think that cities closer to the Mexico-U.S. border are those located in states 
with high exposure to globalization. However, figure 1.1 shows that the mapping 
between these two characteristics is not perfect. Finally, regarding the job 
characteristics, the table indicates that the rate of self-employment is much higher in the 
unregistered than in the registered sector. The fraction of people working in 
establishments of less than 6  persons is also higher, as well as the fraction of people 
working at home. By the definition of unregistration used here, no one in the 
unregistered sector receives any kind of social or health insurance.
takes the value 1 otherwise. The distance data comes from the Secretariat o f Transport and 
Communications. The four major border crossings are Tijuana-San Diego, Nogales, Ciudad Juarez-El 
Paso, and Nuevo Laredo-Laredo.
9 He measures regional exposure to globalization through the share o f maquiladora value added, foreign 
direct investment, and imports in state GDP, each one averaged over the period 1993-1999. Hanson sorts 
states according to their average rank across the three measures and selects as high-exposure states those 
whose average rank is in the top third, while low-exposure states are those whose average rank is in the 
bottom third. The high-exposure states are Baja California, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, Jalisco, 
Tamaulipas and Aguascalientes. The low-exposure states are Zacatecas, Quintana Roo, Nayarit, Colima, 
Guerrero, Veracruz, Chiapas, Campeche, Hidalgo and Oaxaca.
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Figure 1.1. Exposure to Globalization and Proximity to the 
U.S. - Mexico Border
0  States with high exposure to globalization1 
E3 States w ith low exposure to g lobalization1 
©  C ities closer to the U.S. - M exico border than to M exico C ity 2
0  M exico City
1 Exposure to globalization as measured by Hanson, G.H. (2004 )
2 Proximity is measured by road distance (kilometers)
1.5. Trade Liberalization and Unregistered Labour: Preliminary Analysis
The analysis of the relationship between trade liberalization and unregistration in this 
chapter begins by looking at the behaviour of the average import tariffs and 
unregistration rate across time. As shown in table 1.2, the city coverage of the ENEU 
survey doubled in 1992. The 16 original cities passed from representing 100% of the 
observations before 1992 to approximately 40% afterwards10. This is a drastic 
modification that could affect the estimation of the yearly average rate of unregistration. 
In order to control for this possible bias, the rate of unregistration is obtained from a 
regression of the indicator for unregistration defined above on a set of city and time 
dummies, using all the years available in the sample. The estimated year coefficients are 
then the estimates of the annual average unregistration rate after controlling for the 
cities included in the survey. These coefficients are finally rescaled so that their mean is 
equal to the mean of the unregistration rate obtained when using the raw data. The 
unregistration rate and import tariffs series are plotted in Figure 1.2. The average
10 The 16 original cities are Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla, Leon, San Luis Potosi, 
Tampico, Torreon, Chihuahua, Orizaba, Veracruz, Merida, Ciudad Juarez, Tijuana, Nuevo Laredo, and 
Matamoros. These cities represent approximately 35% o f  the total population o f the country.
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Figure 1.2: Average Im port T ariffs and U nregistration
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Mexican import tariff on U.S. products remained basically constant at around 14% ad 
valorem between 1989 and 1993. It then dropped to 7% in the first year of NAFTA 
(1994), and continued to decrease gradually to approximately 1% in 2002. The U.S. 
import tariff on Mexican products also remained relatively constant between 1989 and 
1993, at around 3%. This low level of pre-NAFTA tariffs reflects the fact that, 
according to the United States International Trade Commission, Mexico was already 
being benefited with the Generalized System of Preferences by qualifying as a 
Beneficiary Developing Country11. This average tariff then decreased to 1% during the 
first year of NAFTA, increased temporarily to 2% in 1995 as a response to the Mexican 
peso crisis, and continued to decrease gradually to approximately 0.1% in 2002. 
Regarding the share of unregistration, the figure shows a positive trend starting in 1992 
and reaching its peak just after the crisis in 1996, making the average rate to increase 
from 48% to 53% of total employment. It then decreased gradually to 49% in 2002. 
From figure 1.2 is difficult to see a clear relationship between trade liberalization and 
unregistration. On one hand, comparing the level of the latter in the first and the last 
years of the period suggests that this rate moved to a higher permanent level, and this 
would imply a negative relationship between tariff reduction and the rate of 
unregistration . But according to the 1992-1996 positive trend, the transition to this 
new permanent level of unregistration began 3 years before the implementation of 
NAFTA, indicating that the change may be due to factors other than the reduction in the
11 For more detail, see the general notes on the Official Harmonized Tariff Schedule o f  the United States 
Annotated, from the HTSA Basic Publication in any year between 1989 and 1994. These documents can 
be found in the website mentioned in footnote 7.
12 The correlation coefficients for the series depicted in figure 1.2 are -0.546 between the Mexican import 
tariff and the rate o f unregistration, and -0.484 between the latter and the U.S. import tariff.
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import tariffs. On the other hand, there is a negative trend in unregistration between 
1996 and 2001, which coincides with the gradual reduction in both the Mexican and 
U.S. import tariffs, and this would suggest a positive relationship between the level of 
the tariffs and unregistration. But it is very likely that most of this negative trend is 
simply reflecting the recovery of the Mexican economy from the 1995 financial crisis.
To analyze these series at a more disaggregated level, figure 1.3 decomposes figure 1.2 
by economic sectors. Once again, an unambiguous relationship between the average 
tariffs and the rate of unregistration does not seem to be present. Perhaps the strongest 
evidence of a positive relationship comes from the Primary metals and the Farms, 
forestry & fishing sectors. The change to a new steady state level of unregistration is 
clearer for the Mining and the Food, beverages & tobacco sectors. As in figure 1.2, the 
transition appears to begin before the implementation of NAFTA and to peak during the 
financial crisis. For the rest of the sectors, the behaviour of the rate of unregistration is 
either erratic or does not seem to be affected by the import tariff elimination process. 
The last panel in figure 1.3 summarizes the trends of unregistration in the non tradable 
sectors. Unregistration increases with the Mexican crisis in 1995 and it does not 
decrease to its pre-1995 levels afterwards, indicating perhaps that any beneficial effect 
steaming from trade liberalization has not permeated significantly to these sectors.
Table 1.4 summarizes the changes of the import tariffs and the unregistration rate for 
the tradable sectors over the 1989-2002 period. It shows the percentage point changes 
from the 1989-91 to the 2000-02 averages. Six of the sectors experienced a reduction in 
their unregistration rates. The largest increase in the unregistration rate is of 5.6 
percentage points in the Mining and Food, beverages & tobacco sectors, while the 
largest decrease is of 5.2 percentage points in the Farms, forestry & fishing sector. It 
can also be seen that the Textiles, apparel & leather and the Mining sector are the ones 
with the largest and smallest tariff cuts respectively, both under the Mexican and the
1 3U.S. schedules . The reduction in the Mexican import tariff is on average 9.6 
percentage points larger than the change in the U.S. import tariff.
At an even higher level of disaggregation, tables 1.5 and 1.6 list the 50 most and the 50 
less liberalized industries respectively, in terms of reduction in import tariff percentage 
points. For each of these industries, the tables show the 4-digit code used by INEGI in 
the ENEU, a brief description of the industry, the economic sector to which they belong, 
and the percentage point change between the 1989-91 and the 2000-02 average
13 The Mining sector was nonetheless the one with the lowest levels o f pre-NAFTA tariffs. See figure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: A verage Im port Tariffs and Unregistration Rates by Sector
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Figure 1.3 (continued)
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Table 1.4: Change in Import Tariffs and Unregistration by Sector 
(Percentage Points)
1989-91 to 2000-02*
Sector Unregistration Mex US
Farms, forestry & fishing -5.2 -12.6 -1.3
Mining 5.6 -8.1 -0.2
Food, beverage & tobacco 5.6 -12.6 -3.3
Textiles, apparel & leather 0.1 -15.5 -9.2
Wood products -0.7 -9.3 -3.4
Paper & printing 2.0 -10.6 -0.7
Chemical products -1.4 -11.4 -1.5
Nonmetallic mineral products 1.8 -12.7 -1.5
Primary metals -3.3 -11.5 -1.4
Machinery & equipment -1.6 -12.0 -0.8
Other manufacturing -1.6 -13.7 -0.6
Maximum 5.6 -8.1 -0.2
Minimum -5.2 -15.5 -9.2
Average 0.1 -11.8 -2.2
Source: author's calculations based on the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour (ENEU) 
INEG1, Diario Oficial de la Federacion (Mexico), and the NBER U.S. Tariff Database. a 
Changes calculated as the difference between the 2000-02 and the 1989-91 averages.
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unregistration rate and import tariffs. The industries included in table 1.5 (table 1.6 ) are 
those that, when sorting all the industries in the sample according to the change of the 
Mexican and the U.S. import tariffs separately, appear in the top 100 (bottom 100) in 
both cases. The main things to notice from the ranking in table 1.5 are the following: 
first, it is dominated by the textiles, apparel & leather economic sector, with 25 
industries in the list; second, 25 industries experienced a decrease in their rates of 
unregistration during this period; third, the largest reductions in import tariffs are of 
approximately 20 percentage points; and fourth, the change in the' Mexican import tariff 
is on average 9.2 percentage points larger than the change in the U.S. import tariff. The 
missing data in the “Unregistration” column corresponds to industries that did not 
appear in the sample for some of the years considered here. The tariff and 
unregistration changes are plotted against each other in figures 1.4 and 1.5. The simple 
regression lines fitted in these figures suggest a slightly positive relationship between 
the reductions in imports tariff and the changes in unregistration.
Regarding table 1.6, it can be seen that the Machinery & equipment and the Mining 
sectors dominate the “least liberalized” ranking, with 1 2  and 1 0  industries respectively. 
28 industries had their unregistration rates reduced, and the largest reductions in import 
tariffs are of approximately 11 percentage points. Notice that for many of these 
industries, the change in the U.S. import tariff is equal to zero because they were 
already fully liberalized in 1989-91, due to the Generalized System of Preferences. The 
decrease in the Mexican import tariff is on average 8 . 6  percentage points larger than the 
change in the U.S. import tariff. Figures 1.6 and 1.7 plot these import tariffs changes 
against the unregistration changes. The fitted regression lines indicate that, unlike the 
most liberalized industries, changes in the import tariffs are now negatively correlated 
with changes in unregistration.
Finally, table 1.7 offers a look at the evolution of unregistration in the non-tradable 
sectors14. It shows the percentage point changes from the 1989-91 to the 2000-02 
average rates. The Hotels, restaurants & trade sector is the only one that experienced a 
reduction in unregistration, of about 0.5 percentage points. The largest increase is of 8  
percentage points for the Financial services & real estate sector. The average change in 
unregistration in the non-tradable sectors (bottom row in the table) is an increase of 
approximately 3 percentage points.
14 Petroleum & coal extraction is classified as non-tradable because o f two reasons: first, it mainly refers 
to petroleum extraction activities and not to the marketing of its outputs (such as oil or gas) which are 
mostly included in the Chemical products sectors; and second, petroleum extraction in Mexico is an 
exclusive activity o f the state-own company, PEMEX.
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Table 1.5: 50 Most Liberalized Industries
IN E G I Code Description Sector U nregistration Change M ex C hange US
105 Fruits Food, beverages & tobacco -0.10 -18.66 -4.08
205 HoTses, mules and donkeys Farms, forestry & fishing 0.25 -15.50 -2.08
206 Poultry Farms, forestry & fishing -0.08 -15.28 -5.03
208 Lambs Farms, forestry & fishing -14.60 -1.96
1112 Cream, butter, cheese Food, beverages & tobacco -0.08 -13.86 -6.72
1201 Dehydrated fruits and vegetables Food, beverages & tobacco -0.09 -18.11 -4.21
1202 Prepared and packed fruits and vegetables Food, beverages & tobacco -0.05 -15.65 -5.62
1602 Piloncillo, Panela or Mascabado Food, beverages & tobacco 0.00 -14.72 -2.15
1611 Ethyl alcohol Food, beverages & tobacco -18.15 -3.07
1901 Regional candies and jelly Food, beverages & tobacco 0.08 -18.66 -7.64
1903 Candies and chocolates Food, beverages & tobacco -0.06 -18.66 -7.64
1942 Ice cream Food, beverages & tobacco 0.04 -13.52 -14.67
2001 Agave liquors Food, beverages & tobacco -0.41 -20.00 -4.51
2011 Non-fermented alcoholic beverages Food, beverages & tobacco 0.10 -18.15 -3.07
2012 Wines Food, beverages & tobacco 0.16 -19.38 -4.53
2201 Softdrinks and purified water Food, beverages & tobacco 0.03 -17.00 -3.32
2421 Threads Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -14.69 -9.00
2432 Cashmeres, cloths and similar products Textiles, apparel & leather 0.04 -14.00 -20.40
2601 Impregnated textiles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.29 -18.07 -4.55
2611 Padding and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather -0.07 -17.57 -5.41
2612 Carpets and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -15.60 -3.93
2613 Felts Textiles, apparel & leather 0.50 -20.00 -10.94
2614 Quilted textiles Textiles, apparel & leather -0.21 -16.25 -13.22
2621 Lace and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.07 -18.15 -10.27
2631 Cotton and bandages Textiles, apparel & leather -0.02 -15.00 -13.48
2641 Tapestry Textiles, apparel & leather -0.10 -18.36 -5.00
2642 Buttons, sequins, and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.09 -18.86 -15.54
2643 Sheets and tablecloths Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -18.99 -7.36
2644 Other textiles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.15 -18.39 -7.82
2701 Socks and tights Textiles, apparel & leather -0.05 -20.00 -16.43
2702 Sweaters and vests Textiles, apparel & leather -0.03 -19.70 -10.27
2703 Knitted articles Textiles, apparel & leather -0.17 -19.25 -15.12
2711 Male cloths, except shirts and uniforms Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -18.13 -11.17
2717 Underwear Textiles, apparel & leather -17.50 -9.29
2721 Hats and caps Textiles, apparel & leather 0.07 -18.33 -9.96
2722 Palm-made hats Textiles, apparel & leather -0.11 -18.00 -11.94
2723 Gloves, handkerchiefs, ties and scarfs Textiles, apparel & leather -0.31 -17.68 -14.00
2801 Tanned leather Textiles, apparel & leather -0.06 -17.55 -14.40
2811 Leather products, exc shoes and clothes Textiles, apparel & leather 0.02 -13.69 -2.86
2812 Non-plastic shoes Textiles, apparel & leather 0.01 -17.50 -15.50
2821 Sandals and similar articles Textiles, apparel & leather 0.19 -18.75 -7.69
2901 Sawmill production Wood products 0.07 -15.02 -2.79
3001 Wooden furniture Wood products -0.01 -15.42 -5.77
3002 Box Spring mattresses Wood products 0.07 -15.00 -12.35
4201 Plastic tubes and contours Chemical products -0.02 -13.46 -3.33
4511 Bricks and tiles Nonmetallic mineral products 0.07 -15.52 -5.20
4512 Refractory products Nonmetallic mineral products 0.14 -14.16 -1.63
5601 Automobiles, trucks and tractors Machinery & equipment -0.01 -13.88 -1.97
5701 Metallic bodyworks and parts Machinery & equipment 0.00 -14.02 -1.98
5902 Watches and clocks Other manufacturing -0.12 -17.37 -2.87
Maximum 0.50 -13.46 -1.63
Minimum. -0.41 -20.00 -20.40
Average 0.00 -16.88 -7.68
The change is calculated as the difference between the 2000-2002 and the 1989-1991 averages. The missing observations in the "Unregistration" column are due to the 
fact that such industries did not appear in the ENEU labour survey for some of the years considered here.
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Figure 1.4. Changes in U nregistration and the Mexican Im port T ariff  1989-91 to 2000-02
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Table 1.6: 50 Less Liberalized Industries
1NEGI Code Description Sector U nregistration Change Mex C hange US
201 Cattle Farms, forestry & fishing 0.02 -1.85 0.00
203 Sheep Farms, forestry & fishing 0.36 -10.77 -0.10
204 Goats Farms, forestry & fishing -0.10 -5.53 -0.20
207 M ilk producer cattle and goats Farms, forestry & fishing -0.19 -7.80 -0.07
413 Other products from the sea Farms, forestry & fishing -8.00 0.00
501 Coal & graphite Mining -0.06 -6.29 0.00
511 Coke & anthracite Mining -7.91 0.00
701 Iron extraction Mining -0.02 -3.75 0.00
901 Limestone extraction Mining 0.55 -10.00 0.00
911 Gypsum extraction Mining 0.00 -6.67 0.00
921 Chippings & sand extraction Mining -0.03 -8.19 0.00
931 Extraction o f clay, marble, quartz, etc. Mining 0.02 -9.10 -0.05
941 Silica extraction Mining 0.00 -10.00 0.00
1001 Fluorite extraction Mining -0.13 -10.00 0.00
1021 Salt & salt mines Mining -0.16 -10.00 0.00
1411 Com milling Food, beverages & tobacco -0.01 -6.40 0.00
1801 Food for animals Food, beverages & tobacco 0.03 -7.63 0.00
3023 Wood coffins Wood products -0.13 -9.22 0.00
3025 Other wooden products, exc. furniture Wood products -0.02 -4.58 0.00
3121 Paper made containers Paper & printing 0.15 -7.43 0.00
3122 Cardboard made containers Paper & printing -0.05 -5.51 -0.02
3123 Other paper and cardboard products Paper & printing -0.06 -9.12 0.00
3201 Newspapers & magazines Paper & printing -0.03 -4.53 -0.02
3211 Printing, lithography & bookbinding Paper & printing 0.01 -7.52 0.00
3301 Petroleum refining Chemical products -0.04 -9.90 0.00
3311 Lubricants & additives Chemical products 0.06 -10.99 0.00
3501 Colourings & pigments Chemical products 0.00 -7.73 -0.06
3521 Primary chemical products Chemical products -0.02 -9.99 0.00
3711 Cellulose & synthetic fibres Chemical products 0.03 -9.78 -0.35
3801 Medicines Chemical products 0.01 -9.04 -0.27
3901 Soaps, detergents and similar products Chemical products 0.00 -10.97 0.00
4044 Other chemical products Chemical products 0.15 -11.29 0.00
4401 Hydraulic cement Nonmetallic mineral products -0.03 -10.04 0.00
4521 Gypsum products Nonmetallic mineral products -0.04 -9.39 0.00
4522 Lime Nonmetallic mineral products 0.00 -10.00 0.00
4701 Copper metallurgy and byproducts Primary metals 0.00 -10.16 0.00
4711 Aluminum metallurgy Primary metals -0.09 -8.54 -0.21
4801 M etallic furniture Machinery & equipment -0.06 -9.81 -0.39
4911 Metallic structures, containers & platforms Machinery & equipment -0.01 -10.12 -0.20
5011 Tools for agriculture Machinery & equipment 0.02 -10.83 -0.45
5041 Smelting o f  nonferrous metallic parts Machinery & equipment -0.04 -11.03 -0.42
5081 Kitchen pans Machinery & equipment 0.11 -7.34 -0.45
5083 Other metallic products Machinery & equipment 0.02 -9.74 -0.28
5112 M&E for the food industry Machinery & equipment 0.12 -10.89 0.00
5151 Nonelectric extinguishers & pumps Machinery & equipment 0.05 -10.07 -0.43
5171 Sewing machines Machinery & equipment -0.07 -10.87 0.00
5211 Electric industrial M&E Machinery & equipment -0.01 -11.06 -0.20
5301 Electric apparatuses and parts Machinery & equipment -0.04 -8.58 -0.11
5801 Ships Machinery & equipment -0.04 -10.18 0.00
5922 Candles Other manufacturing 0.21 -10.06 -0.17
Maximum 0.55 -1.85 0.00
Minimum -0.19 -11.29 -0.45
Average 0.01 -8.72 -0.09
The change is calculated as the difference between the 2000-2002 and the 1989-1991 averages. The missing observations in the "Unregistration" column are due to the 
fact that such industries did not appear in the ENEU labour survey for some of the years considered here.
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Figure 1.6. Changes in U nregistration and the M exican Im port T ariff 1989-91 to 2000-02
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Table 1.7: Changes in Rates of Unregistration for the Non-tradable 
Sectors (Percentage Points)
Sector 1989-91 to 2000-02*
Petroleoum & coal extraction 5.4
Construction 2.1
Electricity, gas & water 1.8
Hotels, restaurants & trade -0.5
Transport & storage 2.3
Financial services & real estate 8.0
Personal, professional and social services 1.7
M aximum 8.0
Minimum -0.5
Average 3.0
Source: author's calculations based on the Mexican National Survey o f  Urban Labour (ENEU) 
INEGI, Diario Oficial de la Federacion (Mexico), and the NBER U.S. T ariff Database. * 
Changes calculated as the difference between the 2000-02 and the 1989-91 averages.
In sum, the main conclusions from this preliminary analysis are the following:
-  When looking at the average unregistration rate and import tariffs (figure 1.2), it is 
not clear that trade liberalization affects in some way the level of unregistration. At 
this stage, it is impossible to distinguish the effect of tariff elimination from an 
apparent change in the permanent level of unregistration and the effect of the 
Mexican financial crisis of 1995.
-  The analysis of the data for the tradable sectors separately (figure 1.3) suggests that 
trade liberalization may have helped in reducing the rate of unregistration in some 
sectors more than in others, such as the Primary metals and Farm, forestry & fishing 
sectors.
-  The statistics in table 1.4 show that the Mining sector is the one with the largest 
increase in unregistration and the smallest reduction in tariffs. However, there is not 
enough evidence of a linear and positive relationship between the level of the tariffs 
and unregistration across sectors since, for example, the sector with the largest tariff 
cuts (Textiles, apparel & leather) is not the one with the largest decrease in 
unregistration. Regarding the non-tradable sectors, table 1.7 shows that the average 
unregistration rate increased by about 3 percentage points during the period of 
study.
-  Finally, the industry level data in tables 1.5 and 1.6 indicate that 50% of the most 
liberalized and 56% of the less liberalized industries experienced a decrease in their
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rates of unregistration between 1989 and 2002. The summary statistics at the bottom 
of these tables show that the average unregistration rate for the less liberalized 
industries increased by 0 . 0 1  percentage points more than that for the most 
liberalized ones. This could be suggesting that the larger the tariff cut, the more 
helpful trade liberalization becomes in reducing these rates.
1.6. Trade Liberalization and Unregistered Labour: Econometric Analysis
Even though useful, the evidence presented in the previous section is inconclusive and a 
deeper analysis of the effect of trade liberalization on unregistration is required. This 
section aims at studying this relationship in a more formal way. The main strategy 
implemented here is a two-stage estimation process based on the one used by Goldberg, 
P. K. and N. Pavcnik (2003). The first step involves the estimation of a linear 
probability model of the form:
y v = H t,Pn + I ij,  *’Pj, + £ IJ, (J-7)
where y ijt is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if worker i in industry j  at time t is
employed in the unregistered sector, and it is equal to 0  if he is employed in the 
registered sector; Hijt is a vector of worker characteristics such as years of schooling, a
quadratic term on years of experience, marital status, gender, position within the 
household (whether he is the head of the family or not), and geographic location; I ijt is
a set of industry dummies that indicate worker z’s industry affiliation; and s ijt is the
error term. The coefficients ipjt capture the part of the variation in unregistered
employment that cannot be explained by worker characteristics, but that is attributable 
to worker z’s industry affiliation. These coefficients should reflect the influence of any 
change in the market conditions at the industry level such as import tariff elimination, 
given that these tariffs are the same for all the firms in a particular industry. For this 
reason, they are the adequate measure of unregistration to link with the trade data. 
Following Goldberg & Pavcnik, these coefficients are denoted industry unregistration 
differentials. Equation (1.7) is estimated separately for each year in the sample.
In the second stage, these industry unregistration differentials are pooled over time and 
regressed on the Mexican import tariff, the U.S. import tariff, a set of industry and time
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indicators, and a set of interactions between the industry dummies and a time trend. A 
weighted least squares estimation is used, with weights equal to the inverse of the 
variance of the unregistration differentials from the first stage.
Because of the rotating panel structure of the ENEU survey described in section 1.4, a 
fifth of the sample in any year appears as well in the following one, and this might be a 
source of autocorrelation for the error term in the second stage model. To account for 
this, the standard errors are computed using the Newey-West method with one lag. 
Regarding the first stage, Huber/White/sandwich standard errors clustered at the 
industry level are estimated in all the regressions.
1.6.1. First Stage Results
Apart from providing the estimates of the industry unregistration differentials, the first 
stage estimation is also useful to study the determinants of unregistered labour at the 
individual level. The results are reported in table 1.8. As expected from the human 
capital theory, the probability of being unregistered decreases with years of experience 
and schooling. It is also lower for married workers, but not for those cohabitating with a 
partner without being married. Males seem to be more likely to be unregistered than 
females. This result does not seem to support what Roberts, B. R. (1989) finds for the 
labour market of Guadalajara, but it is consistent with Goldberg, P. K. & N. Pavcnik 
(2003) findings for Colombia. The table also shows that the likelihood of unregistration 
is significantly lower for the head of the household and higher for the second provider 
of income in the family (secondhead). This seems to be a reasonable result if one 
considers that, as found by Roberts, B. R. (1989) and argued by Maloney, W. F. (1999), 
the deductions made for welfare in registered employment are perceived as a 
disadvantage by many workers. Since social welfare in Mexico normally covers not 
only the worker but his family as well, there is no benefit for the second provider of 
income to work in the registered sector and pay the welfare deductions to get his own 
social insurance, as he is already covered by the one from the head of the household. 
Regarding the geographic characteristics, the probability of unregistration appears to be 
positively correlated with the natural logarithm of the population of the city were the 
worker lives, and also with the proximity to Mexico City (relative distance). However, 
the estimated coefficients are statistically significant only for a few years of the sample. 
Finally, the estimates indicate that the likelihood of unregistration is significantly lower
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Table 1.8: L inear P robability  M odel fo r U nregistration
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
experience -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 * -0.002 *** -0.003 •** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 • -0.002 -0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
experience2 0.00008 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00007 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00009 **♦ 0.00008 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00009 *** 0.00008 *** 0.00008 ***
[0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00002] [0.00002] [0.00001] [0.00001]
schooling -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.004 -0.006 ** -0.006 ** -0.005 -0.005 * -0.006 ** -0.005 ** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 **
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
married -0.018 -0.018 * -0.008 -0.014 -0.011 -0.020 *** -0.017 *** -0.022 *** -0.018 *** -0.020 *** -0.017 ** -0.017 ** -0.018 *** -0.010
[0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007]
cohabitating 0.015 ** 0.010 0.010 0.016 ** 0.007 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.005 '
[0.007] [0.010] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
male 0.045 *** 0.045 *** 0.040 *** 0.043 *** 0.032 *** 0.028 ** 0.027 ** 0.028 ** 0.023 * 0.024 * 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.011
[0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016]
firsthead -0.029 ** -0.017 * -0.028 *** -0.032 *** -0.031 *** -0.027 *** -0.039 *** -0.041 *** -0.040 *** -0.034 *** -0.028 *** -0.036 *** -0.023 *** -0.029 ***
[0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
secondhead 0.063 *** 0.063 *** 0.056 *** 0.061 *** 0.067 *** 0.062 *** 0.051 *** 0.056 **• 0.054 *** 0.061 *** 0.054 *** 0.049 *** 0.056 *** 0.049 ***
[0.017] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.016] [0.019] [0.016] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.011]
ln(population) 0.013 0.015 0.007 0.001 -0.014 * -0.014 -0.013 -0.001 0.673 0.002 0.0003 0.0002 0.007 *** 0.002
[0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.006] [1.603] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
relative distance 0.010 0.014 0.030 0.026 0.054 ** 0.054 * 0.076 *** 0.030 -2.981 0.057 ** 0.041 * 0.031 0.035 0.106 ***
[0.024] [0.020] [0.019] [0.024] [0.025] [0.032] [0.025] [0.025] [7.241] [0.028] [0.025] [0.022] [0.027] [0.024]
high exposure 0.010 0.0006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.076 ** -0.108 *** -0.076 *** -0.043 *♦ 2.141 -0.070 *** -0.099 *** -0.103 *** -0.143 *** -0.088 **♦
[0.023] [0.019] [0.020] [0.017] [0.031] [0.030] [0.022] [0.017] [5.209] [0.018] [0.024] [0.030] [0.030] [0.023]
low exposure 0.010 0.079 *** 0.013 -0.001 -0.069 *** -0.086 * -0.064 0.026 2.357 -0.023 -0.104 *** -0.091 *** -0.068 ** -0.082 ***
[0.023] [0.025] [0.029] [0.024] [0.024] [0.050] [0.041] [0.026] [5.605] [0.028] [0.033] [0.031] [0.026] [0.025]
No. Obs. 60,334 62,441 63,082 114,637 123,460 130,054 147,271 153,622 190,405 184,229
*•*, **, aud * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include city and industry dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown m brackets.
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Table 1.9: Average Year-to-Year Correlations of Estimated 
Unregistration Differentials by Sector
Sector Average 1989-20021
Farms, forestry & fishing 0.699
Mining 0.673
Food, beverage & tobacco 0.830
Textiles, apparel & leather 0.594
Wood products 0.909
Paper & printing 0.862
Chemical products 0.492
Nonmetallic mineral products 0.886
Primary metals 0.180
Machinery & equipment 0.767
Other manufacturing 0.651
Non-Tradable 0.920
Maximum 0.920
Minimum 0.180
Average 0.705
1 A verage correlation coefficients a t the  sector level o f  the  industry 
unregistration  differentials estim ated w ith the  linear probab ility  m odel in the 
first stage.
for workers living in a state with high exposure to globalization (for 9 years of the 
sample) and higher for those living in a state with low exposure to it (for 8  years of the 
sample).
Although not reported, the regressions in the first stage also included a set of city 
dummy variables. In most of the cases these indicators were individually and jointly 
statistically significant, suggesting that geographic location is an important determinant 
of the likelihood of unregistration. Also, as for Brazil and Colombia in Goldberg, P. K. 
& N. Pavcnik (2003), the estimated unregistration differentials (i.e. the coefficients of 
the industry dummies) are correlated through time, with the year-to-year correlation 
coefficients ranging from 0.74 to 0.95, and averaging 0.85. Table 1.9 breaks down these 
correlations by economic sector. The highest coefficients are those for the Non­
tradable, Wood products, Non-metallic mineral products and Paper & Printing sectors; 
and the lowest ones are those for the Primary Metals, Chemical products, and Textiles, 
apparel & leather sectors. A high (low) year-to-year correlation could be indicative of a 
low (high) sensitivity of the likelihood of unregistration to changes in the level of 
import tariffs.
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1.6.2. Second Stage Results
After controlling for individual characteristics and city fixed effects, the next step in this 
estimation procedure is to pool the unregistration differentials over time and to relate 
them to the import tariffs data. The estimated equation is of the following form:
where ip jt is the unregistration differential for industry j  at time t, Tjt is the matrix of 
Mexican and U.S. import tariffs, Yt is a matrix of year indicators, ZT is a matrix of
dummies and a time trend, and s jt is the error term. Identification of p T therefore
comes from within-industry fluctuations of T around a time trend. A Mexican and U.S. 
tariff of 0 % is artificially assigned to the non-tradable industries, so that these industries 
are not dropped from the sample. In this way, these observations do not contribute to the 
estimation of the coefficients in fiT but they are useful in getting more precise estimates 
of the year effects yY. The year indicators are included to remove the aggregate 
variation from all the other variables in the right-hand side of equation ( 1 .8 ), like the 
tariff variables. Likewise, industry indicators are included to control for unobserved 
industry characteristics that may be constant through time. The inclusion of the 
interactions between the industry dummies and the trend accounts for the possibility 
that different industries may follow different paths through time, for example due to 
factors such as the Mexican crisis (by which export oriented industries benefited more 
from a depreciation of the peso than other industries).
Apart from using the standard import tariffs, the effect of trade liberalization on 
unregistration can also be estimated by using an input-output matrix to calculate an 
import tariff that reflects the taxes payable on imported inputs more precisely. The 
input-output matrix shows the intersectoral transactions at current producer prices, 
which can be expressed as shares of the total output of each sector. These shares are 
then used to construct a weighted tariff that reflects the interdependence of sectors in the 
production process. For example, suppose that the inputs that the Mining sector obtains 
from the Machinery & equipment sector represent 25% of its total output, the inputs 
from the Chemical products represent another 25%, and the rest of the inputs are
(1.8)
industry indicators, (d . xtrf ) refers to the set of interactions between the industry
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obtained internally. If the average sector import tariffs were 15%, 20%, and 10% 
respectively, the weighted tariff for the Mining sector would be:
(0.25 x 0.15)+(0.25 x 0.20)+(0.50 x 0.10) = 0.1375 (1.9)
or 13.75%. Furthermore, the input-output matrix also contains the share of imported 
inputs for each sector. Assuming for example that 35% of all inputs used in the Mining 
sector are imported, its weighted tariff (from now on the IOM tariff) becomes 4.81% 
(that is 0.1375 times 0.35 times 100). Therefore, apart from summarizing the 
intersectoral dependence, the IOM tariff also reflects the relative importance of imports 
across sectors. Among the virtues of this tariff, it makes now possible to assign a real 
import tariff to the non-tradable sectors, because of their interactions with the tradable 
ones. Its disadvantage is that the input-output matrix data for Mexico is not publicly 
available at the industry level, so this tariff can only be calculated at the sector level. 
Nevertheless, this alternative approach is explored here, as it might be useful to shed 
more light in understanding the effect of trade liberalization on unregistration for the 
whole economy. There are four matrices available and unfortunately the most recent 
one is from 198015. The weights used to generate the IOM tariff are the average weights 
derived from these matrices (1970, 1975, 1978 and 1980). Although these do not 
capture the evolution of the intersectoral relationships between 1989 and 2002 (which 
might have been affected by the trade liberalization process) they should at least reflect 
their historical interactions.
Finally, as mentioned above, equation (1.8) is estimated using weighted least squares 
with weights equal to the inverse of the variance of the unregistration differentials from 
the first stage, and the standard errors are computed using the Newey-West method with 
one lag.
Table 1.10 reports the estimates of equation (1.8). Column (a) presents the estimates 
obtained for the current values of the import tariffs. When the unregistration 
differentials are regressed on each one of the tariffs separately (panels 1 to 3) it can be 
seen that both the Mexican and the IOM tariffs have positive and significant 
coefficients. Panel 1 indicates that a 1-percentage point decline in the current Mexican 
import tariff reduces the probability of unregistration in a given industry by 0.392
15 The matrices were originally generated by the Mexican central bank, and later on by INEGI. The 
publicly available versions contain aggregated data for 18 economic sectors. They can be found at 
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/default.asp?c=1629 .
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Table 1.10. Effect of Trade Liberalization on Unregistration
00 (b) (c)
1 Mex Tariff
0.392 *** 
[0.128]
0.504 *** 
[0.133]
0.283 *** 
[0.077]
No. Obs. 4737 4403 4403
2
US Tariff -0.144
[0.252]
-0.086
[0.193]
-0.124
[0.163]
No. Obs. 4697 4376 4360
3
IOM Tariff 0.080 ** 
[0.037]
0.058
[0.036]
0.044 ** 
[0.022]
No. Obs. 4737 4403 4403
Mex Tariff 0.338 ** 
[0.144]
0 491 *** 
[0.144]
0.275 *** 
[0.085]
4
US Tariff -0.139
[0.249]
-0.123
[0.190]
-0.148
[0.162]
IOM Tariff 0.042
[0.042]
0.007
[0.038]
0.011
[0.024]
No. Obs. 4697 4376 4360
***, **, and * indicate significance a t the  1%, 5% , and  10% level, respectively. A ll 
regressions include y ear dum m ies, industry dum m ies and  industry  trends. N ew ey- 
W est standard errors w ith 1 lag are show n in brackets.
(a) C urrent tariffs
(b) 1-year lagged tariffs
(c) Sum  o f  current and  1 -year lagged tariffs
percentage points. This effect falls to 0.338 when the three import tariffs are used 
together in the regression of panel 4, but remains statistically significant at a 5% level. 
The significance of the IOM coefficient is lost in this last specification.
Column (b) explores the possibility that adjustments in the likelihood of unregistration 
with respect to changes in the level of import tariffs may require some time to take 
place. Using the 1-year lagged values instead, the column reports larger effects for the 
Mexican tariff and smaller ones for the U.S. and the IOM tariffs. Only the first one is 
statistically significant. According to panel 4, a 1-percentage point decrease in the 
Mexican import tariff is related to a 0.491 percentage point reduction in the probability 
of unregistration.
The last column in the table uses the sum of the current and the 1-year lagged tariffs as 
regressors, so as to summarize the dynamic effects found in the other two. The 
estimates confirm the importance of the Mexican import tariff. Panel 4 indicates that a 
two-year cumulated reduction of 1-percentage point in this tariff generates a 0.275 
percentage point reduction in the probability of unregistration. A significant effect for
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the IOM tariff is also obtained when this is used separately as regressor, but it is not 
robust to the inclusion of the other tariffs in the equation.
All the estimated coefficients for the U.S. import tariff are not significantly different 
from zero, and this is likely to be the case if one recalls that the U.S. tariffs on Mexican 
imports were already low before NAFTA due to the GSP (see previous section), and 
that it is precisely the Mexican import tariff the one that is changing the most after 
1994. As for the IOM tariff, the estimates in table 1.10 are all of positive sign, and this 
would in principle support hypothesis (a) in section 1.2: lower Mexican import tariffs 
would allow Mexican firms to obtain cheaper inputs, machinery and equipment from 
the United States, which could lead to an increase in productivity and to a reduction of 
unregistration. However, the fact that the estimated coefficients for this tariff are not 
statistically significant for any of the regressions in panel 4 may also indicate that the 
effect of trade liberalization has not spread throughout the non-tradable sectors.
Another possibility worth exploring is that trade liberalization may have different 
effects on the rate of unregistration in industries with different degrees of exposure to 
trade. For example, an export oriented industry may benefit more from the elimination 
of the U.S. import tariff than other industries, or perhaps an industry with a relatively 
high share of imported inputs or means of production benefits more from the 
elimination of the Mexican import tariff. To see if this is the case, equation (1.8) is 
modified in order to include a set of interactions between the tariffs and the following 
measures of exposure to trade:
-  Exporter, an industry’s net sales in foreign markets as a share of the market value of 
its total output.
-  Importer, the share of an industry’s machinery and equipment of production that is 
imported directly.
-  Import Penetration, an industry’s imports of final products as a share of the market 
value of its total output.
The data used to generate the first two measures comes from the Annual Industrial 
Survey, carried out by INEGI, and which objective is to generate information about the 
trends of the main economic variables of the national manufacturing sector. INEGI 
follows a non-probabilistic sampling procedure to determine the group of 
manufacturing plants that will be surveyed. It excludes maquiladoras, basic 
petrochemical plants, refineries, and also micro-industry plants (i.e. plants with less than
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Table 1.11; Exposure to Trade By Sector
1994-2002 Average Values
Sector Exporter* Importerb Import Penetration0
Mining 0.001 0.001 0.021
Food, beverage & tobacco 0.053 0.037 0.451
Textiles, apparel & leather 0.120 0.056 0.603
Wood products 0.102 0.035 0.385
Paper & printing 0.040 0.103 1.160
Chemical products 0.128 0.060 0.504
Nonmetallic mineral products 0.128 0.036 0.622
Primary metals 0.246 0.112 0.364
Machinery & equipment 0.227 0.078 24.983
Other manufacturing 0.147 0.066 1.768
M axim um
M inim um
A verage
0.246
0.001
0.119
0.112
0.001
0.058
24.983
0.021
3.086
Source: au thor's calculations based  on the A nnual Industrial Survey (IN E G I). 1 N e t sales in foreign  
m arkets as a  share o f  the m arket value o f  to ta l output. b Share o f  m ach ineiy  and  equipm ent o f  
p roduction  tha t is im ported directly. c Im ports o f  final products as a  share o f  the m arket value o f  total 
output.
15 employees). Among other things, this source contains annual measures of total 
employment, remunerations, operating costs, output, sales, income, assets, and 
depreciation for industries in the manufacturing sectors. The sample available for this 
Study covers the period 1994 through 2002, and it is aggregated at the 6 -digit level, 
following the International Standard Industrial Classification. The data on final product 
imports used in constructing the third variable comes from the international trade 
statistics generated by the BANXICO-INEGI-SAT-Secretariat of Economy work group, 
and that is publicly available from INEGI16. The period covered is 1993 through 2002. 
The three variables were calculated for each industry in each available year. Table 1.11 
summarizes these measures at the sector level. The Primary metals sector is the one 
with the highest levels of relative exports and imports of machinery and equipment, 
while the Mining sector is the one with the lowest levels. Regarding import penetration, 
the Machinery & equipment, Other manufacturing and Paper & printing sectors seem 
to import more final products than the ones they produce domestically.
16 BANXICO is the Mexican Central Bank and SAT is the Tax System Administration. Data available in 
Banco de Information Economica, INEGI’s website: http://dgcnesvp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-
win/bdieintsi.exe/NIVJ 1001640016#ARBOL.
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Table 1.12. Unregistration and Exposure to Trade
Mex Tariff 
Mex Tariff * Importer 
Mex Tariff* Imp.Penetration 
US Tariff
US Tariff* Exporter 
IOM Tariff 
IOM Tariff * Importer 
IOM Tariff* Imp.Penetration
(a) (b) (c)
0.334 * 
[0.200]
0.613 *** 
[0.208]
0.328 *** 
[0.123]
0.095
[2.321]
-2.379
[2.217]
-0.905
[1.331]
-0.015 ** 
[0.007]
-0.009
[0.009]
-0.007
[0.005]
-0.527 * 
[0.291]
-0.308
[0.229]
-0.448 ** 
[0.203]
5.922 ** 
[2.364]
3.181
[1.976]
3.907 *** 
[1.493]
0.039
[0.060]
-0.026
[0.054]
-0.010
[0.034]
0.010
[0.486]
0.592
[0.415]
0.306
[0.262]
0.002 ** 
[0.0008]
0.001
[0.001]
0.0009 * 
[0.0005]
No. Obs. 4697 4376 4360
***, **, and * indicate significance a t the  1%, 
year dum m ies, industry dum m ies and  industry 
in brackets.
(a) C urren t tariffs
(b) 1-year lagged tariffs
(c) Sum  o f  current and  1-year lagged tariffs
, 5% , and 10%  level, 
trends. N ew ey-W est
respectively. A ll regressions include 
standard e rrors w ith 1 lag are  show n
The 1994-2002 industry averages of these variables were multiplied by the import 
tariffs to generate interactions for the whole 1989-2002 period. These new covariates 
are included in the estimation of an equation like the one in (1.8). The results are 
reported in table 1.12. The estimates for the current values of the tariffs in column (a) 
indicate that for a given reduction in the Mexican import tariff, the rate of unregistration 
decreases less in industries with higher levels of import penetration than in other 
industries. This may be so because those industries were already under strong foreign 
competition before NAFTA and had previously adjusted their levels of unregistered 
workers, or maybe because this foreign competition increased with NAFTA, forcing 
some firms in those industries to increase their unregistered labour force instead of 
reducing it. Also, the elimination of the U.S. import tariff helps in reducing the rate of 
unregistration in industries that are relatively more export oriented. Firms for which the 
main market is the U.S. benefit more from the elimination of the U.S. import tariffs on 
Mexican products than firms for which the main market is the domestic one. Regarding
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the IOM tariff, there is a modest positive effect of trade liberalization on unregistration 
for industries with a higher degree of import penetration.
The results for the 1-year lagged values in column (b) indicate that these effects are only 
contemporary, as none of the estimated coefficients for the interactions is significantly 
different from zero. Finally, the estimates for the two-year cumulated tariffs in column 
(c) confirm the importance of most of the effects identified in column (a).
The last part of the analysis in this section consists of looking at the impact of trade 
liberalization on the industry’s employment share, the composition of unregistration 
(i.e. its effect on self-employment, unregistered salaried, and unpaid workers, 
separately), and the size of the labour force of firms. The employment share of a 
particular industry is measured as its fraction of total employment in the economy. As 
described in section 1.4, self-employment is measured as those persons in an industry 
that run a firm of 6  or less employees and that do not have any kind of social or health 
insurance. Similarly, the unregistered salaried are the persons that work for a firm of 
any size and that do not have any kind of social or health insurance. Likewise, the 
unpaid workers are the workers that do not receive any kind of payment. Finally, firm’s 
labour force size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total labour force in the 
industry’s average firm, and it is estimated from the data collected by the ENEU survey 
when the interviewed workers are asked about the total number of people in their 
workplaces.
The industry’s employment share and the average firm’s labour force size are computed 
for each industry in each year of the sample, and are then regressed on the import tariffs 
using the model in equation (1.8). For the cases of self-employment, unregistered 
salaried and unpaid workers, the econometric strategy is the same two-stage procedure 
as the one used for total unregistration above. The results are reported in table 1.13. The 
estimates in the first column indicate that trade liberalization has generated some labour 
force reallocations across industries through the elimination of the U.S. import tariff on 
Mexican •products: a 1-percentage point reduction in this tariff increases an industry’s 
employment share by 0.033 percentage points. This result is consistent with the theory 
in Melitz (2003), as it would suggest that the new profit opportunities in the U.S. market 
induce firms in more liberalized industries to increase their labour demand.
The second to fifth columns in table 1.13 refer to the composition of unregistration. The 
second column is simply repeating column (a) from table 1 .1 0 , in order to compare it 
with the results for each type of unregistration separately. The third to fifth columns
53
Table 1.13. Effect o f Trade Liberalization on Employment Shares, Composition of Unregistration, and the Size of Firms
Em ploym ent
Share1
Total
U nregistration
Self-
Em ploym ent
U nregistered
Salaried
Unpaid
W orkers
ln(L abour
Force)1
1
Mex Tariff -0.010
[0.021]
0.392 *** 
[0.128]
0.219 ** 
[0.092]
0.096
[0.102]
0.077
[0.059]
-0.312
[0.346]
No. Obs. 4746 4737 4737 4737 4737 4732
2 US Tariff -0.033 * 
[0.020]
-0.144
[0.252]
-0.312 * 
[0.173]
0.451 ** 
[0.182]
-0.283 *** 
[0.108]
-0.840
[0.699]
No. Obs. 4706 4697 4697 4697 4697 4692
3 IOM Tariff -0.488
[0.758]
0.080 ** 
[0.037]
0.048 * 
[0.027]
0.008
[0.029]
0.024 * 
[0.013]
-0.332
[9.254]
No. Obs. 4746 4737 4737 4737 4737 4732
Mex Tariff -0.001 
[0.011]
0.338 ** 
[0.144]
0.185 * 
[0.099]
0.097
[0.113]
0.056
[0.070]
-0.400
[0.449]
4 US Tariff -0.031 * 
[0.017]
-0.139
[0.249]
-0.308 * 
[0.173]
0.449 ** 
[0.180]
-0.279 *** 
[0.109]
-0.761
[0.707]
IOM Tariff -0.451
[0.669]
0.042
[0.042]
0.025
[0.029]
0.0002
[0.033]
0.016
[0.017]
7.711
[12.029]
No. Obs. 4706 4697 4697 4697 4697 4692
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include year dummies, industry dummies and industry trends. ‘All the 
estimates are obtained using weighted least squares, with weights equal to the number of observations available for each industry-year. Newey-Wesl standard errors 
with 1 lag are shown in brackets.
present these results. They indicate two main things: first, that a 1-percentage point 
reduction in the Mexican import tariff on U.S. products reduces unregistered self- 
employment by 0.185 percentage points, and it does not seem to affect significantly the 
probability of becoming an unregistered salaried or an unpaid worker. Second, they also 
indicate that a 1-percentage point reduction in the U.S. import tariff increases the 
likelihood of unregistered self-employment and unpaid work by 0.308 and 0.279 
percentage points respectively, while it reduces the probability of unregistered salaried 
employment by 0.449 percentage points. Even though the coefficient for the U.S. tariff 
is larger (in absolute terms) than the coefficient from the Mexican tariff in the case of 
the unregistered self-employed, the overall effect of trade liberalization on this type of 
unregistration is very likely to be determined by the second one because, as shown in 
table 1.1, the average Mexican tariff is higher than the U.S. one for every year in the 
sample. Also, given that the effect of trade liberalization on total unregistration is 
mainly through the elimination of the Mexican import tariff (as shown in the second 
column of table 1.13), the consequence of the reduction in the U.S. tariffs seems to be 
principally a reallocation of workers within the unregistered sector. That is, while the 
elimination of the Mexican tariff increases the incentives for people in the unregistered 
self-employment sub-sector to move into the registered sector, the elimination of the
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U.S. tariff may be simply inducing people in the unregistered salaried sub-sector to 
move into the unregistered self-employment and the unpaid work sub-sectors.
A possible interpretation of these results could be the following. Trade liberalization 
makes it more attractive for owners of firms to register, as it is only through registration 
that they can take advantage of the cheaper and better inputs, machinery or equipment 
produced in the U.S. (because registered firms are the only ones that can get involved in 
trade). Owners of firms in the unregistered sector are concentrated either in the self- 
employment or in the unpaid work sub-sectors (regarding the unpaid workers, about 
97% of the people in this category works for a family business, and the median age is
17approximately 23 years . A good example of this type of worker could then be a 
student that helps his parents running a family-owned restaurant every day after 
classes). Thus, when trade liberalization takes place, those unregistered employees that 
could either run their own unregistered firm or work in a family business instead of 
being employed by someone else would be more attracted to move into self- 
employment or into unpaid work in the family business, as the potential profits that they 
could derive from those activities are now greater due to the lower trade costs. In other 
words, within the unregistered sector, trade liberalization could be making more 
profitable to become an entrepreneur than to remain employed in someone else’s firm as 
an unregistered salaried.
Finally, the last column in table 1.13 shows the estimates from regressing the natural 
logarithm of the size of the average firm’s labour force. Trade liberalization does not 
seem to have any significant effect on the size of the labour force, at least as reported by 
interviewed workers.
Summing up, the econometric analysis in this section shows the following conclusions:
-  From the first stage results, the probability of unregistered employment decreases 
with years of experience and schooling. It is also lower for married and female 
workers. Within a household, the likelihood of unregistration is significantly lower 
for the first provider of income and significantly higher for the second provider, 
which supports the results of Roberts, B. R. (1989) and Maloney, W. F. (1999).
-  Regarding geographic location, the results imply that the probability of 
unregistration varies significantly across cities. It is also higher for workers that live 
closer to Mexico City than to the U.S.-Mexico border, and lower for workers living 
in a state with high exposure to globalization, as defined by Hanson, G. H. (2004).
17 Average values calculated from the 1989-2002, April-June ENEU interviews.
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-  Industry affiliation is also an important determinant of unregistration. As for Brazil 
and Colombia in Goldberg, P. K. & N. Pavcnik (2003), the estimated unregistration 
differentials are correlated through time, particularly in the Non-tradable, Wood 
products, Non-metallic mineral products and Paper & Printing sectors.
-  From the second stage results, the estimates suggest a significant effect of trade 
liberalization on the probability of unregistered employment. Specifically, a 1- 
percentage point decline in the Mexican import tariff is associated with a 0.392 
percentage point reduction in the likelihood of unregistration. The U.S. import tariff 
does not seem to have a significant effect, which is a reasonable outcome 
considering its already low level in the pre-NAFTA period. The analysis also 
suggests that the benefits of trade liberalization have not spread over to the labour 
force in the non-tradable sectors in a statistically significant sense.
-  When the import tariffs are interacted with different measures of exposure to trade 
for the manufacturing sectors, the analysis indicates that for a given reduction in the 
Mexican import tariff, unregistration decreases less in industries with higher levels 
of import penetration. Likewise, the elimination of the U.S. import tariff helps in 
reducing unregistration in industries that are relatively more export oriented.
-  Finally, trade liberalization affects the employment shares and the composition of 
unregistration across industries, but it does not seem to have an impact on the size of 
the firm’s labour force. The level of the U.S. import tariff is negatively related to the 
industry’s share of total employment. The elimination of the Mexican import tariff 
reduces self-employment in the tradable industries, and the elimination of the U.S. 
import tariff seems to have a reallocation effect within the unregistered labour force, 
from salaried to either self-employment or unpaid work.
Overall, the econometric analysis of the behaviour of unregistered labour seems to 
provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the tariff elimination process 
undertaken by Mexico when joining NAFTA in 1994 has helped in reducing the 
incidence of informality. The next section studies the effect of trade liberalization on the 
industry wage differentials and the intra-industry registered-unregistered wage gap.
1.7. Trade Liberalization and Wages
The analysis in the previous section shows that trade liberalization in Mexico is 
significantly related to reductions in the probability of unregistered employment within
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the tradable economic sectors. This finding provides empirical support for one of the 
implications of the theoretical model discussed in section 1.2. This section analyzes the 
effect of tariff elimination on wages and the registered-unregistered wage differential. 
The econometric analysis here starts by estimating the effect of import tariffs 
elimination on industry wage differentials, in order to complement the results of 
previous studies with the ENEU data. A two-stage approach similar to the one used for 
unregistration in the previous section is implemented. The first step consists of 
estimating a log-wage equation of the following form:
lgwageljt = H v,Ph, +1y *ipj, +£„, (1.10)
where lg wagejjt is the natural logarithm of the wage for worker i in industry j  at time t,
H ijt is a vector of worker characteristics and geographic location variables, I ijt is a set
of industry dummies that indicate worker Vs industry affiliation, and s ijt is the error
term. The coefficients ip jt capture the part of the variation in wages that is attributable
to worker Vs industry affiliation. These coefficients are denoted industry wage 
differentials and they capture the difference in wages that is attributable to industry 
affiliation. Equation (1.10) is estimated separately for each year in the sample. As with 
unregistration, in the second stage these industry wage differentials are pooled over time 
and regressed on the Mexican import tariff, the U.S. import tariff, the IOM tariff, a set 
of industry and time indicators, and a set of interactions between the industry dummies 
and a time trend. A weighted least squares estimation is used, with weights equal to the 
inverse of the variance of the wage differentials from the first stage.
The results for the first stage are reported in table 1.14. They indicate that wages 
increase with years of experience and schooling, are higher for married people and for 
those cohabitating with a partner. They are also higher for males, for the head of the 
household and for the second provider of income, when compared to the other members 
of the family. Regarding the geographic characteristics, the estimates show that earnings 
increase with the population size of the city in which the worker lives, that they are 
higher for people living in states with high and low exposure to globalization than for 
those living in states with an intermediate level of exposure, and that they are higher in 
places closer to the U.S.-Mexico border than to Mexico City, which agrees with the 
findings of Hanson, G. H. (2003). Although not reported, the regressions in table 1.14
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Table 1.14. Linear Regression of ln(Wages)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
experience 0.025 **♦ 
[0.001]
0.026 **• 
[0.001]
0.026 *** 
[0.001]
0.028 •** 
[0.001]
0.028 *** 
[0.001]
0.028 *** 
[0.001]
0.027 **• 
[0.001]
0.027 *** 
[0.001]
0.025 *** 
[0.001]
0.024 *** 
[0.001]
0.021 *** 
[0.001]
0.021 *** 
[0.001]
0.020 *** 
[0.001]
0.018 *** 
[0.001]
experience2 -0.00030 *** 
[0.00002]
-0.00031 *** 
[0.00002]
-0.00030 **» 
[0.00002]
-0.00033 *** 
[0.00003]
-0.00033 •** 
[0.00002]
-0.00032 *** 
[0.00002]
-0.00030 *** 
[0.00002]
-0.00029
[0.00002]
-0.00026 *** 
[0.00002]
-0.00026 *** 
[0.00002]
-0.00023 *** 
[0.00001]
-0.00023
[0.00002]
-0.00023 *** 
[0.00002]
-0.00020 *** 
[0.00001]
schooling 0.072 *** 
[0.003]
0.076 *** 
[0.003]
0.079 *** 
[0.003]
0.083 *** 
[0.003]
0.085 ♦** 
[0.003]
0.088 *** 
[0.004]
0.088 *** 
[0.004]
0.090 *** 
[0.004]
0.089 *** 
[0.004]
0.085 *** 
[0.004]
0.081 •** 
[0.004]
0.083 *** 
[0.004]
0.080 **• 
[0.005]
0.076 •** 
[0.004]
married 0.088 *** 
[0.007]
0.108 *** 
[0.008]
0.102 *** 
[0.010]
0.106 *•* 
[0.008]
0.106 *** 
[0.009]
0.099 *** 
[0.008]
0.102 *** 
[0.007]
0.093 *** 
[0.007]
0.104 *** 
[0.010]
0.114 *** 
[0.010]
, 0.098 *•* 
[0.010]
0.103 **» 
[0.010]
0.097 *** 
[0.008]
0.098 *** 
[0.009]
cohabitating 0.018
[0.019]
0.018
[0.013]
0.012
[0.019]
0.015
[0.013]
0.028 * 
[0.016]
0.016
[0.014]
0.023
[0.017]
0.021 * 
[0.012]
0.010
[0.016]
0.035 *** 
[0.011]
0.031 •** 
[0.011]
0.033 ** 
[0.014]
0.027 *** 
[0.010]
0.027 ** 
[0.011]
male 0.059 *** 
[0.020]
0.057 *** 
[0.019]
0.034
[0.024]
0.017
[0.028]
0.020
[0.030]
0.013
[0.030]
0.008
[0.026]
0.009
[0.029]
0.002
[0.024]
0.016
[0.023]
0.030
[0.025]
0.047 ** 
[0.023]
0.054 ** 
[0.023]
0.052 ** 
[0.021]
firsthead 0.108 *** 
[0.011]
0.125 *** 
[0.014]
0.123 *** 
[0.012]
0.111 *** 
[0.008]
0.118
[0.010]
0.119 »*• 
[0.013]
0.111
[0.011]
0.114 *♦* 
[0.007]
0.120
[0.010]
0.119 *♦* 
[0.010]
0.128 *** 
[0.010]
0.121 »** 
[0.008]
0.125 *** 
[0.009]
0.108 **• 
[0.009]
secondhead 0.049 *** 
[0.010]
0.056 *** 
[0.011]
0.064 *** 
[0.010]
0.064 *** 
[0.009]
0.064 *** 
[0.015]
0.067 *** 
[0.009]
0.077 *** 
[0.009]
0.067 *** 
[0.008]
0.064 *** 
[0.010]
0.064 *** 
[0.007]
0.074 *** 
[0.009]
0.063 *** 
[0.008]
0.059 *** 
[0.008]
0.051 *** 
[0.009]
ln(population) 0.020 ** 
[0.008]
0.037 *** 
[0.007]
0.170 *** 
[0.014]
0.124 *** 
[0.010]
0.072 *** 
[0.014]
0.126 *** 
[0.015]
0.069 *** 
[0.014]
0.015
[0.011]
14.914 *** 
[3.734]
16.446
[12.249]
0.011 *** 
[0.002]
0.020 *** 
[0.004]
-0.009
[0.008]
-0.004 ** 
[0.002]
relative distance -0.432 *** 
[0.036]
-0.547 *** 
[0.039]
-0.503 *** 
[0.034]
-0.432 **• 
[0.028]
-0.164 *** 
[0.022]
-0.342 *** 
[0.030]
-0.100 *** 
[0.029]
-0.169 *»* 
[0.029]
5.871 *** 
[1.567]
-74.285
[55.248]
-0.116 *•* 
[0.017]
-0.248 *** 
[0.048]
-0.144 *** 
[0.016]
-0.203 •** 
[0.038]
high exposure 0.097 *** 
[0.025]
0.0323
[0.024]
0.399 ♦** 
[0.025]
0.312 *•* 
[0.019]
0.314
[0.039]
0.265 *** 
[0.025]
0.226
[0.032]
-0.149
[0.021]
-26.133 *** 
[6.595]
51.983
[38.841]
0.017
[0.030]
0.094 *** 
[0.028]
0.611 *** 
[0.097]
0.106 *** 
[0.022]
low exposure 0.084 *♦* 
[0.024]
0.076 *** 
[0.025]
0.323 *** 
[0.035]
0.473 **• 
[0.030]
-0.037
[0.058]
0.625 *** 
[0.068]
0.291 **♦ 
[0.068]
0.094 ** 
[0.044]
-25.735 *** 
[6.481]
63.108
[46.925]
0.193 *** 
[0.039]
-0.102 **♦ 
[0.024]
0.671
[0.099]
0.108 *** 
[0.034]
No. Obs. 52,716 53.743 53,711 97,987 102,574 106,323 108,302 115.633 122,504 130,862 148,642 159.810 164,539 159.643
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include city dummies and industry indicators. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown in brackets
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also included a set of city dummies, which in most of the cases where both individually 
and jointly significant. The estimated industry wage differentials are correlated through 
time, but not as strongly as the unregistration differentials in the previous section. The 
year-to-year correlation coefficients range from 0.29 to 0.80 and averaging 0.55. This 
suggests that wages could be highly sensitive to changes in the level of import tariffs.
In the second stage the industry wage differentials are pooled over time and regressed 
on the Mexican, the U.S. and the IOM tariffs, a set of year and industry fixed effects, 
and a set of interactions between the industry dummies and a time trend, as specified in 
die following equation, which parallels equation ( 1 .8 ) in the previous section:
As before, a Mexican and U.S. tariff of 0% is artificially assigned to the non-tradable 
industries. The year indicators are included to remove the aggregate variation from all 
the other variables in the right-hand side of equation (1.11). The industry indicators are 
included to control for unobserved industry characteristics that may be 
constant through time. The inclusion of the interactions between the industry dummies 
and the trend accounts for the possibility that different industries may follow different 
paths through time. Therefore, as with unregistration in equation (1.8), identification of 
p T comes from within-industry fluctuations of T around a time trend.
Table 1.15 reports the estimates of equation (1.11). All but one of the estimated 
coefficients are negative, indicating a negative correlation between import tariffs and 
industry wage differentials. Column (a) presents the estimates obtained for the current 
values of the import tariffs. There is a negative and significant effect on wages coming 
from the elimination of the IOM tariff, and this effect is robust to the inclusion of the 
Mexican and the U.S. import tariff in the estimated equation (panel 4). Column (b) 
explores the possibility that adjustments in wages with respect to changes in the level of 
import tariffs may require some time to take place. Using the 1-year lagged values, the 
column reports smaller effects for the Mexican and the U.S. import tariffs, but again 
only the one from the IOM tariff is statistically significant at a 5% level. Column (c) 
summarizes the dynamic effects by using the sum of the current and the 1 -year lagged 
tariffs as regressors. Panels 3 and 4 confirm the relevance of the changes in the IOM 
import tariffs for changes in wage differentials.
Table 1.15. Effect o f Trade Liberalization on W ages
(a) (b) (c)
1 Mex Tariff 0.290
[0.180]
-0.205
[0.168]
-0.145
[0.096]
No. Obs. 4720 4388 4388
2
US Tariff -0.216
[0.315]
-0.044
[0.356]
-0.085
[0.208]
No. Obs. 4680 4361 4345
3 IOM Tariff -0.121 ** 
[0.052]
-0.129 ** 
[0.052]
-0.074 *** 
[0.029]
No. Obs. 4720 4388 4388
Mex Tariff -0.128
[0.188]
-0.038
[0.183]
-0.048
[0.104]
4 US Tariff -0.246
[0.316]
-0.074
[0.359]
-0.108
[0.209]
IOM Tariff -0.116 ** 
[0.055]
-0.134 ** 
[0.056]
-0.076 ** 
[0.031]
No. Obs. 4680 4361 4345
***, **, and * ind icate  significance a t the  1%, 5% , and 10%  level, respectively. All 
regressions include year dum m ies, industry dum m ies and industry  trends. N ew ey-W est 
standard errors w ith  1 lag are shown in brackets.
(a) Current tariffs
(b) 1-year lagged tariffs
(c) Sum  o f  current and  1-year lagged tariffs
The conclusion from the estimates in table 1.15 is that the elimination of the IOM 
import tariff has contributed to the increase in wages. Industries with larger cuts in 
tariffs experienced larger increases in wages, and this result is valid both for the tradable 
and the non-tradable sectors. It is important to stress what the significant effect on the 
IOM tariff could mean here: typically, domestic industries lobby for
higher tariffs to protect their output and hence the wages paid to their workers. The 
estimates in table 1.15 seem to suggest instead that industries with higher levels of 
protection are hurt because their inputs become more expensive.
The next step is to estimate the effect of trade liberalization on the registered- 
unregistered wage gap. As pointed out by Robbins, D. (1996), empirical work relating 
trade liberalization and income distribution has identified the important anomaly that 
the former has helped in shifting income towards high-skilled labour by increasing its
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Figure 1.8. A verage Real H ourly W ages
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relative demand in many developing countries18. Considering that the average years of 
schooling in the registered sector is typically higher than in the unregistered sector (see 
table 1.3), the effects of this skill-biased technological change should also be present 
when comparing these two. To see this, figure 1.8 plots the average real hourly wages 
(in 2002 pesos) for the registered and the unregistered sectors in Mexico using the 
April-June ENEU interviews with 1994 as the base year. The chart clearly shows that 
after enacting NAFTA in 1994 average wages in the unregistered sector have remained 
lower than their counterpart in the registered sector. From 1989 to 1994 inclusive, real 
hourly wages in the unregistered sector represented on average 99.02% of the real 
hourly wages in the registered sector. From 1995 to 2002 this figure dropped to 81.03%. 
Table 1.16 presents the changes of the registered-unregistered wage gap and the import 
tariffs at the sector level over the period 1989 through 200219. The wage gap index 
increased in 12 out of 18 sectors during those years. The largest increase is of 2.23 
points for the Primary> metals sector, while the largest decrease is of 3.39 points for the 
Personal, professional and social services sector. Although not reported in the table, 
while the average change in the wage gap for the tradable sectors is positive and equal 
to 0.66 points, it is negative and equal to -0.74 points for the non-tradable ones. This
18 Anomaly in the sense that this result is not what would be predicted by the standard Hecksher-Ohlin 
model o f the International Economics theory, considering that low-skilled labour is the abundant factor of 
production in LDCs.
19 The changes in the wage gap are calculated as follows: For each year and economic sector the wage 
gap in real hourly wages is obtained by taking the difference between real wages in the registered and the 
unregistered sectors. The resulting series is expressed setting the estimated gap for 1994 as the base 
observation (1994=1). The change in the wage gap is then obtained as the difference between the 1989- 
1991 and the 2000-2002 average values o f  this index.
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Table 1.16: Change in Import Tariffs and Registered-Unregistered Wage Differential by Sector
1989-91 to 2000-02“
Sector Wage Differentialb Mex US
Tradables:
Farms, forestry & fishing 0.32 -12.6 -1.3
Mining -0.59 -8.1 -0.2
Food, beverage & tobacco 1.75 -12.6 -3.3
Textiles, apparel & leather 0.89 -15.5 -9.2
Wood products 0.11 -9.3 -3.4
Paper & printing 0.28 -10.6 -0.7
Chemical products 1.00 -11.4 -1.5
Nonmetallic mineral products -0.23 -12.7 -1.5
Primary metals 2.23 -11.5 -1.4
Machinery & equipment 0.04 -12.0 -0.8
Other manufacturing 1.45 -13.7 -0.6
Non-tradables:
Petroleoum & coal extraction -0.48
Construction -3.35
Electricity, gas & water 0.18
Hotels, restaurants & trade 0.95
Transport & storage 1.00
Financial services & real estate -0.08
Personal, professional and social services -3.39
Maximum 2.23 -8.1 -0.2
Minimum -3.39 -15.5 -9.2
Average 0.12 -11.8 -2.2
Source: author's calculations based on the ENEU survey (INEGI), Diario Oficial de la Federacion (Mexico), and 
the NBER U.S. Tariff Database. a Changes calculated as the difference between the 2000-02 and the 1989-91 
averages. b Wage gap calculated as the difference between average real hourly wages between the registered and the 
unregistered sectors (2002 pesos, 1994=1).
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could be indicative of a negative relationship between the level of the tariffs and the 
wage differentials, which seems to be confirmed by figures 1.9 and 1.10: within the 
tradable sectors larger reductions in both the Mexican and the U.S. import tariffs are 
associated with larger increases in the wage gap. In order to estimate the effect of trade 
liberalization on the wage gap formally, equation ( 1 .1 0 ) is modified in the following 
way:
lgwagev, =Hl],PHl + (Hlj, x f ijt)5iHxf),+ I ll *ipJt +(/„, + % (1.12)
where (Hjjt x f ) is a matrix of interactions between the vector H iJt and an indicator
for registration f ijt that takes the value of 1 if worker i in industry j  at time t works in
the registered sector and 0  otherwise; (Ijjt x /  ) is a matrix of interactions between the
industry dummies and the registration indicator; and the rest of the terms are as defined 
before. The new coefficients d(Hxf)t capture the part of the variation in wages that is
attributable to differences in individual and geographic characteristics between the 
registered and the unregistered workers. The coefficients are denoted within-
industry registered-unregistered wage differentials and they capture the difference in 
wages between registered and unregistered workers that is attributable to industry 
affiliation. Equation (1.12) is estimated separately for each year in the sample. As 
before, in the second stage these wage differentials are pooled over time and regressed 
on the Mexican import tariff, the U.S. import tariff, the IOM tariff, a set of industry and 
time indicators, and a set of interactions between the industry dummies and a time 
trend. The results for the first stage are reported in table 1.17. The interactions with the 
registration indicator suggest that there are not important differences in returns to 
potential experience between the sectors, but the effects of more years of schooling, 
being the head of a household, living in a bigger city, living closer to the U.S.-Mexico 
border, or living in a state with low exposure to globalization are in general significantly 
larger for the registered workers. As with the previous estimations, the regressions in 
table 1.17 also included a set of city dummies, and the interactions of these with the 
registration indicator. In most of the cases these variables where both individually and 
jointly significant, indicating that geographic location is an important determinant of 
earnings, and that its effect varies across registered and unregistered workers. The 
estimated registered-unregistered wage differentials are correlated through time, with
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Table 1.18. Effect o f Trade Liberalization on W age Differentials
(a) (b) (c)
1
Mex Tariff -0.169
[0.319]
-0.356
[0.352]
-0.074
[0.191]
No. Obs. 3938 3710 3710
2
US Tariff -0.695
[0.760]
-1.450 ** 
[0.585]
-0.949 ** 
[0.371]
No. Obs. 3938 3964 3680
3
IOM Tariff 0.115
[0.108]
0.003
[0.120]
0.052
[0.065]
No. Obs. 3968 3710 3710
Mex Tariff -0.289
[0.352]
-0.334
[0.379]
-0.097
[0.209]
4 US Tariff -0.633
[0.751]
-1.399 ** 
[0.581]
-0.904 ** 
[0.370]
IOM Tariff 0.138
[0.117]
0.022
[0.129]
0.051
[0.070]
No. Obs. 3938 3694 3680
***, **, and * indicate significance a t the 1%, 5% , and 10% level, respectively. A ll regressions 
include year dum m ies, industry dum m ies and  industry trends. N ew ey-W est s tandard  errors 
w ith 1 lag are show n in  brackets.
(a) C urrent tariffs
(b) 1 -year lagged tariffs
(c) Sum  o f  current and  1-year lagged tariffs
year- to-year correlation coefficients ranging from 0.12 to 0.70 and averaging 0.36. This 
suggests that the registered-unregistered wage gap could also be highly sensitive to 
changes in the level of import tariffs.
In the second stage the within industry registered-unregistered wage differentials are 
pooled over time and used as the dependent variable in the estimation of the following 
equation, which parallels equations ( 1 .8 ) and ( 1 .1 1 ) above:
0(7*/)j t  =  T j t P r  +  Y t Y y  + D j & D  "*■ (P j x  y i ( D x t r )  £ j t
Table 1.18 reports the estimates of equation (1.13). Column (a) presents the estimates 
obtained for the current values of the import tariffs. None of the estimates in this 
column is significantly different from zero. The coefficients for the Mexican and the 
U.S. import tariffs are negative, indicating a negative correlation with the registered- 
unregistered wage differentials. Column (b) explores the possibility that adjustments in 
the wage differentials with respect to changes in the level of import tariffs may require 
some time to take place. Using the 1-year lagged values, the column reports larger
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effects for the Mexican and the U.S. import tariffs, but only the second one is 
statistically significant at a 5% level. Column (c) summarizes the dynamic effects by 
using the sum of the current and the 1-year lagged tariffs as regressors. Panels 2 and 4 
confirm the relevance of the changes in the U.S. import tariffs for changes in the wage 
gap. The conclusion from the estimates in table 1.18 is that the elimination of the U.S. 
import tariff contributes to the increase of the wage differential, but this effect takes 
some time to show up. This result may also suggest that wages in Mexico are somewhat 
sticky, as they do not adjust to changes in the economic environment immediately after 
these take place. Given the insignificance and the large standard errors of the estimates 
of the IOM tariff, it can also be said that this result is valid for the tradable sectors only. 
The evidence in this subsection supports the predictions from the dynamic industry 
model with firm heterogeneity in section 1 .2 , and is also in line with the results from 
previous studies regarding the effect of trade liberalization on the distribution of wages.
1.8. Conclusions
This chapter has investigated the relationship between trade liberalization and 
informality in Mexico during the 1990s. Using the Melitz, M. J. (2003) model of 
heterogeneous firms to analyse the possible implications of trade liberalization on the 
rate of informality, it is predicted that by making more profitable to some firms to enter 
the formal sector, by forcing the less productive informal firms to exit the industry, and 
by inducing the most productive formal firms to engage in trade, trade liberalization 
could reduce the incidence of informality, particularly in industries characterized by 
higher levels of aggregate productivity. Both the exit of the least productive firms and 
the additional export sales gained by the more productive firms reallocate market shares 
towards the more productive firms and contribute to an aggregate productivity gain. The 
increased labour demand by the more productive firms and the new entrants tends to 
increase more the real wages in industries that experience larger tariff cuts.
The empirical analysis referred to the relationship between trade liberalization and the 
share of workers without social security registration (which is one specific type of 
informality that can be measured from employee data from a household survey like 
ENEU) to provide supporting evidence for this view. Reductions in the Mexican import 
tariffs are found to be significant in reducing the likelihood of unregistration in the 
tradable sectors. This result contrasts with the findings of Goldberg, P. K. & N. Pavcnik 
(2003) for Brazil and Colombia, but one has to keep in mind that liberalization of trade
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in those countries has been rather different from the 1990s Mexican experience. The 
analysis in this chapter also indicates that for a given reduction in the Mexican import 
tariff, unregistration decreases less in industries with higher levels of import 
penetration; and that for a given reduction in the U.S. import tariff, unregistration 
decreases more in industries that are relatively more export oriented. It is also found that 
trade liberalization affects the employment shares and the composition of unregistration 
across industries, but it does not seem to have an impact on the size of the labour force 
of firms, as reported by workers when asked about the number of people in their 
workplaces. This chapter also presented evidence of an increase in industry wage 
differentials and a widening effect of trade liberalization on the registered-unregistered 
wage gap.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this results. The empirical part 
of the present chapter used a reduced-form approach to illustrate how, in one specific 
case, trade liberalization may affect informality through changes in social security 
payments. But, as it is clear from the model developed in section 1.2, social security 
unregistration is not the only characteristic of informality. Furthermore, trade 
liberalization may affect social security registration through a variety of channels, and 
given that these are not analyzed here, it is difficult if not impossible to use these results 
to predict how trade liberalization would affect registration and hence informality in 
other countries -or even in Mexico at another point in time. Some of the possible ways 
in which trade liberalization may affect the levels of registration could be by altering the 
skill mix (i.e., increasing the demand for skilled workers, who may be less likely to take 
a job that does not offer social or health insurance), by changing the size distribution of 
firms (increasing the average size of a firm’s labour force, which makes it more easily 
monitored by the authorities and hence reduces the incentives for unregistration), by 
favouring investment by foreign firms with different views or objective functions 
regarding registration (i.e., foreign firms may face more severe consequences in their 
countries of origin if they employ unregistered workers abroad and are therefore 
perceived as exploiters), or by affecting the relative costs of the factors of production 
(hence generating pure rents to the firm owners and perhaps leading them to share these 
rents with their workers through the provision of social security benefits). The analysis 
of the effect of trade liberalization on social security registration through each one of 
these alternative channels is left as an agenda for future research.
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1.10. Appendix 1A: Proof that Po does not change with trade liberalization
In a model like the one described in section 1.2, an equilibrium will be characterized by
a mass of firms M  = M 7 + M F + M x and an ex post distribution of productivities p((p)
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over a subset of (0 ,oo). is conditional on successful entry to the industry and is 
truncated at q> :
(1A.1)
0  otherwise
The average productivities in different sectors of the industry are determined by the ex 
post productivity distribution and the zero-profit productivity cut-offs. Let (p be the 
weighted average productivity across all firms. Then:
The average productivity across all firms, (p, is based only on market share differences 
between firms. If some firms are formal or trading, then this average will not reflect the 
additional shares of more productive firms. Furthermore, neither of these averages 
reflect the proportions a , p , and z  of output units that are “gained” and “lost” in
passing to the formal sector and to the trading sub-sector, respectively. Let (pt be the 
weighted productivity average that reflects these differences. (pt can be written as:
(1A.2)
a  = j  + M f [ (1  + aXl + ^ r ^ L  + M x \ '  + a t \  + p y T - 'v x ] - '
(1A.3)
(pt can then be used to obtain expressions for the aggregate prices and expenditure 
levels, P  and R respectively. In particular:
This implies that the derivative of P0 with respect to (pt is equal to:
dP» _ P 9 ,(1 -  P h(v, )" ' q'{p,) - g(p, T p P ,, ,  , ,
s f .  '  ~ ( p ? , y  ( }
and its sign depends on the sign of the numerator. For example, for it to be positive:
(1A-6)
or,
but the left-hand side of this inequality is also equal to a , as it is simply the elasticity of 
q(<pt) with respect to fjft . Hence, the numerator in (1A.5) is equal to zero, implying that
P0 is not affected by changes in (pt .
1.11. Appendix IB: Proof of Proposition 1
The formal proofs for points 1 and 3 of proposition 1 are the same as in the original 
model in Melitz, M.J. (2003), and therefore there are not repeated here. The way in 
which trade liberalization works is the following: a decrease in r to r'<  r  will induce 
an increase in the industry’s cut-off productivity level (p* to <p*'> (p*, and a decrease in 
the cut-off productivity level for the trading sub-sector (p*x to <p*x '< (p*x . There are two 
potential channels through which trade can affect the distribution of surviving firms. 
The first one is through the increase in product market competition, which in the present 
model is not operative due to the assumption of monopolistic competition under C.E.S. 
preferences. The second channel operates through the domestic factor market where 
firms compete for labour. As mentioned in section 1.2.2, expanded exposure to trade 
offers new profit opportunities only to the more productive firms who can cover the 
entry cost f x , and it also induces more entry of new firms to the industry, as 
prospective firms respond to the higher potential returns associated with a good 
productivity draw. The increased labour demand by the more productive firms and new 
entrants bids up the real wages and forces the least productive firms to exit. From
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equation ( 1 .6 ), it can be seen that (p*F is an increasing function of real wages, w , so that 
this would also translate into an increase in the cut-off productivity level for formality:
1 - 2  p
dr kB dr
< 0 (IB. 1)
dw * *because —  < 0. The fact that both <p and <pF increase with trade liberalization means 
dr
that there will be an ambiguous effect on the size of the labour force in the informal 
sector. The fact that q>x and r  decrease with trade liberalization translates into an 
increase in the labour force of the trading-formal sub-sector. To see this formally, recall 
that the prices and output in each one of the sectors are given by the following 
equations:
Pi =
w <h=Q
p<p
w
pp<p„
_ (l + a)w qF =Q 
p(\ + 0)cp
_ t (1 +  cc) w  _
P x ~ p { \ + p y p  q x = Q
(l + a)w  
Pp(\ + p)q>_
■(l + a)w  
_Pp{1 + P}p_
(1B.2)
Therefore, using equation (1.2), the labour demands in each sector can be written as:
*i{<p) = f i + Q
Pp
w
<7-1
e F(<P) = fp  + Q
pp{l+ jg)'
(l + a)w 9
a - 1
(1B.3)
e x (<p)=fx + Q
p p (i+ ft]
r( 1 + a)w 9
CT—1
And total employment in the industry is given by:
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<Pp oo  oo
L = Le + j t , (<p)/j(<p)d<p + (1B.4)
<p <pF  <px
where Le is the labour used by new entrants for investing in the industry’s fixed entry 
cost f e (see Melitz, M.J (2003)), and //(#>) is the ex-post distribution of productivities 
defined in equation (1A.1). In equilibrium, the market clearing condition for investment 
workers requires Le to be equal to the total investment by new entrants, M ef e, where
M e is the total number of new entrants to the industry. Also, in equilibrium, stability 
requires that the mass of successful entrants exactly replaces the mass of incumbents 
who are hit with the bad shock and exit: p inM e = S M , where p jn is the probability of
successful entry into the industry (e.g. of drawing a productivity parameter (p>(p*) and 
8  is the probability of being hit by a bad shock in every period. These two equilibrium 
conditions together with the free entry condition to the industry n  = 8fe /[1 -  G((p*)]
(where it are the average profits in the industry) imply that the labour force employed 
in investment by new entrants can be written as:
L , = M J e = — f e =Mw  (1B.5)
Pin
From equation (IB.5) is easy to see that trade liberalization increases the labour demand 
of the new entrants: a decrease in t increases (p*, which in turn increases i t . 
Therefore, Le increases as well. On the other hand, it is also easy to see the positive
impact of trade liberalization on the employment share of the trading-formal sub-sector. 
Using the last equation in (1B.3) together with equation (1A.1) in the last term of the 
right-hand side of equation (IB.4):
oo 1 °°
_  j
<Px v  / <px
f x +Q
P p ^ + P )  
r ( 1 + a)w <P*-Xy
g(<p)d<P (1B.6)
which is clearly negatively related to r : when r  decreases, the term in brackets 
increases, <p* increases so that l/[l -  G((p*)] increases, and (p*x decreases so that the area 
of integration increases as well. Thus, the employment share of the trading-formal sub­
sector increases with trade liberalization. Finally, consider the employment share of the 
formal sector in the domestic market. Using again equation (1A.1) together with the
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second equation in (IB.3) in the second integral on the right-hand side of equation 
(1B.4):
<Pf
1 “f
' - < & UW )
1 - g U  
i - 4 '
f F+Q (l + a)w 
f pp( \+p)
g((p)d<p =
U i + « V J
p p { \+ p ) X \ - G { 9 ;)  / .w_,
(i + « V ,
1 - c f o )
1 - G < /) / f + e
pp (i+ /? ) 
(l + «)w *Pf
(1B.7)
where (pF ((p*F) is the average productivity in the formal sector, as defined in equation 
(1 A.2). From this last expression it can already be seen that the relationship between r  
and the employment share of the formal sector (and hence of the informal sector) is 
ambiguous. The derivative of (pF (cp*F) with respect to r  is negative, as q>F increases 
with a decrease in r  and (pF is increasing in <pF. However, the sign of the derivative of 
[l -  g (<pf )]/[l -  G(p*)] cannot be determined, as it depends on the shape of the 
distribution g(<p) and the specific values of the parameters in the model:
dr 1 -  G\ip’)
(1B.8)
M , 1
Looking at the numerator of (IB.8 ), 1 -  G{(p*)> 1 -  G{pF ) given that <p* <<p*F . Using 
equations (1.5) and (1.6), — — < :1JL- whenever —  < v" ~ r' / , and< d(p* "(i+ p y
dr dr / / 1 + a
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g(cp*F) > g{(p*) when the distribution g{p) is sufficiently skewed to the left. In such a 
case, the share of employment in the formal sector increases with trade liberalization.
1.12. Appendix 1C: Proof of Proposition 2
The only difference with respect to the proof in proposition 1 in appendix IB is that 
now it is not possible to determine a unique sign of the derivative of (p*F with respect to 
z . Recall that:
1-/7
(1C.1)
where B = ' l  + fT '
\ \  + a j
1-/7
- ( l  — ye). Considering that now ft  is also affected by trade
dpliberalization, so that < 0 :
dr
i - p
d<p'F = J (l + a )fF - (l - r e ) f ,  \  *
dr pB Vp dr dr
1-/7
w2p f(l + a )/F - ( l-y g ) //] p 
pB'lp 1 k J
(1C.2)
r 2/7-1
pw f i + p 'l 1-/7 M .
dz l + a U + a J dz
^  * Ow ^ ^
the sign of —— is undetermined, as —  < 0 and —  < 0. Thus, in general it is not
dr dr dz
possible to say whether <p*F increases or decreases, inducing less or more firms to enter
the formal sector after trade liberalization. However, using the results for market share
f )  *
reallocations, it is possible to find cases in which the sign of — — is uniquely
■ dz
determined. To begin, recall that revenues from sales to the foreign market increase
after trade liberalization, so that drx (<p)
dz
< 0. Using the last pair of equations in (1B.2):
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(1C.3)
/+ + /? )  1
<7-2 p r ( 1 + P)^r- -  p (] + /?Vdz dz
r(l + a)w z 2(l + a)w2
<0
For this inequality to hold, the numerator of the last term in the right-hand side has to 
negative:
z w p ^ - - p z ( l  + p ) ^ - p ( l  + fi)w < 0  
dz dz
dw
(1C.4)
On the other hand, total revenues in the trading-formal sub-sector, (l + r 1 ° \ F(tp), also 
increase after trade liberalization, as there is a market share reallocation towards these 
firms. Thus, using the second pair of equations in (IB.2):
A ( i + r i - ) .  ( p ) = A ( i + r ^ ) 0 p
dr dtp
> ' r-'
= (< r-i j e p v * - 1 p(l+ A )
(l + a)w
(7- \
p (i+ fi) '
(l + a)w  
(l + z x
<T- 1
(1C.5)
wM _ ( i  + ^
O T
dw
dr
(l + 0)w
<0
As before, for this inequality to hold, the last term in the right-hand side has to be 
negative, or:
l + r 1—O ’ dp  / \dw  
dr dz
<
(l + p)w
(1C.6)
^  ^w.r < a-\ . iT + 1
Since T> 1 , then —  <1. Therefore, equations (1C.4) and (1C.6) together imply
r  +1
tf\+ P ,r Ww,r ^  c r-l < 
Z  + 1
(1C.7)
Now, rewrite revenues rx (<p) as a function of <pF, using expressions in (IB.2):
r W <p
W f
( 7 - 1
W f
<7-1
(l +  or)w
p ( t+ /? K
cr-1
(1C.8)
The derivative of (1C.8) with respect to z  is equal to:
SrA<p)
dz
= (< r-i)Q py"-' (l +  6Jfw)
p O+ m
< 7 - 2
(1 + J(1 + ^ _21<!±A)M_wM
1  dz (pF dz dz
(l + Pf<p'F
(1C.9)
and it is negative because of (1C.3). Thus, it has to be the case that:
/ a\dw w(l + p)dq>F dB ^
+     W— < Q  <S> tj - Tf . - t lup ,  < 0
dz (pF dz Vf,xdz
(1C.10)
Now, (1C.7) can be used to determine the possible signs of rj^ . r . Consider first the case 
when rjl+0T - tjw = 0 . Then it must be that 77 . > 0 for (1C. 10) to hold. Therefore,
P  > > <Pp ,x
when the elasticity of productivity in the formal sector with respect to z is equal to the
f) *
elasticity of wages, — — > 0  and more firms are induced to leave the informal sector. 
dz
In this case, using (1B.8) it can be seen that the share of employment in the formal 
sector will increase.
Consider now the case when tj1+p T-r jWT < 0. This implies that tj^  >0 and
sufficiently large for (1C. 10) to hold. Thus, when the elasticity of productivity in the 
formal sector with respect to z  is larger than the elasticity of wages (in absolute terms),
S<Pf
dz
> 0 and more firms are induced to leave the informal sector. In this case, (1B.8)
implies that the share of employment in the formal sector will also increase.
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Finally, consider the case in which 0  < rjnpr -7 *  r < J i  1 • For (1C. 10) to hold, it is
T +1
required that: (a) j^._r > 0  or (b) 0  > jj^  > T]w, - 7 i+/>>, > -  | + • If (a) holds, then
p\ *
— — > 0  and the share of employment in the formal sector increases or stays the same 
dr­
after trade liberalization. On the other hand, if (b) holds, then the share of employment 
in the formal sector will decrease with reductions in t  .
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Chapter 2. Informality and Taxes in Mexico
2.1. Introduction
In the recent theoretical literature, when modelling the informal sector it is generally 
assumed that there exists a direct relationship between the tax burden and regulations 
faced by firms and workers, and the likelihood of informal employment in the economy. 
For example, Boeri, T. and P. Garibaldi (2001) use a matching model where shadow 
employment emerges in equilibrium as the endogenous response of firms and workers 
who fell overburdened by taxes and regulations. Rauch, J. E. (1989) develops a model 
in which the decision of formality and informality is endogenously determined as a 
function of the minimum wage imposed by the government. Fortin, B., N. Marceau and 
L. Savard (1997) build a model with firm heterogeneity in which an increase in either 
corporate taxes, taxes on wages paid to the employees, or the minimum wage imposed 
by the government lead to a larger informal sector. Ihrig, J. and K. S. Moe (2001) 
develop a dynamic model that shows how tax rates and enforcement policies influence 
the size of the informal sector. Other models with similar implications can be found in 
Albrecht, J., L. Navarro and S. Vroman (2006), Azuma, Y. and H. I. Grossman (2002), 
Loayza, N. V. (1996), and Marcouiller, D. and L. Young (1995).
However, the related empirical literature available to date indicates that there is still 
mixed evidence on this issue20. For example, Cebula, R. J. (1997) examines the impact 
of federal income tax rates, IRS penalties on unpaid tax liabilities, and audit rates of the 
Internal Revenue Service on the size of the underground economy in the United States. 
He finds that the maximum marginal personal income tax rate raises the size of the 
underground economy, which is also a decreasing function of both the percentage of tax 
returns audited and the penalties imposed by the IRS on unpaid taxes. In contrast, 
Dabla-Norris, E., M. Gradstein and G. Inchauste (2005) analyze the determinants of 
informality on a cross-section of countries using data from the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBES) compiled by the World Bank. They find that the quality 
of the legal framework is crucially important in determining the size of the informal 
sector, whereas the significance of taxes, regulations, and financial constraints is
20 A comprehensive review o f empirical studies in this topic can be found in S c h n e id e r , F. (2004): 
"Shadow Economies around the World: What Do We Really Know?" European Journal o f Political 
Economy, Vol. 21, pp. 598-642., and S c h n e id e r , F., and D. H. E n s t e  (2000): "Shadow Economies: Size, 
Causes, and Consequences," Journal o f  Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 77-114.
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reduced in the context of a well functioning legal system. Other studies, such as Auriol, 
E. and M. Warlters (2004), Friedman, E., S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann and P. Zoido- 
Lobaton (2000), and Straub, S. (2005) find that the size of the informal sector also 
depends on other factors, like the fixed costs of entry to the formal economy, the burden 
of bureaucracy and corruption from the authorities, or the financial development of the 
economy. Finally, the literature on the elasticity of the income tax base also provides 
some indirect evidence. Gruber, J. and J. Rauh (2005) study the relationship between 
corporate taxable income and the corporate tax rate. They find strong evidence that the 
corporate tax base is elastic with respect to the marginal effective tax rate, but that this 
elasticity is fairly small compared to the one normally found for individual income 
taxation. Other related contributions are Gruber, J. and E. Saez (2002), and Cowell, F. 
A. and J. P. F. Gordon (1988).
Thus, in order to shed more light on the nature of the relationship between taxes and the 
informal sector, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by studying the effect 
of two controversial tax policies that took place in Mexico between 1989 and 2002. The 
first one is the introduction of a 2 % asset tax, which affected both firms and individuals 
with entrepreneurial activities in all sectors of the economy, apart from the financial 
sector. Its objective was to protect the fiscal revenue from two important sources of 
distortion: the 2-digit inflation rates experienced in Mexico during the 1980s, and which 
severely affected the income tax base; and the frequent manipulation of transfer prices 
by firms with subsidiaries, particularly the multinational companies. The asset tax 
became effectively a minimum tax for firms and individuals that attempted to evade 
taxes by declaring lower profits or even net losses, but on the other hand it also 
represented an important disincentive for foreign investment. Its fairness and efficiency 
have been the subject of an intense debate since its introduction in 1989. A recent 
example of this came in January 2007, when the Asset Tax Law was modified in order 
to eliminate the possibility of deducting any kind of debt from the calculation of its tax 
base, which some analysts estimate will increase by approximately 400%21. This new 
scenario has generated a wave of appeals for legal protection against the reform,
99particularly from multinational firms in the Automobiles industries .
21 According to El Economista -a  renowned Mexican business newspaper, Price Waterhouse Coopers has 
estimated that the companies with assets that are insufficient to generate at least a 4.4% profit margin are 
the ones that are going to be more severely affected by the reform. Approximately 4.8% out of the 
4,007,000 small and medium sized formal firms in the country are in this situation, and these firms 
represent 5.2% of the Mexican GDP.
22 See for example the article “Comienzan amparos contra impuesto al activo” by Susana Gonzalez G., in 
the Mexican newspaper La Jornada, www.iomada.unam.mx. on the 18th o f January, 2007.
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The second policy is the elimination of the optional accelerated depreciation (OAD) 
scheme during the years 1999 to 2001, which affected firms that had investments in 
regions other than the three main metropolitan areas in Mexico (i.e., Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, and Monterrey). For many years, the OAD represented an effective system 
used by the federal government to promote decentralization through the stimulation of 
investment and the creation of formal employment. The 1999-2001 reforms were 
essentially changes in the real discount rate allowed by the government to calculate the 
present value of depreciation allowances. Originally aimed at overcoming a shortfall in 
government revenue caused by low international oil prices, the elimination of the OAD 
scheme in 1999 generated a significant increase in the cost of investment undertaken by 
firms outside the above mentioned cities. Verdugo, A. R. (2006) estimates the elasticity 
of business investment with respect to this policy at -2 . 0  approximately, a very large 
figure compared to the -0.7 consensus value for the U.S. case. Furthermore, he shows 
that in industries such as the Automobile Parts the user cost of capital -or the firm’s 
“subjective” value of a unit of capital in units of contemporaneous output- increased 
drammatically by almost 40%.
Using an industry model with heterogeneous firms to study the possible implications of 
these tax reforms for the labour markets, it is predicted that both the introduction of an 
asset tax and the elimination of the optional accelerated depreciation scheme would be 
expected to raise the rate of informality in the steady state. Intuitively, regarding the 
asset tax, its implementation raised unambiguously the fiscal burden faced by the formal 
sector, and this would be expected to make less attractive for firms to step out of 
informality. On the other hand, the elimination of the OAD scheme translated into a 
higher cost of investment outside the three main cities in the country, and the expected 
consequence of this would be that it makes relatively more difficult for firms in this 
region to generate formal employment. In order to measure these effects empirically, the 
1987-2002 Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour (ENEU) dataset is used to obtain 
estimates of the unregistration rate (i.e., the fraction of workers without any social 
security or health coverage) for each 4-digit industry in each city included in the sample 
at each point in time. As discussed in the previous chapter, unregistration is just one 
side of informality, and even though this implies limitations to the validity of the 
results, it is an effective reduced-form measure of informality that can be easily 
obtained from employee data collected through a household survey. These estimates are 
then used as the dependent variable in a differences-in-differences approach to exploit 
the cross-sectional variation in the effect that the tax reforms had on different sectors
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and regions of the Mexican economy. In addition, for the case of the elimination of the 
optional accelerated depreciation scheme, the derivation in Jorgenson, D. W. (1963) is 
followed to see how this tax reform would have also translated into an increase in the 
user cost of capital, and therefore that a positive relationship between this variable and 
the rate of unregistration should exist. This hypothesis is tested directly, using 
individual level data from the April-June ENEU interviews together with the 1994-2002 
Mexican Annual Industrial Survey (EIA) database, which allows constructing an 
estimate of the user cost of capital for each 4-digit industry by region (i.e., the three 
main metropolitan areas and elsewhere in the country) and by year. The econometric 
analysis suggests that the positive relationship between taxes and informality generally 
assumed in the theoretical literature not always holds, and that whenever it does the 
response of the likelihood of informal employment to changes in the level of taxes is 
rather heterogeneous, depending both on the particular economic sector and the nature 
of the tax policy in question. For the case of the asset taxation, the differences-in- 
differences estimates indicate no significant or robust effect on the unregistration rate, 
even when it is allowed to differ across the nonfinancial sectors, relative to the financial 
one (which is the control group). On the other hand, for the case of the elimination of 
the optional accelerated depreciation scheme, the differences-in-differences estimation 
yields significant effects on unregistration in some of the manufacturing industries. In 
particular, it is obtained that this policy translated into an average increase of 4 
percentage points in unregistration for the Food, beverages & tobacco and the Other 
manufacturing industries. Finally, even though ordinary least squares estimation 
suggests that there exists a positive relationship between the user cost of capital and 
unregistration, instrumental variables estimation indicate that the variation in the former 
due to the elimination of the OAD scheme does not affect unregistration in a significant 
way.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a brief description 
of the Mexican corporate tax system and the above mentioned tax reforms. Section 2.3 
develops the theoretical model used in studying their possible implications for 
informality. Section 2.4 gives a description of the main trends in unregistration across 
sectors and regions, during the periods of interest. Section 2.5 conducts the formal 
econometric analysis. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2. The Mexican Corporate Tax System and the Tax Reforms
This section briefly describes the relevant aspects of the Mexican corporate tax system 
and the two tax reforms analysed in this chapter. The first one is the introduction of a 
2% asset tax in 1989, which affected both firms and individuals with entrepreneurial 
activities in all sectors of the economy, apart from the financial sector. The second is the 
elimination of the optional accelerated depreciation scheme for the years 1999 to 2001, 
and which affected firms that had investments in regions other than the three main 
metropolitan areas in Mexico.
2.2.1. The Mexican corporate tax system
According to the Mexico 2000 Business Directory, the Mexican tax system has been 
subjected to comprehensive tax reform legislation during the last 25 years, in an attempt 
to make it continuously compatible with the tax systems of Mexico’s most important 
trading and investment partners, such as the United States. The Mexican tax system 
divides tax payers into four groups: resident corporations and other associations taxable 
as corporations; resident individuals; non-resident corporations and individuals; and 
non-profit organizations. The principal taxes payable by individuals and corporations 
operating in Mexico are those levied by the federal government. State and municipal 
governments have more limitations and are not authorized to levy general corporate 
income taxes. The main taxes at the federal level are the income tax, the asset tax, the 
value-added tax, the special tax on production and services (STPS), the import and 
export taxes, and the payroll taxes. On the other hand, the main taxes at the local level 
are the tax on real property, the tax on salaries (payable by the employer), and the tax on 
acquisition of real property. The federal corporate income tax rate is 35%, and the 
personal income tax rate is progressive with a maximum rate of 35%. There is full 
integration of the personal and corporate tax systems in Mexico: once a corporation has 
paid its income tax, after-tax earnings may be distributed to the shareholders without 
any further tax. The asset tax is payable at the rate of 2% of the value of the assets of 
corporations. It is a minimum tax in the sense that it is only payable if it exceeds the 
regular corporate income tax due. Also, the Mexican Constitution mandates firms to 
distribute 10% of pre-tax income to workers and employees each fiscal year. This 
profit-sharing scheme increases the burden of corporate taxation. Regarding the payroll 
taxes, the Federal Labour Law requires corporations to make social security and other
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labour related contributions, such as those made to the National Worker’s Housing 
Institute or the Premium for Occupational Risks; which all together can amount to up to 
35% of the payroll. Social security contributions must be withheld and paid by an 
employer and remitted to the Mexican Institute for Social Security every month. 
Additionally, employers are required to contribute to their employees’ social security. 
Both contributions are based on a percentage of the employees’ wages, and as with the 
corporate taxes described above, they also increase the tax burden on firms.
2.2.2. The asset tax reform
According to Garcia-Verdu, R. (1996), asset taxation was introduced in Mexico as a 
response to the decline in tax collection due to two main factors. The first one was the 
high inflation rates experienced by the country during the 1980’s, which affected the tax 
base by distorting the measurement of benefits, interest payments, and the returns to 
capital of the firms (see for example, Feldstein, M. (1982)). The second factor was the 
manipulation of the prices that multinational firms set internally to carry out 
transactions between their different units (i.e. between the headquarters and the 
subsidiaries). These prices are known as transfer prices, and they are frequently used by 
transnational enterprises to reduce their overall fiscal burden.
Because of this reduction in fiscal revenues, the Mexican Congress passed the Asset 
Tax Law (Ley del Impuesto al Activo de las Empresas) on the 30th of December 1988, 
which came into effect on January 1st, 198923. This law established a 2% tax on the 
average value of assets owned by firms and individuals with any entrepreneurial 
activity. The financial sector was exempted from this tax because the government 
concluded that it already had appropriate mechanisms to control taxpayers in these 
activities; and also because applying an asset tax to this sector would translate into 
double taxation, as the assets of the financial sector are at the same time means of 
production for the rest of the economy.
The asset tax became effectively a minimum tax for firms and individuals that 
attempted to evade taxes by reporting losses through the manipulation of transfer prices. 
Even though most of the economic agents thought of it as a measure against informality, 
it is important to stress that the introduction of this tax raised the burden on firms that 
were using legal methods to pay low taxes, and not to raise revenue from those who
23 The Asset Tax Law was originally published in the Official Journal o f the Federation (Diario Oficial de 
la Federacion), and was lastly modified on the 1st of December, 2004. The text can be found in the 
website of the Mexican Congress, at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/76.pdf.
85
were illegally avoiding them (i.e., informal firms). The asset tax is complementary to 
the income tax, in the sense that firms and individuals reporting benefits can deduct the 
latter from the payment of the former. Finally, in order to avoid taxation of 
unproductive assets, it was not required to pay this tax during the first four years of 
business.
2.2.3. The reforms to the Optional Accelerated Depreciation (OAD) scheme
The second reform considered in this analysis is the one corresponding to the changes in 
the Mexican depreciation rules. As described in Verdugo, A. R. (2006), depreciation 
allowances in Mexico are based on a straight-line method of deductions for fixed assets. 
The specific percentage deduction for each asset is specified in the Income Tax Law 
(Ley del ISR). For machinery and equipment, this percentage also depends on the 
industry in which it is used. By 1994, depreciation rules also included the option to 
immediately expense the present discounted value of future depreciation allowances 
using a fixed real discount rate of 5%. This Optional Accelerated Depreciation (OAD) 
scheme was only applicable to investment expenditures undertaken outside the three 
main metropolitan areas of the country (i.e. Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey), 
and for many years this system was used by the government to promote 
decentralization.
In the aftermath of the 1995 financial crisis, the Mexican government approved some 
measures designed to boost economic activity, growth and investment. These measures 
included a decrease in the discount rate to calculate the OAD rate from 5% to 3%, 
which increased considerably the value of depreciation allowances. By the end of 1998, 
the federal government presented to the Congress a series of reforms designed to 
increase government revenue collections. The approved law included the elimination of 
the OAD system, which was replaced with a system of differential taxation of retained 
earnings over distributed earnings.
During 2001, the federal government promoted the discussion of a fundamental tax 
reform. The discussion included the academia, tax advisors, corporations, and the 
government. At the end, failures in the political negotiations at the Congress resulted in 
a new tax law that was far from a fundamental reform. The OAD system was reinstalled 
with a discount rate of 6% while the preferential treatment of retained earnings was 
abandoned. The OAD immediate expense in the approved system, however, was not 
allowed to be made in the year of acquisition, but until the next one. The government
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noticed that the system of OAD was considerably less effective than the one in effect in 
1998, both because of the high discount rate and because of the deferral rule. For this 
reason, the Income Tax Law was further modified in 2003, decreasing the discount rate 
to 3% and allowing the immediate expense to be done partially (one third) in the year of 
acquisition, and the rest (two thirds) in the following year. Finally, for the fiscal year 
2004 the deferral rule was two thirds in the first year and one third in the second, and 
for fiscal year 2005 and beyond, it was possible to expense the full present discounted 
value in the same year of acquisition.
2.3. A Model of Taxes and Informality
This section develops an industry model with heterogeneous firms to study the possible 
implications of the aforementioned tax reforms on informality. The model can be 
related to the Melitz, M. J. (2003) model and the Ramsey model with adjustment costs 
for investment (see for example Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp. 152-160). 
To begin, assume that the preferences of the representative consumer are defined over a 
continuum of goods, and that there is a continuum of firms in a particular industry. 
Also, assume that the production function in both the formal and the informal sector is 
Cobb-Douglas with decreasing returns to scale:
F,(L,K)=<pL°Kli 
Ff (L,K) = <p ( \ + X)L“K p
where the subscripts I  and F  refer to the informal and the formal sector, respectively, 
a  + p  < 1 , (p is a firm-specific productivity parameter drawn from a common
distribution before entering the industry, and (l + X) reflects the fact that firms in the 
formal sector are in general more productive than firms in the informal sector24. Each 
firm owns its stock of capital, which changes according to the following accumulation 
process equation:
K  = I - S K  (2.2)
24 An example o f this could be that, unlike firms in the informal sector, firms in the formal sector do not 
need to hide from the authorities and therefore can get involve in trade more easily, which could translate 
into a wider access to better technologies, intermediate goods, and raw materials.
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where I  is gross investment and 8  is the economic depreciation rate. The cost of 
investment in each sector is given by:
(2.3)
where y > 0  and cr > 0  are the adjustment costs in the informal and the formal sector, 
respectively, and it may be the case that y < a  due to governmental regulations in the 
formal sector (such as the implementation or the elimination of the OAD scheme). 
Firms in the informal sector pay the real competitive wage rate w to their employees,
a partition of firms between the formal and informal sectors to exist in equilibrium, it is 
assumed that X > b , so that the higher productivity in the formal sector more than 
compensates for the higher marginal cost of labour. Also, every period there is a fixed 
cost associated with production in each sector / 7 and f F , where f t < f F as firms in the 
formal sector have to deal with registrations, corruption, and bureaucracy from the 
authorities. Furthermore, firms in the formal sector have to pay taxes on corporate 
profits. For every period in which a given firm reports net gains, it pays a fraction rc of
them to the government. On the other hand, no tax is paid for the periods in which the 
firm reports net losses. Let p  represent the exogenous probability of a bad economic 
shock leading the firm to incur in net losses. The expected value of after-tax corporate 
profits n  in any period is then equal to:
while firms in the formal sector pay taxes and worker benefits over wages, w(l + b). For
E(it) = (l -  p \ 1 -  rc \<p(\ + l)LaK f  -  w(l + b)i]+ p[<p(\ + X)LaK fi -  w(l + b)i]
= [(1 -  />Xl -  rc)+ p \v (1 + f  -»{l + b)i]
= e[(p{\ + l)L “ K fl -  h{] + b)i]
(2.4)
where 0 = ( \ - p ^ \ - r €)+ p . Under these considerations, a firm’s net cash flow is then 
given by:
r
NCF, = <pVKf  - w L - I - r  f ,
NCFf = o[(p{\ + A)FJK /) -  vr{l + b ) l ] - 1 - a - —  f F
K
(2.5)
8 8
Thus, assuming a constant interest rate between times 0 and t, the firm’s objective is to 
choose L and I  at each date in order to maximize its present discounted value:
subject to equation (2.2) and an initial value of capital K 0. At the margin, the decision 
of a firm of whether to become informal or formal will be based on the comparison of 
the expected present discounted values of these maximized net cash flows, V]e. Given
that firms in the informal sector evade taxes, every period they face a positive 
probability 0 < s  < 1 of being caught by the government. Assume that if this happens, 
the government forces them to close down. Thus, a firm will be indifferent to becoming 
formal whenever -  V* = 0 , or equivalently:
Solving this last expression for (p, it is possible to obtain a cut-off productivity 
parameter for formality as a function of all the other parameters in the model (see 
appendix 2 A. 1): <p* = (p(a, /?, w, 6 , X, r, <j , y , 8,6, f j , f F ). Any firm drawing a
productivity parameter <pxp* will choose to produce in the formal sector.
2.3.1. The effect o f asset taxation on informality
As discussed in the previous section, the asset tax can be interpreted as a minimum tax 
for firms in the formal sector. In terms of the model described here, its introduction 
requires the modification of equation (2.4). Let ra be the asset tax rate. As before, for
any given period a firm reporting net gains will pay r cn  to the government as corporate 
income tax. If instead the firm suffers net losses, the firm will now be required to pay 
raK . Thus, the new expected value of afier-tax corporate profits for any firm in the 
formal sector is given by:
(2.6)
f e~"NCFF(t)dt-  f°e ”( l- e)NCF,(t)dt = 0 (2.7)
(2.8)
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Hence, the introduction of the asset tax translates into an increase in the expected taxes
d(p*on corporate profits. Given that > 0 (see appendix 2A.2), this reform will be
expected to generate an increase in the cut-off productivity level for formality, inducing 
less firms to exit the informal sector.
2.3.2. The effect o f the OAD reforms on informality
As discussed in Verdugo, A. R. (2006), the reforms to the depreciation rules conducted 
by the Mexican government in the 1990’s are essentially changes in the real discount 
rate allowed by the government to calculate the present value of depreciation 
allowances. Following the well known derivation in Jorgenson, D. W. (1963), the user 
cost of capital (COC) can be shown to be a decreasing function of this present value25. 
Eliminating the OAD scheme translates into an increase in the real discount rate of 
depreciation allowances, and consequently into a reduction of their present value, 
followed by an increase in the COC. In the present context, such policies are captured 
by changes in the parameters a  and y . Thus, given that the informal sector does not 
comply with governmental regulations, the effect of the OAD reforms in our model can
d(p *be summarized as an increase in a  only. As shown in appendix 2A.3, — > 0,
da
implying that an increase in the real discount rate of depreciation allowances in the 
formal sector due to the elimination of the OAD scheme generates an increase in the 
cut-off productivity for formality, inducing less firms to exit the informal sector.
2.4. Main Trends in Unregistration
The model developed in the previous section, together with the nature of the tax reforms 
exposed in section 2.2, implies that the effect of introducing an asset tax in Mexico at 
the end of the 1980’s would have generated an increase in the rate of informality in all 
industries, compared to the financial sector. On the other hand, the model also suggests 
that the governmental decision of eliminating the OAD scheme during the years 1999 to 
2 0 0 1  would have contributed to an increase in the rate of informality for all the regions
25 The user cost o f capital is the firm’s subjective value o f a unit o f capital in units o f output. In terms of 
the Ramsey model with adjustment costs for investment, it corresponds to the current-value shadow price 
o f installed capital in units o f contemporaneous output. See Barro, J. R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (2004), p. 
153 for more detail.
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Figure 2.1. Annual Unregistration Rate in the Financial and Non Financial Sectors 1987-1994
Non Finance'Finance
other than the three main metropolitan areas of the country. It is important to note that 
these predictions refer to the effects of the tax policies on the steady state level of 
informality, and that a different relationship between the policies and the level of social 
security registration may arise during the transition towards the new equilibrium, given 
that registration is just one of the many sides of informality. In order to study these 
effects empirically, the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour (ENEU) dataset is 
used to obtain an estimate of the unregistration rate for each 4-digit industry in each city 
at each point in time26. The ENEU survey is conducted by the National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography and Computing (INEGI) since 1983. It provides information 
about the state of the Mexican labour market, the main socio demographic 
characteristics of the household members aged 1 2  and above, and housing in the 
principal urban areas of the country. It is carried out on a quarterly basis. From 1983 to 
1984 the ENEU survey covered only the three main cities in Mexico (Mexico City, 
Guadalajara and Monterrey). Between 1985 and 1991 its geographical coverage was 
expanded to 16 cities, within which the main cities at the Mexico-U.S. border were 
included (Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and Tijuana). Between 1992 and 
2000 another 32 cities were gradually incorporated to the sample. For the analysis of the 
asset taxation the 1987-1994 datasets are used, and for the analysis of the OAD reforms 
the 1994-2002 files are used. Also, for the latter case attention is restricted to the
26 Following the definition used in A leman-Castilla, B. (2006): "The Effect o f Trade Liberalization on 
Informality and Wages: Evidence from Mexico," CEP Discussion Papers, No. 763, pp. 1-68., a person is 
classified as working in the unregistered sector if  he or she runs a firm o f 6 or less employees and does 
not have any kind of social or health insurance (unregistered self-employed), if  he or she works for a firm 
of any size and does not have any kind o f social or health insurance (unregistered salaried), and if he or 
she works without receiving any kind of payment (unpaid workers).
91
manufacturing industries, as part of the analysis developed later in this chapter will rely 
on information obtained from the Annual Industrial Survey (described below), a data 
source exclusive to this economic sector.
Looking first at the evolution of unregistration over time, and starting with the asset 
taxation case, figure 2 . 1  plots the annual unregistration rates in the financial and non 
financial sectors for the 1987-1994 period. The difference between both series remains 
basically constant during the first three years, it then decreases slightly during 1990, and 
it diminishes significantly in 1991 due to a marked increase in the unregistration rate of 
the “non treated” financial sector. This latter effect may be mainly related to the 
privatization process of the Mexican banks, conducted by the federal government
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between 1991 and 1992 . The graph apparently suggests that the introduction of the tax 
in 1989 may not have had an important effect on unregistration. At a higher level of 
disaggregation, the graphs in figure 2 . 2  plot the difference in rates of unregistration 
between the financial sector and each one of the non financial sectors separately. A 
negative differential indicates that the rate of unregistration was higher in the financial 
sector than in the corresponding non financial one. The graphs show a temporary 
increase in unregistration for the Farms, forestry & fishing; Mining; Hotels, restaurants 
& trade; and Services sectors, relative to the financial sector between 1988 and 1990, 
and which could be related to the introduction of the asset tax. However, most of the 
sectors show a decline in unregistration relative to the financial sector after 1991, 
indicating that other more important factors (such as the privatization of the banking 
system) are taking place during the same period and that they could be affecting the 
social security payment decisions of the economic agents in a more strong way.
In order to get an idea of the relevance of the asset tax from the authorities’ point of 
view, table 2.1 presents some statistics on the Mexican fiscal revenue decomposed by 
the most important taxes. The data comes from the Secretariat of Finance, which is the 
most reliable and complete source for this kind of information. However, it has two 
disadvantages: first, there is no public data for the years before 1990; and second, there 
is no specific disaggregation for the asset tax, which is included in the Other taxes
27 In 1982, as a response to the financial crisis that affected the country, the administration o f President 
Jose Lopez Portillo decided to nationalize all the Mexican banking system. The financial sector remained 
under absolute control by the government until 1991, when the administration o f President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari decided to return the control of the banks to private investors, in order to achieve a higher level 
of efficiency in the Mexican economy. For more detail, see M u r il l o , J. A. (2002): "La Banca En 
Mexico: Privatizacion, Crisis Y Reordenamiento," Direccion de Estudios Economicos de Banco de 
Mexico, pp. 1-55.
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Figure 2.2. Unregistration Differentials between the Financial and Non Financial Sectors
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Table 2.1. Mexico's Total Fiscal Revenue by Main Taxes, 1990-2002 (Millions of current USD)
Total IncomeTax
% o f Total VAT % o f Total IEPS % o f Total Im ports % o f Total
O ther Taxes 
(including 
asset tax)
% o f Total
1990 26,388 10,979 42% 8,869 34% 3,730 14% 2,125 8% 686 3%
1991 33,089 13,995 42% 10,591 32% 4,138 13% 3,228 10% 1,137 3%
1992 40,689 18,599 46% 9,775 24% 5,839 14% 4,136 10% 2,341 6%
1993 46,072 22,278 48% 10,661 23% 6,217 13% 4,082 9% 2,835 6%
1994 39,023 17,745 45% 9,380 24% 6,802 17% 3,093 8% 2,003 5%
1995 22,199 9,607 43% 6,750 30% 3,221 15% 1,453 7% 1,168 5%
1996 28,731 12,352 43% 9,167 32% 3,775 13% 1,888 7% 1,549 5%
1997 38,428 16,634 43% 12,034 31% 5,584 15% 2,229 6% 1,948 5%
1998 40,846 17,125 42% 12,113 30% 7,740 19% 2,171 5% 1,697 4%
1999 55,322 22,919 41% 16,032 29% 11,315 20% 2,895 5% 2,160 4%
2000 61,473 27,344 44% 20,037 33% 8,617 14% 3,473 6% 2,001 3%
2001 71,488 31,169 44% 22,751 32% 12,083 17% 3,155 4% 2,330 3%
2002 71,187 31,120 44% 21,352 30% 13,319 19% 2,662 4% 2,553 4%
Total 574,934 251,866 44% 169,511 29% 92,380 16% 36,590 6% 24,407 4%
Average 44,226 19,374 44% 13,039 29% 7,106 16% 2,815 6% 1,877 4%
Maximum 71,488 31,169 44% 22,751 32% 13,319 19% 4,136 6% 2,835 4%
M inimum 22,199 9,607 43% 6,750 30% 3,221 15% 1,453 7% 686 3%
Source: Subsecretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Direction General de Planeacion Hacendaria. Consulta de Series y Datos Historicos (1990-2007) VAT stands for Value 
Added Tax, and IEPS stands for Special Tax on Production and Services
category. Nevertheless, the fact that the aforementioned category represented about 4% 
of total fiscal revenue between 1990 and 2002, indicates that asset taxation is not a very 
important component of fiscal revenue28.
On the other hand, regarding the elimination of the OAD scheme, figure 2.3 shows the 
annual unregistration rates in the three main metropolitan areas (3MMA region) and the 
rest of the country (OAD region) for the 1994-2002 period. It can be seen that the 
response of unregistration to the 1994-1995 financial crisis was more severe in the latter 
region. The elimination of the optional accelerated depreciation scheme in 1999 does 
not seem to have an immediate effect on the negative trend of unregistration in the OAD 
region; but looking at the year 2 0 0 0 , the policy may not be allowing it to decrease as 
much as in the 3MMA region either.
Finally, figure 2.4 plots the differences in unregistration rates between the OAD and the 
3MMA regions, for each manufacturing industry separately. Apart from the Textiles, 
apparel & leather and the Other manufacturing cases, none of the graphs seems to 
contain clear evidence of an effect of the elimination of the OAD scheme on 
unregistration. However, there is a clear temporary shock in some of these figures in the 
year 2 0 0 0 , which could be indicative of a heterogeneous response of unregistration to 
the fiscal policies across sectors. But also, given that this effect is only present in one 
year, it could very well be a consequence of different factors.
28 Trillo, F. H., A. Zamudio, and J. P. G. Amparan (2000): "Los Impuestos En Mexico: Quien Los Paga 
Y Como?" Programa de Presupuesto y Gasto Publico, CIDE, pp. 1-18. suggest that the share of asset tax 
on total fiscal revenue was approximately 2% in 1998.
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Figure 2 3 .  Annual Unregistration Rate in the 3MMA and OAD regions, 1994-2002 
(manufacturing industries only)
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Thus, the trends presented in this section suggest that there is no evident and 
homogeneous response of unregistration to either of the tax policies across sectors and 
regions. The next section carries out the estimation of formal econometric models in 
order to obtain more precise results regarding these possible relationships.
2.5. Econometric Analysis
This section proceeds to the formal empirical estimation of the effect of these two tax 
reforms on unregistration. To do this we first use a differences-in-differences approach, 
and later on for the case of the OAD reform, the estimation of a more sophisticated 
model that allows exploiting the variation at the 4-digit industry level introduced by the 
referred policy on the user cost of capital is also attempted.
2 . 5 . 1 .  D i f f e r e n c e s - i n - d i f f e r e n c e s  a p p r o a c h
Let us begin by looking at the effect of the introduction of the asset tax in 1989. In order 
to avoid picking up the effect that the privatization of the banking system may have had 
on unregistration, the analysis here will be focused to the 1987-1990 period. The 
variation across sectors introduced by this tax is exploited in order to estimate the 
following equation:
4 ,  = « , + /?ir < T “' + P J a x T or + + 4 ,  (2.9)
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Figure 2.4. Unregistration Differentials between the OAD and 3M M A Regions by Industry
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Figure 2.4 (continued)
ODwr manufacturing
!
where <j)ict is the unregistration rate of industry i in city c at time t; a t is a set of 4-digit 
industry dummies; Taxpf f od is a dummy variable equal to 0 for all quarters between 
1987 and 1988, and is equal to 1 for all quarters between 1989 and 1990; Tax™for is a 
dummy variable equal to 0  for all the industries in the financial sector and equal to 1 
otherwise; Tjt is a set of quarter dummies; and eict is the error term. Equation (2.9) is
fitted using ordinary least squares, and robust standard errors clustered at the city level 
are calculated. The results are reported in table 2.2. Column 1 presents the basic 
estimation of the equation. There is no significant effect of the introduction of the asset 
tax on unregistration. In column 2 the Taxpetnod dummy is substituted for a group of
quarter dummies; and column 3 further adds city dummies and some labour force 
controls (i.e., means at the industry-city level of years of experience, years of schooling, 
fraction of married workers, fraction of males in the industry, and fraction of heads of 
households). Nevertheless, the insignificance of the effect of the tax policy on 
unregistration remains unchanged.
We then explore the possibility of a heterogeneous response of unregistration to the 
introduction of the asset tax by allowing the coefficients /?,, J32, and / ? 3 to differ across
all the non financial sectors. This is done by interacting the Tax^tnod, Tax™tor, and
(T a x x Tax^ tor) variables in equation (2.9) with a set of dummy variables for the
sectors listed in figure 2.2. The main results are reported in table 2.3, and the 
Manufacturing sector is left as the reference category. There are now some significant 
and opposite-signed effects for some of the sectors, which may provide some weak 
evidence of heterogeneity. However none of these results is robust to all the three 
specifications reported in the table.
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Table 2.2. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for the Effect of Asset Taxation on Unregistration
(1) (2) (3)
Taxperiod 0.004
[0.016]
Taxsector 0.763 *** 0.763 *** 0.637 ***
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030]
Taxperiod x Taxsector -0.003 -0.003 -0.006
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Constant 0.104 *** 0.093 *** 0.181 ***
[0.026] [0.032] [0.033]
No. Observations 46,751 46,751 46,742
R-squared 0.472 0.473 0.499
Labour force controls & city dummies NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
***, **, and * indicate significance a t the 1%, 5% , and  10% level, respectively. R obust standard  errors clustered at 
the  city level are shown in brackets. Labour force controls include m eans a t the industry-city  level o f  years o f  
experience, schooling, fraction o f  m arried w orkers, fraction o f  m ales, and  fraction o f  heads o f  households.
Next, a similar differences-in-differences analysis is done for the effect of the OAD 
scheme on unregistration in the manufacturing sector. The basic econometric 
specification is given by the following equation:
4 , = a, + pflAD ir°d + A O A D ':r + A {oADfcr “ * O A D ':r ) + n, +** (2.10)
in which O AD ^ioJ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for all quarters in the years 1994 to 
1998, and 2002 (i.e., for the period in which the OAD scheme applied); OAD™glon is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for all cities other than the three main metropolitan areas of 
Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey (i.e., the region in which the OAD scheme 
applied); and the rest of the variables are as defined for the previous case. Equation 
(2 .1 0 ) is also estimated using ordinary least squares and the estimated standard errors 
are again clustered at the city level. The results are reported in table 2.4. There is no 
evidence of a significant effect of the optional accelerated depreciation scheme on 
overall unregistration, and the results are the same regardless of the inclusion of quarter 
dummies (column 2) or city dummies and labour force controls (column 3)29.
29 One possibility for the insignificance o f the difference-in-difference estimates in this case is that, as 
shown in figure 2.3, the unregistration rates for the 3MMA and the OAD regions seem to follow 
somewhat different trends before the treatment in 1999 (mainly due to a stronger impact of the 1995 crisis 
in the latter region). In order to account for this, the model was also estimated (a) excluding the 1994- 
1996 years, and (b) using only the seven biggest cities in the OAD region as the treatment group (so as to
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Table 2.3. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for the Effect of Asset Taxation on Un registration by Sectors
(1) (2) (3)
Taxpcnotl x Taxsector (A) -0.008 -0.041 -0.042
[0.015] [0.046] [0.045]
(A)*Farms, forestry & fishing 0.021 0.003 0.003
[0.017] [0.050] [0.050]
(A)*Mining -0.066 ** -0.091 -0.073
[0.032] [0.078] [0.080]
(A)*Petroleoum & coal extraction 0.013 0.004 -0.004
[0.019] [0.025] [0.031]
(A)*Construction 0.002 0.007 0.014
[0.016] [0.043] [0.040]
(A)*Electricity, gas & water -0.002 0.029 0.032
[0.013] [0.035] [0.035]
(A)*Hotels, restaurants & trade 0.006 0.019 0.023
[0.008] [0.026] [0.023]
(A)*Transport & storage 0.0004 0.041 0.041
[0.013] [0.039] [0.035]
(A)*Personal, professional ans social services 0.016 ** 0.007 0.011
[0.008] [0.026] [0.024]
Constant 0.104 *** 0.121 *** 0.184 ***
[0.026] [0.042] [0.043]
No. Observations 46,751 ■ 46,751 46,742
R-squared 0.472 0.474 0.501
Labour force controls & city dummies NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
**.*, **, and  * indicate significance a t the 1%, 5% , and 10% level, respectively. R obust s tandard  errors clustered  a t the city  level 
are show n in brackets. In all the regressions the  reference category is the  M anufacturing  sector. L abour force controls include 
m eans a t the  industry-city  level o f  years o f  experience, schooling, fraction  o f  m arried  w orkers, fraction o f  m ales, and fraction  o f  
heads o f  households.
As in the case of the asset tax, we also explore the possibility of a heterogeneous 
response to this tax policy across different manufacturing industries, by including the 
interactions of the OAD^ nod, the OAD™fon, and the (oAD ^riod x OAD™g,on) variables
with a set of dummies for the 2-digit manufacturing industries listed in figure 2.4. The 
reference category is the Machinery & equipment group, and the results are reported in 
table 2.5. There are significant effects for the Food, beverages & tobacco and the Other 
manufacturing industries, with the signs of the coefficients as predicted by the model in
make it more similar to the control group. These cities are Puebla, Toluca, San Luis Potosi, Tijuana, 
Leon, Ciudad Juarez, and Torreon). In both cases the results o f these non-reported regressions where very 
similar to the ones shown in this section.
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Table 2.4. Differences-in-DifTerences Estimates for the Effect of the OAD Scheme on Unregistration
(1) (2) (3)
O A D period
OADregion
0.024 * 
[0.013]
0.053 *** 0.053 ***
[0.012] [0.012]
OADperiod x OADregion -0.009 -0.008 -0.009
[0.014] [0.014] [0.006]
Constant -0.064 *** -0.067 *** 0.185 **
[0.011] [0.018] [0.080]
No. Observations 91,198 91,198 91,191
R-squared 0.399 0.400 0.477
Labour force controls & city dummies NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% , and 10%  level, respectively. R obust standard  errors c lustered a t the 
c ity  level are show n in brackets. O D A  stands fo r the reg ion  outside the  three  m ain m etropolitan areas (M exico C ity, 
G uadalajara, and M onterrey), w here the optional accelerated  depreciation  schem e applied  in 1994-1998 and  2002. 
L abour force contro ls include m eans a t the industry-city  level o f  years o f  experience, schooling, fraction o f  m arried 
w orkers, fraction  o f  m ales, and  fraction o f  heads o f  households.
section 2.3. The estimates suggest that the rate of unregistration in the aforementioned 
manufacturing industries was significantly lower outside the three main metropolitan 
areas during the years in which the optional accelerated depreciation scheme was in 
place. These effects are robust to both the inclusion of quarter dummies in column 2, 
and the inclusion of city dummies and labour force characteristics in column 3.
Thus, the differences-in-differences estimates presented here suggest two main results: 
first, that the introduction of the asset tax in 1989 may have not had important 
implications for the levels of unregistration in Mexico; and second, as predicted by the 
theory, the elimination of the OAD scheme during the years 1999 to 2001 may have had 
derived in an increase in unregistration, but only for some manufacturing industries.
2.5.2. The OAD reforms, the user cost o f capital, and unregistration
In the last part of section 2.2 it was suggested that the elimination of the OAD scheme 
would be expected to translate into an increase in the user cost of capital (i.e., the firm’s 
subjective value of a unit of capital in units of output), and eventually into an increase in 
unregistration. We will now try to estimate the direct relationship between these two 
variables, in order to see whether changes in the COC due to changes in the OAD 
scheme are directly related to changes in the rate of informality.
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Table 2.5. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for the Effect of the OAD Scheme on Unregistration by Sectors
(1) (2) (3)
OADpenod x 0 ADreg,0n (A) 0.014 0.014 0.013
[0.015] [0.015] [0.010]
(A)*Food, beverages & tobacco -0.040 ** -0.040 ** -0.034 **
[0.016] [0.016] [0.015]
(A)*Textiles, apparel & leather -0.047 ** -0.048 ** -0.038 *
[0.021] [0.020] [0.020]
(A)*Wood products -0.026 -0.027 -0.024
[0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
(A)*Paper & printing -0.029 -0.029 -0.034 *
[0.021] [0.021] [0.020]
(A)*Chemical products -0.010 -0.010 -0.012
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
(A)*Nonmetallic mineral products 0.005 0.003 -0.005
[0.026] [0.027] [0.026]
(A)*Primary metals -0.040 -0.042 -0.049 *
[0.029] [0.028] [0.027]
(A)*Other manufacturing -0.067 ** -0.068 ** -0.068 **
[0.030] [0.031] [0.029]
Constant -0.108 *** -0.064 * 0.016
[0.020] [0.033] [0.077]
No. Observations 91,198 91,198 91,191
R-squared 0.401 0.403 0.479
Labour force controls & city dummies NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
***, **, and * indicate significance a t the 1%, 5% , and 10% level, respectively. R obust standard  errors clustered a t the city  level are 
shown in brackets. In all the regressions the reference category is  the M achinery &  equipm ent sector. O D A  stands fo r the  region 
outside the three  m ain m etropolitan areas (M exico C ity, G uadalajara, and  M onterrey), w here  the optional accelerated depreciation 
schem e applied in  1994-1998 and 2002. L abour force controls include m eans a t the  industry-city  level o f  years o f  experience, 
schooling, fraction o f  m arried w orkers, fraction o f  m ales, and fraction o f  heads o f  households.
The 1994-2002 Mexican Annual Industrial Survey (ELA) is used to obtain an estimate 
of the COC. The EIA survey is conducted by INEGI and it is housed at its headquarters 
in Aguascalientes, Mexico. Its objective is to generate information about the trends of 
the main economic variables of the national manufacturing sector. INEGI follows a 
non-random sampling procedure to determine the group of manufacturing plants to be 
surveyed. It excludes maquiladoras, basic petrochemical plants, refineries, and also 
micro-industry plants (i.e., plants with less than 15 employees). A small random sample 
of new plants is added every year. Among other things, this source contains annual 
measures of total employment, remunerations, operating costs, output, sales, income, 
assets, and depreciation. Due to confidentiality reasons, it was not possible to know the
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city in which each plant in the sample was located, but only whether they were in the 
3MMA region or the OAD region. Thus, the COC can only be estimated for each 4- 
digit industry by region and by year. The analysis in this section considers the user cost 
of capital related to machinery and equipment assets. Other types of assets, such as 
construction, land, and transportation equipment were used in non-reported analysis 
with very similar results. This is available from the authors upon request. Following 
Jorgenson, D. W. (1963), the user cost of capital is calculated as :
c o c  = Z ^ x ('- + f ) ><(1- r ) (2 .H )
P I1-* -)
where p K is the price of capital, p Y is the price of output, r is the required rate of 
return, 8  is the economic depreciation rate, and T is given by:
T = ITC + t z  (2.12)
where ITC refers to the investment tax credits and z is the present value of 
depreciation allowances:
^ N D R x V
with NDR equal to the Normal Depreciation Rate (i.e. the percentage of the purchase 
value of an asset that the government allows to deduct each year), V is the purchase 
value of an asset, and p  is the real discount rate, which for a plant in the OAD region is 
equal to the rate allowed by the government to calculate the accelerated depreciation; 
while for a plant in the 3MMA region it is equal to the riskless long term interest rate. 
Figure 2.5 plots the average unregistration rate and user cost of capital for the period of 
analysis. The series for unregistration increases approximately 2 percentage points to 
38% of total employment in 1995, as a consequence of the Mexican financial crisis. It 
then decreases gradually to 30% in 2000, year in which it experiences a new change in 
trend. On the other hand, the decrease in the cost of capital between 1995 and 1996 is 
mostly due to the fact that during this period the Mexican government reduced the 
discount rate to calculate the OAD rate from 5% to 3% so as to boost economic activity.
30 For a more detailed description of the construction o f this variable, see Appendix 2B.
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Figure 2.5. A verage A nnual U nregistration Rate and U ser Cost o f C ap ita l in the M anufacturing
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Finally, the effect of the elimination of the OAD scheme on this variable is also very 
clear from the graph, as the series increases by about 0.06 units from 1998 to 1999.
We now exploit the cross-sectional variation in the user cost of capital and proceed to 
estimate its relationship with unregistration. The baseline econometric specification is 
the following:
y,]t = a  + pCOCjrt + 77, + 0C + Hj + £ijt (2-14)
where y ijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if individual z in industry j  at time t works in
the unregistered sector, and is equal to 0 otherwise; COCjrt is the natural logarithm of
the user cost of capital for industry j  in region r at time /; 77, is a set of quarter dummies;
0C is a set of city dummies; /z; is a set of industry dummies; and s ijt is the error term.
Given that the ENEU survey has a panel structure and a quarterly frequency, and given 
that the cost of capital can only be constructed on a yearly basis, only the April-June 
interviews are used in the estimation of the model, so as to avoid autocorrelation 
problems and further complications with individual effects. Table 2.6 shows the results 
of fitting equation (2.14) by ordinary least squares, with the standard errors clustered at 
the industry level. The estimates in the first column suggest a positive and significant 
relationship between the user cost of capital and the rate of unregistration when the full 
1994-2002 sample is used. The second column shows that the results are robust to the 
inclusion of labour force controls, such as years of experience, years of schooling,
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Table 2.6. OLS Estimation of the Effect of the User Cost of Capital on Unregistration
1994-2002 1994-2002 1996-2002
COC 0.050 ** 0.052 ** 0.044 *
[0.023] [0.022] [0.025]
Constant -0.008 0.160 *** 0.108
[0.062] [0.059] [0.068]
No. Observations 140,761 140,741 120,006
R-squared 0.343 0.364 0.365
Labour force controls NO YES YES
City FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
***, **, and  * indicate s ignificance a t the  1%, 5% , and 10% level, respectively . R obust standard  errors 
clustered a t the  industry  level are show n in brackets. L abour force contro ls include years o f  experience, 
schooling, m arital status, gender, and household  position  (i.e. w hether the  individual is head  o f  househo ld  or 
not).
marital status, gender, and household position (i.e., whether the individual is head of 
household or not). Lastly, the third column shows the results when excluding the 
Mexican crisis years of 1994 and 1995, which is done in order to control for a possible 
correlation between the user cost of capital and the error term due to the aforementioned 
governmental decision of reducing the discount rate to calculate the OAD rate. Thus, 
the OLS estimates suggest a positive and significant relationship between unregistration 
and the user cost of capital, as predicted by the theoretical model discussed in section
2.3. The next step is to see whether changes in the COC due to the elimination of the 
OAD scheme affect the rate of unregistration or not. This is done using instrumental 
variables estimation, with the OAD policy variables as instruments for the cost of 
capital. That is, an equation like the following is first estimated:
COCjr, = a  + P f i A D ^  + P2OADr‘rf"" + p j (0AD ^mJ x O A D 'f°")+ £Jn (2.15)
where all the variables are as define before. The results of this first stage are reported in 
table 2.7. The coefficients in column 1 refer to the estimation of the basic equation 
(2.15), and they indicate a negative and highly significant effect of the OAD scheme on 
the user cost of capital, as expected. It means that whenever the optional accelerated 
depreciation policy is in place, the user cost of capital tends to be significantly lower. 
Column 2 reports the results when industry dummies are added to the model. This is 
done to account for the fact that the COC varies significantly across industries, due to 
the different levels of capital intensity between them. Finally, column 3 shows the
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Table 2.7. Instrumenting the User Cost of Capital with the OAD Policy
0 ) (2) (3)
OADperiod -0.013 -0.012
[0.015] [0.012]
OADregion -0.003 0.002
[0.005] [0.004]
OADpenod x OADregion -0.100 *** -0.101 *** -0.098 ***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.004]
Constant -1.362 *** -1.498 *** -1.317 ***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.023]
No. Observations 140,761 140,761 140,761
R-squared 0.110 0.450 0.892
City FE NO NO YES
Quarter FE NO NO YES
Industry FE NO YES YES
***, **, and * indicate s ignificance a t the 1%, 5% , and  10% level, respectively . R obust s tandard  errors 
clustered  a t the  industry  level are  show n in brackets. O D A  stands fo r the  region outside the three m ain 
m etropolitan areas (M exico  C ity, G uadalajara, and M onterrey), w here  the  optional accelerated  depreciation 
schem e app lied  in 1994-1998 and 2002.
results when the OADpenod and the OADregion variables are substituted with quarter and 
city dummies. For the reasons explained above, the specification in column 2 is 
considered to be the best one and its predicted value of COC is used in the second stage
•31
re-estimation of equation (2.14) reported here . The corresponding results are shown in 
table 2.8, which has the same structure as table 2.6 above. There is now no significant 
effect of the instrumented user cost of capital on unregistration, and the result does not 
change with the inclusion of labour force controls, nor with the elimination of the 
Mexican crisis years from the sample.
Thus, the results from the instrumental variables estimation of the relationship between 
the user cost of capital and the rate of unregistration suggest that the variation in the 
former due to the elimination of the OAD scheme does not affect the latter in a 
significant way. This seems to confirm the differences-in-differences results reported in 
tables 2.4 and 2.5 above, regarding the weakness of the effect of this tax policy on 
informality.
31 The results are virtually the same when using the predicted value of the user cost o f capital from the 
specifications in either column 1 or column 3 of table 2.7. The corresponding tables are available from the 
authors upon request.
Table 2.8. IV Estimation of the Effect of the User Cost of Capital on Unregistration
1994-2002 1994-2002 1996-2002
COC 0.015 0.018 0.074
[0.105] [0.102] [0.105]
Constant -0.053 0.118 0.157
[0.172] [0.167] [0.175]
No. Observations 140,761 140,741 120,006
R-squared 0.343 0.364 0.365
Labour force controls NO YES YES
City FE YES YES YES
Quarter FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
***, **, and  * indicate s ignificance a t the 1%, 5% , and  10%  level, respectively . R obust s tandard  errors 
c lustered  a t the  industry  level are show n in brackets. L abour force con tro ls  include years o f  experience, 
schooling , m arital status, gender, and  househo ld  position  (i.e. w hether th e  individual is head  o f  househo ld  
o r not).
2.6. Conclusions
In the recent theoretical literature, when modelling the informal sector it is generally 
assumed that there exists a direct relationship between the tax burden and regulations 
faced by firms and workers, and the likelihood of informal employment in the economy. 
However, the related empirical literature available to date indicates that there is still 
mixed evidence on this issue and only a few studies have been able to link corporate 
and individual decisions. To fill this gap in the literature, this chapter studied the effect 
of two important and controversial tax policies that took place in Mexico between 1989 
and 2002: the introduction of a 2% asset tax in 1989, and the elimination of the OAD 
scheme during the years 1999 to 2001, which affected firms with investments in regions 
other than the three main metropolitan areas in Mexico. Using an industry model with 
heterogeneous firms, it was predicted that both reforms would have been expected to 
generate an increase in the rate of informality in the steady state. The econometric 
analysis developed in the present work suggests that the response of the likelihood of 
unregistered employment (which is one of the many characteristics of informality) to 
changes in the level of corporate taxes is rather heterogeneous, depending both on the 
particular economic sector and the nature of the tax policy in question. For the case of 
the asset taxation, there is no evidence of a significant effect on unregistration, even 
when allowing for different relationships across different economic sectors. This is an 
important result in itself, given that the objective of introducing such a tax was the 
reduction of tax evasion, and most of the people saw it as a measure against informality.
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For the case of the elimination of the OAD scheme, differences-in-differences 
estimation yields significant effects on unregistration in some of the manufacturing 
industries. It is obtained that this policy translated into an average increase of 4 
percentage points in unregistration for the Food, beverages & tobacco and the Other 
manufacturing industries. Finally, this chapter explored the possibility that this tax 
reform would have produced an increase in the user cost of capital and therefore that a 
positive relationship between this variable and the rate of unregistration should exist. 
This hypothesis allows exploiting an alternative source of variation to estimate the 
effect of the OAD reforms on unregistration. Even though ordinary least squares 
estimation suggested that there exists a positive and significant relationship between the 
user cost of capital and unregistration, instrumental variables estimation indicates that 
the variation in the former due to the elimination of the OAD scheme does not affect 
unregistration in a significant way.
2.7. References
A l b r e c h t , J., L. N a v a r r o , and S. V r o m a n  (2006): "The Effects of Labour Market 
Policies in an Economy with an Informal Sector," IZA Discussion Paper Series, 
No. 2141, pp. 1-31.
A l e m a n -C a s t il l a , B. (2006): "The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Informality and 
Wages: Evidence from Mexico," CEP Discussion Papers, No. 763, pp. 1-68. 
A u r io l , E., and M. W a r l t e r s  (2004): "Taxation Base in Developing Countries," 
Journal o f Public Economics, Vol. 89, pp. 625-646.
A z u m a , Y., and H. I. G r o s s m a n  (2002): "A Theory of the Informal Sector," NBER 
Working Paper Series, 8823, pp. 1-23.
B a r r o , R. J., and X. Sa l a -i-M a r t in  (2004): Economic Growth. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
B o e r i, T., and P. G a r ib a l d i (2001): "Shadow Activity and Unemployment in a 
Depressed Labour Market," Bocconi University, CEPR, and IGIER, pp. 1-35. 
C e b u l a , R. J. (1997): "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Government Tax and 
Auditing Policies on the Size of the Underground Economy: The Case of the 
United States, 1973-94," The American Journal o f Economics and Sociology, 
Vol. 56, pp. 173-185.
Co w e l l , F. A., and J. P. F. G o r d o n  (1988): "Unwillingness to Pay," Journal o f Public 
Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 305-321.
107
D a b l a -N o r r is , E ., M . G r a d s t e in , and G. In c h a u s t e  (2005): "What Causes Firms to 
Hide Output? The Determinants of Informality," IMF Working Papers, 
WP/05/160, pp. 1-33.
Fe l d s t e in , M. (1982): "Inflation, Capital Taxation, and Monetary Policy," in Inflation: 
Causes and Consequences, ed. by R. E. Hall. Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press.
Fo r t in , B., N. M a r c e a u , and L. S a v a r d  (1997): "Taxation, Wage Controls and the 
Informal Sector," Journal o f Public Economics, Vol. 6 6 , pp. 293-312.
F r i e d m a n , E ., S . Jo h n s o n , D. K a u f m a n n , and P. Z o id o -L o b a t o n  (2 0 0 0 ):  "Dodging 
the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries," 
Journal o f Public Economics, Vol. 76, pp. 459-493.
G a r c ia -V e r d u , R. (1996): "Un Modelo De Equilibrio General Dinamico Del Impuesto 
A1 Activo," Gaceta de Economia, Year 2, pp. 65-94.
G r u b e r , J., and J. Ra u h  (2005): "How Elastic Is the Corporate Income Tax Base?"
NBER, MIT, and University of Chicago, pp. 1-31.
G r u b e r , J., and E. S a e z  (2002): "The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and
Implications," Journal o f Public Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 1-32.
Ih r ig , J., and K . S. M o e  (2001): "Lurking in the Shadows: The Informal Sector and 
Government Policy," International Finance Discussion Papers, 664, pp. 1-22.
Jo r g e n s o n , D. W. (1963): "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior," American 
Economic Review, Vol. 53, pp. 247-259.
Lo a y z a , N. V. (1996): "The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple Model and 
Some Empirical Evidence from Latin America," Camegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, 45, pp. 129-162.
M a r c o u il l e r , D., and L. Y o u n g  (1995): "The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory 
State and the Informal Sector," American Economic Review, Vol. 85, pp. 630- 
646.
M e litz , M. J. (2003): "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and 
Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Vol. 71, pp. 1695-1725.
M u r il l o , J. A . (2 0 0 2 ):  "La Banca En Mexico: Privatizacion, Crisis Y
Reordenamiento," Direccion de Estudios Economicos de Banco de Mexico, pp. 
1-55.
R a u c h , J. E. (1989): "Modelling the Informal Sector Formally," Journal o f 
Development Economics, Vol. 35, pp. 33-47.
108
Sc h n e id e r , F. (2004): "Shadow Economies around the World: What Do We Really 
Know?" European Journal o f Political Economy, Vol. 21, pp. 598-642. 
S c h n e id e r , F., and D. H. En s t e  (2000): "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and 
Consequences," Journal o f Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 77-114. 
St r a u b , S. (2005): "Informal Sector: The Credit Market Channel," Journal o f 
Development Economics, Vol. 78, pp. 299-321.
T r il l o , F. H., A. Za m u d io , and J. P. G. A m p a r a n  (2000): "Los Impuestos En Mexico: 
Quien Los Paga Y Como?" Programa de Presupuesto y Gasto Publico, CIDE,
pp. 1-18.
V e r d u g o , A. R. (2006): "Tax Incentives and Business Investment: New Evidence from 
Mexico," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 1-56.
2.8. Appendix 2A
2A.I. The solution for <p
In this section we solve the model for the case in which the asset taxation is already in 
place. The steady state solution to the maximization problem in the informal sector is 
characterized by:
i
L ,=
a '- P  j} P q y
vv' * (r + 8  + yd1 + IryS 'f
K ,=
a ap '-a<p
wa(r + 8 + yd2 + 2  rySj
1 -a-L
(2A.1)
I I =8K]
Similarly, the solution to the maximization problem in the formal sector is given by:
109
Lr =
0^a '- f p 0(p^ + X)
1
1 -a-P
w1 p (l + b)] p [(l + 2 crS)r + (l + erS)S + p z a ^
i
K v = 0l-aa ap'~av(l + X)
wa (l + b)a [(l + 2 crS)r + (l + crS)S + p ra }
»1 - a
1 -a -p
(2 A. 2)
I F — SKF
Equations 2A.1 and 2A.2 can then be used to obtain an expression for the maximized 
net cash flows in the formal and the informal sectors. The net cash flow for a firm in the 
informal sector can be written as:
NCFj = a a p pq>
g (s  + yS2)+ g(r + 2ryS'f\ — a)
wa - f ,
(2A.3)
where g = \/{ \.-a  - p )  and N  = r + S  + yd1 + 2ryS . Similarly, the net cash flow in the 
formal sector is:
NCFf = ' e K-aa ap f <p{\+x)
g p ra + 8  + a S 1 + g(r + 2rtjS^\ — a)
w“ (l + 6 )“ g M tf~a)s
- f F (2A.4)
where M  = r + 2rcr8 + S  + <j S 2 + pTa. Now, since the limits of integration for the
present discounted value of a firm in the formal sector are the same as those in the 
informal sector, equation (2.7) can be written as:
f V "  [NCFf (t) -  (l -  e)NCF, (t)\Jt = 0 (2A.5)
Therefore, a firm will be indifferent between the formal and the informal sectors 
whenever NCFf ( /) - ( l  -  s)NCF} (/) = 0. Using equations A.3 and A.4, this implies:
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And solving for (p:
(p *  =
a * p P (j + Ay (j_ _ p e (i-«k0 + x y (p r a +S + uS1 )m “(1-o)s - c}*
(2A.7)
where C = (l + 6 )°® (l ~ s)N   ^ [a(1 — a ) —(s+ yS2)/?] is independent of cr and r a .
2A. 2. The effect o f asset taxation on informality.
In the model of section 2.3, the introduction of an asset tax translates into an increase in 
za. Therefore, the effect of this tax on the rate of informality is given by the derivative
of <p* with respect to ra. From equation 2A.7, and after some algebraic manipulation:
d(p'
g
P ^ 'p G  > 0
[fF -  (1  -  s ) f ,  ]g (1  + b f  M 1-2*-*
(2A.8)
where G = g(l -  a)(l + 2aS)r + M . Hence, an increase in r„ increases the equilibrium
cut-off productivity level for formality, which leads to a higher rate of informality in the 
steady state.
2A. 3. The effect o f the OAD reforms on informality.
Also as discussed in section 2.3, the reforms to the OAD scheme imply a change in the 
adjustment cost of investment for the formal sector, captured by the parameter or. Thus,
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the effect of these reforms on informality is given by the derivative of (p * with respect 
to a . Using equation 2A.7:
dp* _  1 
8cr g - 2  a - l
p ^ 'S D  > 0 (2A.9)
where D = g (1 -  + 2r)[) + 2aS)r + S M . Hence, an increase in cr increases the
equilibrium cut-off productivity level for formality, inducing more firms to produce in 
the informal sector.
2.9. Appendix 2B
Estimation o f the user cost o f capital (COC).
The user cost of capital is estimated at the 4-digit industry level for the two different
regions (3MMA or OAD) using equation 11 and the following inputs:
-  The capital-output price ratio {pK! p Y)'- is the output deflator for each 2-digit 
industry divided by the price index for fixed capital accumulation. 32 It was set equal 
to 1 in 2 0 0 2 .
-  Corporate Tax Rate ( r ) : comes from Income Laws, and was adjusted to include the 
burden of the profit sharing rate.
-  Real required rate of return (r): was assumed equal to the real riskless interest rate, 
plus a time varying risk premium equal to the difference between the short term 
nominal interest rate on private and government bonds. 33
-  Present discounted value of depreciation allowances (z ) :  calculated based on 
equation 13, using normal depreciation rates or the optional accelerated depreciation 
rates according to each plant location (OAD or 3MMA), from Income Tax Laws.
Economic depreciation (&) : estimated at the 6 -digit industry level using data from the
1984-1994 EIA panel, and assigned at the 4-digit industry level for each plant in the
1994-2002 EIA panel.
32 The first comes from the Mexican National Income and Product Accounts and the second from the 
Mexican Central Bank.
33 The real riskless rate is the rate on UDIBONOS (inflation indexed long term government bonds). The 
risk premium is the difference between the rate on private commercial paper and CETES (short term 
government bonds).
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Chapter 3. The Returns to Temporary Migration to the U.S.: 
Evidence from the Mexican Urban Employment Survey.
3.1. Introduction
Mexican migration to the United States has become a very important issue during the 
twentieth century. Many authors trace the beginning of this socio-economic 
phenomenon back to the late 1880s, linking it to the construction of the railroad 
between the two countries, just a few decades after the U.S. took Texas, New Mexico 
and California from Mexico. According to Martin, P. (1998), there have been three 
major phases of recruitment of Mexican workers authorized by the U.S. government, 
each one associated with a war-time emergency. The first one occurred in 1917, as a 
response to the labour force shortage due to World War I, and it is estimated that 
between 1917 and 1920 some 50,000 Mexican workers where admitted legally, most of 
them as farm workers. The second stage initiated in 1942 with the Bracero Program, 
when the U.S. and the Mexican governments concluded an agreement that permitted 
Mexican workers to enter the U.S. as emergency farm workers whenever the U.S. 
workers where not available. According to Craig, R. B. (1971), this program can then be 
divided in two phases: from 1942 to 1951, when the labour shortages in the U.S. where 
mainly due to the participation in the World War II and the U.S. government was the 
direct supervisor of the program; and then from 1951 to 1964, when U.S. growers where 
allowed to participate directly in the recruitment of Mexican workers to cover for the 
shortages generated by the Korean war. Nevertheless, it is believed that the main 
reasons for extending the program to 1964 were both the pressure coming from the 
Mexican government and the belief that the Bracero Program was the only way to 
control the increasing illegal immigration. Overall, between 1942 and 1964 
approximately 4.6 million Mexicans were admitted in the United States as temporary 
farm workers, and for some authors (see for example, Hanson, G. H. (2006) or Epstein, 
G. S., A. L. Hillman and A. Weiss (1999)), the end of this program marked the 
beginning of large-scale illegal immigration.
The relevance of Mexican migration to the United States has reached unprecedented 
levels during the last two decades. Apart from being the hottest topic in the bilateral 
agenda, it has also become a very important component of the economic relation 
between the two countries. To the south of the border, and according to data published
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by the Mexican Central Bank and the Mexican Institute of Statistics, Geography and 
Computing (INEGI)34, remittances of Mexican workers accounted for approximately 
2.3% of the GDP between 2003 and 2006, which makes it one of the most important 
sources of income for the economy. Woodruff, C. and R. Zenteno (2001) estimate that 
remittances are responsible for 2 0 % of the capital invested in micro enterprises 
throughout urban Mexico. On the other hand, to the north of the border, the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor estimates that 8.3% of the employed
•7C
people in the United States during 2004 and 2005 were from Mexican origin , and the 
increasing presence of Mexican illegal immigrants in the United States has been 
constantly generating debates among different groups of the population and the 
government, up to the point that in September 2006 the U.S. Congress approved a 
budget of 1 , 2 0 0  million dollars in order to build a 1 , 1 2 0  kilometers fence along the 
U.S.-Mexico border.
So, even though Mexican migration to the U.S. is almost as old as the countries 
themselves (as we know them today), its increasing complexity contributes to make it 
an even more attractive topic for research with the passing of time. To date, there is a 
huge body of literature that analyses many different aspects of this phenomenon, such 
as the characteristics of the migrants (Bustamante, J. A. et. al. (1998a); Durand, J. and 
D. S. Massey (1992)), the factors that influence migration (Massey, D. S. and K. E. 
Espinosa (1997); Latapi, A, E. et. al. (1998); Markusen, J. R. and S. Zahniser (1997); 
Papail, J. (1998)), the quantification of legal and illegal migrants (Woodrow-Lafield, K. 
A. (1998); Hanson, G. H. (2006); Bean, F. D. et. al. (1998); Bean, F. D., R. Corona, R. 
Tuiran, K. A. Woodrow-Lafield and J. V. Hook (2001)), the interconnectedness 
between international and regional migration in Mexico (Lozano-Ascencio, F., B. R. 
Roberts, and F. D. Bean (1996)), or the economic performance of Mexican migrants 
with respect to the U.S. labour market ( Boijas, G. J. (1982), (1987) and (1989); Boijas, 
G. J., and L. F. Katz (2006); Chiquiar, D. and G. H. Hanson (2005)). Interestingly 
though, it seems that the economic performance of migrants with respect to the Mexican 
labour markets has received far less attention, and this is precisely the area in which the 
present chapter attempts to contribute on.
The main objective of this chapter is to present new evidence on the effect that 
migration to the United States has on the earnings of Mexican workers. It adds to the
34 See http://www.banxico.org.mx/polmoneinflacion/estadisticas/balanzaPagos/balanzaPagos.html. and 
http://dgenesvp.inegi.gob.mx/cgi-win/bdieintsi.exe/Consultar. for some data on family remittances and 
quarterly GDP.
35 Estimated using data from the Current Population Survey. See http.7/www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaatl3.pdf and 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat9.pdf for more detail.
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existing literature by comparing the economic performance of these workers during 
their stay in the U.S. to their situation when they are back in Mexico. In order to do this, 
the present study focuses on temporary migration, and it uses data from the Mexican 
National Survey of Urban Labour (ENEU), for the period between 1994 and 2002. To 
my knowledge, the information on temporary migration collected by the ENEU has not 
been used in this type of studies before, even though it offers some noticeable 
advantages, like its quarterly coverage or its panel structure (which allows minimizing 
the problems of self-selection biases). Additionally, unlike other sources, the ENEU 
survey frequently contains information about the migrants even when they are not 
present, given that the informant is allowed to be different from the subject in these 
cases. Finally, the survey collects measures of different variables that may affect the 
migration decision at different levels, such as individual, household, geographic, or 
workplace characteristics.
To preview the most important results, fixed-effects estimates of the effect of temporary 
migration on real hourly earnings indicate that a Mexican worker earns on average 
112% more in the U.S. labour market than in Mexico during the period of migration. 
Temporary migrants also work on average 6.5% more hours per week during their stay 
abroad, a result that is consistent with the standard theory of the response of the labour 
supply to temporary positive shocks to real wages. Additionally, it is found that 
temporary migrant workers have a generally higher likelihood of non employment 
during the period of return migration. Lastly, the estimates of the interactions between 
migration and individual characteristics indicate that the effect of temporary migration 
on earnings is lower for more skilled workers and for those migrating from the most 
distant regions in Mexico, relative to the United States.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the data used in the 
analysis and provides a discussion about their representativeness and validity. Section 
3.3 presents a preliminary analysis of the characteristics and the determinants of 
temporary migration from the ENEU data, in order to compare them with the results 
obtained by other researchers. Section 3.4 develops the econometric estimation of the 
effect of temporary migration on hourly earnings, weekly hours worked, and the 
likelihood of employment. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2. Description and Representativeness of the Data
The present study uses data from the Mexican National Survey of Urban Labour 
(ENEU) to study temporary migration from Mexico to the United States. The period 
covered here goes from 1994 to 2002. The ENEU survey is carried out by the National 
Institute of Statistics, Geography and Computing (INEGI) since 1983. It provides 
information about the state of the Mexican labour market, the main socio-demographic 
characteristics of the household members aged 1 2  and above, and housing in the 
principal urban areas of the country. The survey is carried out on a quarterly basis, and 
the sample is divided in five independent panels, each one staying in it for five 
consecutive quarters (i.e. it is a rotative panel that allows following individuals for 1.25 
years). From 1983 to 1984 the ENEU survey covered only the three main cities in 
Mexico (Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey). Between 1985 and 1991 its 
geographical coverage was expanded to 16 cities, within which the main cities at the 
Mexico-U.S. border were included (Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo and 
Tijuana). Between 1992 and 2000 another 32 cities were gradually incorporated to the 
sample.
Regarding migration, the ENEU survey asks for the residential status of each person in 
the household. A person is then classified as temporarily absent emigrant if he or she 
was reported as absent from the household at the time of the interview, temporarily 
residing in a place outside the city where the household is, but still reported by the other 
members of the household as being part of it. The survey also asks for the temporary 
place of residence of the absent member, allowing the classification of the migratory 
movements as internal (i.e. between two Mexican states) and international migration. If 
the migration movement is internal, the informant is asked for the state to which the 
referred individual moved. If the migration movement is international, the informant is 
asked to report the country (if Guatemala, Belize, or the United States) or the region of 
the world (if some other country in the American continent or any other country of the 
world) in which the migrant is currently residing. If the person moved to the United 
States, the informant is further asked whether he or she moved to a state in the U.S.- 
Mexico border or to some other place. Finally, the ENEU survey also has some 
information regarding the reason for migrating, which allows for the classification of 
migrants as those migrating for work reasons, those migrating for study reasons, and 
those migrating for other reasons. In order to reduce the problem of selectivity bias, the 
present study excludes migration for study reasons from the analysis.
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There are several advantages in using the ENEU data to study Mexico-U.S. migration. 
The first one is that, unlike the population censuses and some other data sources, it is a 
survey carried out quarterly every year and not only every 5 or 10 years. This allows for 
example to make a more detailed analysis of the response of migration to different 
macroeconomic events, such as the Mexican crisis, NAFTA, or the different changes in 
the U.S. migratory policy. Second, because of its panel structure, it is possible to follow 
individuals through time, making it easier to control for self-selection biases when 
studying certain aspects of the phenomenon, such as the economic returns to migration 
and to circular migration. Third, when possible, the ENEU dataset contains information 
about the migrants even when they are not in the household for the interview (i.e. when 
they are in the U.S.). This is so because when an individual is absent for an interview, 
the information is frequently collected from another member of the family. Therefore, in 
some cases the ENEU contains valuable information of the migrants while in the U.S. 
Finally, given that it is a labour markets survey, the survey collects measures of 
different variables that may affect the migration decision at different levels, such as 
individual characteristics (age, schooling, gender, marital status), household 
characteristics (number of children, head of household, number of family members, 
number of providers of income), geographic characteristics (metropolitan area, 
proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border, whether the individual lives in a state or region 
with traditionally high rates of migration), and workplace characteristics (industry 
affiliation in Mexico and in the U.S., employment status in Mexico and in the U.S., 
informality status in Mexico and in the U.S., etc.).
On the other hand, there may also be some concerns about using the ENEU survey to 
analyse migration, and perhaps the most important one could be regarding its 
representativeness. First, as the survey covers only the 48 main cities in the country, any 
estimation based on these data may be irrelevant if an insignificant fraction of the 
migrants comes from urban places. However, previous evidence indicates that this is not 
the case. Table 3.1 reports data on migration to the U.S. estimated by INEGI from the 
Mexican population census. According to these numbers, between 1990 and 1995 a 
total of 1,737,520 Mexicans moved (both temporarily and permanently) to the United 
States36. Of these, 59% came from places with more than 2,500 inhabitants. Similar
36 This estimate is corroborated by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, which reports that 
1,490,040 Mexicans arrived to the United States between 1991 and 1995. See Table 4 in B e a n , F. D., R. 
C o r o n a , R. T u ir a n , and K. A. W o o d r o w -L a fe eld  (1998): "The Quantification of Migration between
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Table 3.1. Distribution of Migrants to the U.S. by Size of the Locality of Origin
1990-1995 1995-2000
Total population 91,158,290 97,483,412
Total migrants 1,737,520 1,500,321
From places with less than 2,500 ha 712,383 600,128
% of total migrants 41% 40%
From places with 2,500+ ha 1,025,137 900,193
% of total migrants 59% 60%
Source: C ensos de Pob lacion  y  V ivienda, 1950 a 2000, and C onteos de  Poblacion y V ivienda, 1995 y 
2005 (IN E G I). B ase de datos de  la m uestra censal.
results are obtained for the 1995-2000 period. The relevance of urban places as places 
of origin for international migration seems to be confirmed by other studies and data 
sources. Bustamante, J. A., G. Jasso, J. E. Taylor and P. T. Legarreta (1998a) report that 
58.49% of the interviewed migrants in the Mexican Survey of Migration of the North 
Border (EMIF) came from places with 15,000 or more inhabitants, and Bustamante, J.
A., G. Jasso, J. E. Taylor and P. T. Legarreta (1998b) indicate that 47.4% of the 
migrants interviewed in the Mexican National Survey of Demographic Indicators 
(ENADID) came from urban places. Also, in analyzing the evidence on the 
characteristics of Mexican migrants to the U.S., Cornelius, W. A. (1992) concludes that 
during the 1970’s and 1980’s the flow of migrants became more geographically diverse, 
originating more in non-traditional sending states and large cities.
The second reason why the representativeness of the ENEU data on migration might be 
questionable is that it captures mainly temporary migration. To see this, table 3.2 
presents some data on the frequency of migration to the United States, calculated from 
the sample of individuals interviewed between 1994 and 2002. All the individuals in 
this database have five consecutive, quarterly interviews. The first column o f data 
presents the results for all the individuals that migrated both for work reasons and for 
other reasons. The first panel indicates that 2,052 out of 1,274,225 individuals migrated 
to the United States at some point in time during the period in question, which yields 
and estimated migration rate of 0.16%. The second panel shows that of all these 
migrants 78.4% where reported as temporarily absent emigrants in one of their five 
interviews, while only 0.58% of them stayed in the United States during all the
Mexico and the United States," Migration Between Mexico and the United States: Binational Study, 
Volume 1: Thematic Chapters, pp. 1-89. for more detail.
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Table 3.2. Number of Migrants and Frequency of Migration to the U.S. 1994 Q2 to 2002 Q4
All Migrants 
(AM)
Migrant Workers 
(MW) MW as % of AM
No. Individuals in sample 1,274,225 1,274,225 100%
No. Migrants1 2,052 953 46%
rate o f migration 0.16% 0.07%
No. Migrants absent for all interviews 12 12 100%
share o f No. Migrants 0.58% 1.26%
No. Migrants absent for 4 interviews 34 32 94%
share o f No. Migrants 1.66% 3.36%
No. Migrants absent for 3 interviews 105 82 78%
share o f No. Migrants 5.1% 8.6%
No. Migrants absent for 2 interviews 292 195 67%
share o f No. Migrants 14.2% 20.5%
No. Migrants absent for 1 interview 1,609 632 39%
share o f No. Migrants 78.4% 66.3%
No. Migrants that migrated 1 time 1,937 874 45%
share o f  No. Migrants 94.4% 91.7%
No. Migrants that migrated 2 times 112 76 68%
share o f No. Migrants 5.5% 8.0%
No. Migrants that migrated 3 times 3 3 100%
share o f No. Migrants 0.1% 0.3%
Source: au thor's calculations based  on the  N ation Survey o f  U rban Em ploym ent (E N EU ). Excludes people that m oved to 
the U .S. fo r study reasons. 'F o r the "A ll M igrants (AM )" colum n: num ber o f  people that w as reported  as tem porarily  
absent from  the household because they m igrated to the U .S . for reasons o ther than studying a t the tim e o f  one o r m ore o f  
the five quarterly  interview s. F o r the "M igrant W orkers (M W )" colum n: N um ber o f  peop le  tha t w as reported as 
tem porarily  absen t from  the household  because they  m igrated  to  the  U .S . fo r w ork  reasons only, a t the tim e o f  one or 
m ore o f  the  five quarterly  interview s.
interviews. This implies that the majority of the migration episodes captured by the 
ENEU lasted at most 6  months. The third panel in the table summarizes the distribution 
of migrants according to the number of times that they migrated to the United States. It 
indicates that 94.4% of them migrated only once. The results are very similar when only 
the people that migrated for work reasons are considered.
The problem in this case would be that if temporary migration is not an important 
component of the overall migratory movements to the United States, then the estimates 
based on the ENEU survey would be irrelevant. Nonetheless, as with the previous 
argument, there exists historical evidence indicating the contrary. According to the 
Mexican Embassy in the United States, “until the second half of the eighties the
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traditional pattern of migration from Mexico to the United States was circular”37. 
Griswold, D. T. (2002) mentions that between 1942 and 1964, 4.6 million Mexicans 
entered the United States on a temporary basis to fill the gaps in the labour market 
caused by the World War II. Between 1965 and 1986, even though per-country legal 
immigration quotas were in place, the “Texas Proviso” prohibited the U.S. authorities 
from prosecuting employers that hired undocumented workers. Massey, D. S., J. Durand 
and N. J. Malone (2002) argue that this situation derived in a de facto guest-worker 
program. To get an idea of the numbers, in the opening line of their analysis of the 
profiles of temporary Mexican labour migrants to the United States in 1978, Ranney, S. 
and S. Kossoudji (1983) state that “the flow of temporary Mexican labour 
migration to the United States is known to be substantial (estimates range from 500,000 
to 2  million persons per year)”38.
In 1986 the United States Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA), which required U.S. companies to check documentation of all prospective 
employees, authorized fines against firms that knowingly hired illegal immigrants, 
increased the spending in the Border Patrol, but at the same time granted permanent 
legal status to almost 3 million illegal immigrants39. Even though some authors argue 
that Mexican temporary migration has decreased during the post-IRCA period (see for 
example Cornelius, W. A. (1992) and Marcelli, E. A. and W. A. Cornelius (2001)40), 
there is also empirical evidence that supports the continuity of its importance. To 
mention one example, Durand, J., D. S. Massey and R. M. Zenteno (2001) use data 
from the ENADID survey, the U.S. census, and the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) 
to analyse the profile of Mexican immigrants to the United States. They conclude that 
there is basically no evidence of a trend away from the dominance of working-age 
males or of a greater family migration, but that instead there has been an increase in the 
propensity towards return migration in the early 1990’s. On the other hand, according to 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, between 1998 and 2005 928,399 Mexicans
37 M e x i c a n _ E m b a s s y _ i n _ t h e _ U n i t e d _ S t a t e s  (2006): "Mexico's Public Policies to Foster Circular 
Migration," Mexico-U.S.: Migration and Border Security www.embassyofmexico.org, pp. 1-24. p. 4.
38 Ranney, S. and S. Kossoudji (1983), p. 475.
39 For more detail, see for example D u n n , T. J. (1996): The Militarization o f  the U.S.-Mexico Border, 
1978-1992: Low-lntensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home. University o f Texas at Austin..
40 Cornelius, W. A. (1992) and Marcelli, E. A. and W. A. Cornelius (2001) find that the increase in 
permanent migration is not only related to the legalization programs introduced by IRCA in 1986, but 
also to the changing composition o f U.S. demand for migrant labour, the economic crisis in Mexico 
during the 1980’s, and the maturing of transnational migrant networks that altered the demographic 
composition of migration flows and strengthened incentives for permanent settlement in the United 
States.
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Table 3.3. Mexican Nonimmigrants Admitted as Temporary Workers, Exchange Visitors, and Intracompany Trainees
T otal
N onm igrants
W orkers
w ith
Specialty
O ccupations
Seasonal
W orkers
In tra -
com pany
T ransferees
W orkers with 
E x trao rd in a ry  
Ability o r  
A chievem ent
A thletes, 
A rtis ts  and  
E n terta in e rs
O th e r
A dm itted
M exican
Im m igran ts
N onm igrants 
as %  o f 
Im m ig ran ts
1998 66,197 10,079 32,321 8,987 348 7,268 7,194 131,575 50%
1999 86,424 12,257 44,996 11,387 561 8,731 8,492 147,573 59%
2000 104,155 13,507 54,927 14,516 750 10,385 10,070 173,919 60%
2001 116,157 14,423 63,421 15,723 881 10,508 11,201 206,426 56%
2002 118,835 15,867 65,818 15,283 851 10,237 10,779 219,380 54%
2003 130,327 16,290 75,802 15,794 1,472 10,375 10,594 115,864 112%
2004 136,518 17,917 73,498 16,336 1,709 8,575 18,483 173,664 79%
2005 169,786 17,063 90,466 16,279 2,216 9,478 34,284 161,445 105%
Total 928,399 117,403 501,249 114,305 8,788 75,557 111,097 1,329,846 70%
Source: Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 1998, 1999, 2000,2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Immigrants, as defined by U.S. 
immigration law, are persons lawfully admited for permanent residence in the United States. A Nonimmigrant is defined as a foreign national seeking to enter the 
United States temporarily for a specific purpose.
entered the United States as temporary workers, exchange visitors, or intracompany 
trainees (see table 3.3). Of these, almost 54% entered as seasonal workers, both 
agricultural and non-agricultural. Total nonmigrants between 1998 and 2005 
represented a 70% of lawfully admitted permanent residents (immigrants). These 
estimates -which should be taken as a lower bound, given that the official statistics do 
not account for illegal migration, indicate that Mexican temporary migrant workers are 
an important proportion of the total flow of Mexican migrants every year.
Finally, it is also possible to get an idea of the relative importance of these workers with 
respect to the stock of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. by looking at the basic monthly 
data of the U.S. Current Population Survey41. Although the survey does not allow for 
the exact identification of temporary migrants, it is possible to approximate their weight 
in the stock of Mexican immigrants through recent immigration (i.e. those that entered 
the country within the referred year, for example) and citizenship status. Figure 3.1 
plots the share in the U.S. population over age 15 of people bom in Mexico. On 
average, Mexicans represented a 2.2% of the U.S. population between 1994 and 2002. 
Figure 3.2 shows the estimated share of Mexican immigrants that entered the country 
during the year. It indicates for example that 2.9% of all the Mexicans living in the 
United States by 1994 entered the country during that year. The average for the 1994- 
2002 period is 3.8%. Figure 3.3 plots the fraction of Mexican immigrants without U.S. 
citizenship. Even though this figure has declined through time, about 79% of all 
Mexican immigrants in 2002 still did not have the U.S. citizenship. The average for the 
1994 to 2002 period is 81.5%. Lastly, figure 3.4 shows that the share of recent Mexican
41 The data comes from the National Bureau o f Economic Research (NBER) Data Collection, in 
http://www.nber.org/data/cps index.html.
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F igure 3.1. S hare of M exicans on U.S. Population
(Basic M onthly D ata from the  U.S. C u rre n t Population Survey)
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Figure 3.2. S hare  o f Recent M exican Im m igrants in Total M exican Im m igration  to the U.S.
(Basic M onthly D ata from  the U.S. C u rre n t Population S urvey)1
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' Recent immigrants arc those that entered the United States during the year.
Figure 3.3. S hare o f Mexican Im m igrants w ithout U.S. C itizenship 
(Basic M onthly D ata from the U.S. C u rre n t Population Survey)
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Figure 3.4. S hare  of Recent M exican Im m igran ts  w ithout U.S. Citizenship
(Basic M onthly D ata from the U.S. C u rre n t Population Survey)
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immigrants without citizenship was always around 96% between 1994 and 2002, which 
could be indicating that most of them do not intend or are not allowed to stay in the 
United States for long periods.
In conclusion, the discussion in this section suggests that temporary migration has been 
a historically important component of the Mexico-U.S. relationship, and that even 
though it represents a small fraction of the total stock of Mexicans in the U.S., it is still 
a very important component of the annual flows. Thus, even though the ENEU captures 
mainly temporary migration, and even though these data refer only to urban places, it 
seems that the survey is in principle able to measure a relevant part of the Mexico-U.S. 
migratory phenomenon. This, together with the aforementioned advantages regarding its 
structure, makes it a valuable data source worth using.
3.3. The Characteristics of Temporary Migration
This section presents new evidence on the determinants of temporary migration to the 
United States, stemming from the main urban places in Mexico. As in table 3.2 in the 
previous section, the results are shown for all migrants and work migrants separately. 
Also, as mentioned before, migration for study reasons is left outside the analysis in 
order to minimize any possible self-selection bias problems.
To begin, figure 3.5 depicts the estimated annual Mexican temporary migration rate to 
the U.S. among the population aged 12 and more. The average annual rate for all
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Figure 3.5: Estim ated T em porary  M igration  R ate to  the U.S.
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migrants is 0.13% while for work migrants is equal to 0.07%. For the case of all 
migrants, there is a negative trend in this rate starting in 1996, while for the work 
migrants it starts to decrease just after 1999. It is interesting to note that in the first case 
this change of trend coincides with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, “which addressed border enforcement and the use of social 
services by immigrants. It increased the number of border patrol agents, introduced new 
border control measures, reduced government benefits available to immigrants, and 
established a pilot program in which employers and social services agencies could 
check by telephone or electronically to verify the eligibility of immigrants applying for 
work or social services benefits”42. Also, the acceleration in the decline of the 
temporary migration rate between 2000 and 2002 for both groups in the figure may be 
partially reflecting the tighter immigration enforcement and border controls that came 
into place after the September 11 terrorist attacks43.
42 C a l d e r a ,  S., and P. P ip e r /B a c h  (2006): "Immigration Policy in the United States," The Congress of 
the United States - Congressional Budget Office, p. 14.
4j On the 26th of October, 2001, President George W. Bush signed into law the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, 
known as the USA Patriot Act of 2001. According to the Centre for Immigration Studies, the act contains 
provisions that improve the ability o f U.S. authorities to identify and either exclude or prosecute aliens 
with terrorist ties. Among other things, it authorizes the exclusion of the spouses and children of aliens 
who have committed acts linking them to terrorist organizations within the past five years and makes 
inadmissible any alien determined by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to have been 
associated with a terrorist organization. It also mandates the implementation of an integrated entry and 
exit data system at airports, seaports, and land border ports; as well as the creation of a student database 
with information on the date and port of entry. See J e n k s ,  R. (2001): "The USA Patriot Act of 2001: A 
Summary o f the Anti-Terrorism Law's Immigration-Related Provisions," Backgrounder. Center for  
Immigration Studies, pp. 1-4. for more detail.
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Apart from its variation over time, migration to the U.S. has also been historically 
diverse among sending regions in Mexico. Even though migrants originate from all over 
the country nowadays, traditionally it has been the west-central region the one with the 
highest levels of migration. According to Chiquiar, D. and G. H. Hanson (2005), this is 
partially an historical accident: “In the early 1900s, Texas farmers began to recruit 
laborers in Mexico. Given the small populations on the Texas-Mexico border, recruiters 
followed the main rail line into Mexico, which ran southwest to Guadalajara, a major 
city in the center west of the country”44. According to estimates based on the ENADID 
and the EMIF data, the border and northern states follow the west-central region in 
importance (Bustamante, J. A., et. al. (1998b)), and the relevance of the border states 
has been increasing in recent years, acting now as a link between internal migration 
from the southern states and international migration to the U.S. (Lozano-Ascencio, F.,
B. R. Roberts and F. D. Bean (1996)).
To see what the ENEU survey has to say about this, the panels in figure 3.6 depict the 
evolution of each region’s share of total temporary migration to the United States, and 
the map in figure 3.7 identifies the states that belong to each region. The graphs confirm 
the importance of the west-central, the border, and the northern regions. They also show 
a decline in the relative weight of the west-central states (from 46% to 29% of all 
migrants and from 55% to 17% of work migrants only, between 1994 and 2002), and a 
strong increase in the share of the border region (from 27% to 37% of all migrants and 
from 16% to 44% of work migrants only). Finally, the data seem to partially support the 
findings by Marcelli, E. A. and W. A. Cornelius (2001), in the sense that the Mexican 
migratory flow is becoming more geographically diversified, and that there has been an 
increase in the likelihood of migration originating in the southern states (in figure 3.2, 
the share of the southern states in work migrants increased from 4% to 9% between 
1994 and 2002).
Another well-known result obtained in previous empirical studies is that migrants and 
nonmigrants have different individual characteristics. As an example, in their revision 
of the pre-IRCA Mexican studies, Bustamante, J. A., G. Jasso, J. E. Taylor and P. T. 
Legarreta (1998c) indicate that, on average, about 70% of the migrants were below age 
30, approximately 85% were males, and roughly 50% were married. A very similar
44 Chiquiar, D. and G. H. Hanson (2005), p.258. According to the authors, the following states belong to 
the west-central region: Aguascalientes, Colima, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Michoacan, 
Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas. They also mention that in the year 
2000, 9% of the households in these states had sent migrants to the U.S. within the last five years, 
compared to 2.6% o f households in the rest o f the country.
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Figure 3.6. Regional Shares in Migration to the U.S.
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pattern is found in more recent studies and data sources (see Bustamante, J. A. et. al. 
(1998a), Durand, J. e t al. (2001), and Durand, J. and D. S. Massey (1992)). Also, 
regarding educational attainment, the profile of the migrants has changed through time. 
Gamio, M. (1969) found that years of schooling among Mexican migrants to the United 
States were very low in the early years: around 5. But more recent studies have 
documented a change towards a higher skilled sector of the population. Using the 1990 
and 2000 Mexican and U.S. population censuses, Chiquiar, D. and G. H. Hanson (2005) 
find that Mexican immigrants in the United States are more educated than nonmigrants 
in Mexico. Cuecuecha, A. (2005) and Mishra, P. (2003) find that the likelihood of 
emigration to the United States is higher for more educated Mexicans. These findings 
contradict the hypothesis of negative selection originally proposed by Borjas, G. J. 
(1987), which stated that in countries with high returns to education and higher wage 
dispersion, such as Mexico, individuals in the lower part of the skills distribution are 
those with the greatest incentives to migrate to the United States. Finally, regarding 
wages, there is also some evidence suggesting that, compared to the Mexican 
distribution, migrants to the U.S. would be concentrated in the middle part of it if they 
were paid according to Mexican prices (Chiquiar, D. and G. H. Hanson (2005)); 
whereas when compared to the United States distribution, the economic performance of 
the Mexican migrants has historically lagged behind with respect to both the U.S. 
natives and other groups of immigrants (Boijas, G. J. and L. F. Katz (2006), Feliciano, 
Z. M. (2001), and Boijas, G. J. (1982)), with a very weak convergence rate throughout 
the twentieth century.
Table 3.4 presents estimates of the average individual characteristics for temporary 
migrants and nonmigrants obtained from the ENEU survey. The first panel shows that 
in general migrants tend to be older and more experienced than nonmigrants, but the 
differences become minimal when comparing only work migrants with nonmigrants, 
and they are reversed when comparing the former with employed nonmigrants. Also, 
the average years of schooling for migrants are very similar to those of the nonmigrants, 
while the fractions of married and male individuals are greater for the first group. The 
estimates also seem to indicate that the likelihood of becoming a migrant is greater for 
the heads of households and for individuals with more children, compared to 
nonmigrants. Finally, average hourly earnings for migrants are significantly higher than 
for nonmigrants, as suggested by the literature discussed above.
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Table 3.4. Mean Sample Characteristics of Migrants and Non-migrants 1994 Q2 to 2002 Q4
All Migrants Migrant Workers Non-Migrants EmployedNon-Migrants
Age 40.61 34.28 34.74 35.65
Experience 26.87 19.84 20.41 20.61
Schooling 7.75 8.45 8.35 9.04
Married 0.57 0.62 0.48 0.54
Male 0.57 0.88 0.47 0.63
Head of household 0.48 0.63 0.32 0.48
No. children in household 4.08 2.34 2.34 2.00
Hourly earnings1 22.55 24.83 15.50 15.50
When in Mexico, lives in:
a border state 0.38 0.35 0.26 0.26
a northern state 0.23 0.27 0.07 0.07
a west-central state 0.31 0.27 0.37 0.38
a central state 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.10
a southern state 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.19
Employment status2:
employed 0.55 0.80 0.53 1.00
unemployed 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.00
out of the labour force 0.41 0.12 0.45 0.00
If employed3:
works in the formal sector 
works in the informal sector
0.66
0.34
0.49
0.51
0.73
0.27
0.49
0.51
Source: author's calculations based  on the N ational Survey o f  U rban E m ploym ent (EN EU ). E xcludes people  that m oved to the 
U .S. fo r study reasons. "A ll M igrants" refers to  people tha t was reported as tem porarily  absen t from  the household  because they 
m igrated to  the U .S. for reasons o ther than studying a t the tim e o f  one o r m ore o f  the  five quarterly  interview s "M igrant 
W orkers" refers to  people that w as reported  as tem porarily  absent from  the household  because they m igrated to  the U .S. for 
w ork  reasons only, a t the tim e o f  one o r m ore o f  the five quarterly interview s.
'N om inal hourly  earn ings in current pesos, obtained during the w eek before the  interview .
2 F o r each colum n, this panel show s the fractions o f  individual-quarter cells that w here  em ployed, unem ployed, and out o f  the 
labour force throughout the  1994Q 2-2002Q 4 sam ple.
3 F o r each colum n, this panel shows the fraction o f  em ployed individual-quarter cells that w here w orking in the inform al and  the 
form al secto r throughout the 1994Q 2-2002Q 4 sam ple
The second panel of table 3.4 summarizes the sample share of each one of the Mexican 
regions described above. It indicates that around 90% of the temporary migrants live in 
a border, a northern, or a west-central state whenever they are residing in Mexico; 
compared to a 70% of the nonmigrants. The third panel of the table contains 
information about the employment status of both migrants and nonmigrants. While the 
figures for all migrants and nonmigrants are very similar to each other, the employment
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Table 3.5. Some Sample Characteristics of Mexican Immigrants from the U.S. Current
Population Survey Compared to Temporary Migrants from ENEU
All Mexicans 
CPS
Recent Mexican 
Immigrants CPS1
All Migrants 
ENEU
Work Migrants 
ENEU
Age 35.93 28.41 40.61 34.28
Schooling 8.75 8.61 7.75 8.45
Married 0.64 0.49 0.57 0.62
Male 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.88
Hourly earnings2 9.02 7.86 5.42 5.46
Employment status: 
employed 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.80
unemployed 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07
out of labour force 0.32 0.35 0.41 0.12
Source: author's calculations based  on the  B asic M onthly D ata o f  U .S. C urren t Population  Survey (N ational B ureau o f  
Econom ic R esearch) and the  M exican  N ational Survey o f  U rban L abour (EN EU ).
1 R ecent im m igration by  year, as available from  the CPS: for 1994 those peop le  entering the  U .S . during  1992-1994; for 
1995 those entering  during  1992-1995; fo r 1996 those entering during  1994-1996; fo r 1997 those entering  during  1994- 
1997; fo r 1998 those entering  during  1996-1998; fo r 1999 those entering  during  1996-1999; fo r 2000 those entering 
during  1998-2000; for 2001 those  entering during 1998-2001; and fo r 2002 those entering  during  2000-2002.
2 N om inal hourly  earnings in current U .S . dollars. F o r the EN E U  m igrants, average hourly  earnings during  the periods o f  
m igration only.
and out-of-the-labour-force rates for work migrants are notoriously higher and lower, 
respectively. Finally, the last panel summarizes the formality/informality status for each 
one of the groups45. The shares of formality and informality for work migrants are the 
same as for employed nonmigrants, but they are markedly different from those of all 
migrants and nonmigrants: while formality and informality basically have an equal 
share in the first group, formality is more common than informality in the other two 
groups.
In sum, the statistics presented in table 3.4 seem to confirm the findings of previous 
studies regarding the individual characteristics of the migrants, particularly for the work 
migrants. This is also an indicator of the good quality of the data collected by the ENEU 
survey. The table also displays one of the advantages of this survey by presenting 
evidence on the employment and the formality/informality status of the migrants, two 
characteristics that were rarely reported in previous studies and that could certainly be 
very important determinants of the migration decision. Table 3.5 contains some of the
45 Following the definition used in A l e m a n - C a s t i l l a ,  B. (2006): "The Effect o f Trade Liberalization on 
Informality and Wages: Evidence from Mexico," CEP Discussion Papers, pp. 1 -71., a person is classified 
as working in the informal sector if  he or she runs a firm o f 6 or less employees and does not have any 
kind o f social or health insurance {informal self-employed), if  he or she works for a firm o f any size and 
does not have any kind o f social or health insurance {informal salaried), and if  he or she works without 
receiving any kind of payment {unpaid workers).
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average individual characteristics for Mexican immigrants obtained from the basic 
monthly data of the U.S. Current Population Survey, and compares them to those of 
Mexican migrants in the ENEU survey. The characteristics of the ENEU work migrants 
are in general closer to those of the all Mexicans CPS category.
Finally, another interesting characteristic of the Mexican migrants is the economic 
sector to which they belong, both when they are still in Mexico and when they are 
already in the United States. For the pre-IRCA period, Bustamante, J. A. et. al. (1998c) 
identified the agricultural, transport, services, and commerce as some of the most 
common economic sectors to which migrants were affiliated before leaving Mexico; 
whereas the agricultural, construction, and transport sectors were the preferred ones 
once they were already in the United States. Regarding their occupation, the authors 
mention that most of the migrants were working as labourers, self-employed, and 
peasants before migrating; and most of them worked as peasants, construction workers, 
industrial labourers, and services employees during their stay in the United States. 
Papail, J. (1998) presents data on the economic activity of Mexican migrants from 
medium-sized cities in the state of Jalisco, for the period between 1980 and 1995. 
Regarding the economic sector affiliation before migration, he finds evidence of a 
progressive diversification of activities in detriment of agriculture (which used to 
provide around 50% of the migratory flows before 1980) and favouring the industrial 
and the services sector, principally. Papail finds a similar pattern regarding economic 
sector affiliation of Mexican immigrants in the United States, with more migrants 
moving from the agricultural to the industrial, construction, restaurants & hotels, and 
services sectors. Finally, Latapi, A. E., P. Martin, P. S. Davies, G. L. Castro and K. 
Donato (1998) and Boijas, G. J. and L. F. Katz (2006) also report some data on the 
participation of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. labour markets. Both studies identify 
janitors and cleaners, food preparation workers, private household workers, farm 
workers, gardeners and nursery workers, sewing machine operators, garment, 
construction workers, and vehicle washers and cleaners as some of the major 
occupations in which Mexican-bom workers were a majority of all workers during 1994 
and 2 0 0 0 , respectively.
Table 3.6 summarizes the information on economic sector affiliation of temporary 
migrants contained in the ENEU sample. It presents data for people that migrated for 
other reasons {non-work migrants) and people that migrated for work reasons, 
separately. For each one of these groups, the table reports the economic sector shares of
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Table 3.6. Distribution of Migrants to the U.S. by Economic Sector
Economic Sector
Non-Work Migrant Work Migrant
in Mexico in the U.S in Mexico in the U.S.
Farms, forestry & fishing 0.68% 0.59% 6.92% 13.36%
Mining, Petroleoum & coal extraction 0.00% 0.00% 0.47% 0.12%
Petroleoum & coal extraction 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 0.12%
Manufacturing industries 7.81% 7.13% 18.87% 20.63%
Construction 2.44% 2.93% 12.43% 14.30%
Electricity, gas & water 0.00% 0.10% 0.23% 0.12%
Hotels, restaurants & trade 13.77% 12.89% 16.88% 3.99%
Transport & storage 1.76% 1.66% 8.44% 3.75%
Financial services & real estate 0.20% 0.10% 0.82% 0.00%
Personal, professional and social services 15.82% 13.77% 24.38% 39.62%
Not available/unemployed/out of the labour force 57.62% 60.94% 10.55% 4.10%
No. Observations (individual-quarter cells) 1,024 1,024 853 853
Source: author's calculations based  on  the N ational Survey o f  U rban  L abour (EN EU ). Percentages are calculated as the  fraction o f  
individual-quarter cells that declared  to  b e  in a  particu lar econom ic sector, d iv ided  by the total num ber o f  ind iv idual-quarter cells 
in each one o f  the four categories listed in the  colum ns o f  the  table.
migrants both before and during migration to the United States. To understand where 
the numbers are coming from, recall that the sample used here is a balanced panel with 
5 quarterly observations for each individual, covering the period between 1994 and 
2002. The percentages in table 3.6 are therefore calculated from the individual-quarter 
cells that fall in each one of the four categories included in it. For example, according to 
table 2 there are 953 work migrants in the sample, each one with 5 quarterly 
observations. Following the last row in table 3.6, only in 853 migration episodes of 
these people it is possible to see what they where doing before leaving (i.e. only in these 
853 cases migration did not occur during the first interview). Thus, for the case of non­
work migrants, apart from being unemployed or out of the labour force, the main 
economic sectors of origin are the Personal, professional & social services and the 
Hotels, restaurants & trade sectors, followed by the Manufacturing industries; 
Construction; and Transport & storage sectors. Not surprisingly, roughly the same 
economic sector affiliation preferences are observed for the periods when these 
migrants are in the United States, confirming that in most of these cases people are 
effectively travelling for reasons other than joining the U.S. labour force. In other 
words, it is very likely that in most of the non-work migrant cases the economic sector
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Table 3.7. Main Occupations o f Non-Worker Migrants Before and During Migration
Before M igration D uring M igration A bsoulte Change %  C hange
A gents, sales representatives, w holesalers, suppliers 61 39 -22 -36%
C lerks and  cashiers 45 39 -6 -13%
Other services employees 30 31 1 3%
Construction workers 30 26 -4 -13%
Food, Beverages & Tobacco labourers 29 23 -6 -21%
Other manufacturing labourers 25 26 1 4%
Secretaries 22 16 -6 -27%
Domestic servants 21 18 -3 -14%
Street vendors and  cash w ashers 18 29 11 61%
M&E, Metallurgy, Mineral Products craftsmen and labourers 18 21 3 17%
Supervisors &  Inspectors 18 13 -5 , -28%
Technicians 17 16 -1 -6%
Professionals 16 19 3 19%
Teachers and instructors 16 16 0 0%
Directors, managers & CEOs 16 14 -2 -13%
Machinery operators 15 19 4 27%
Drivers, pilots and sailors 13 15 2 15%
Janitors 8 11 3 38%
Nurses and nursemaids 7 6 -1 -14%
Farms, forestry & fishing labourers and peasants 7 5 -2 -29%
Gardeners 3 1 -2 -67%
Unspecified employment status 1 2 1 100%
Em ployed 363 231 -132 -36%
Unemployed 20 13 -7 -35%
O ut o f the labou r force 640 778 138 22%
TO TA L (ind iv idual-quarter cells) 1024 1024
Source: author's calculations based on the National Survey o f  Urban Labour (ENEU). "Before Migration" refers to the quarter immediately before being registered as temporarily absent 
from the household for reasons other than work or study. The rows with bold numbers refer to those occupations for which the reported values changed in 5 or more units.
reported by the ENEU in the quarters when these individuals where temporarily away is 
simply referring to their economic activity back in Mexico.
Regarding work migrants, the main economic sectors of origin are the Personal, 
professional & social services and Manufacturing industries, followed by the Hotels, 
restaurants & trade; Construction; and Transport & storage sectors. The relatively low 
importance of agriculture as a sector of origin is obviated by the fact that, as described 
in the previous section, the ENEU survey is an urban employment survey. Compared to 
the case of non-work migrants, a much smaller fraction of work migrants come from 
unemployment or economic inactivity. On the other hand, the last column of the table 
indicates that there is a strong preference of this type of migrants to work in the 
Personal, professional & social services; Manufacturing industries; Construction; and 
Farms, forestry & fishing sectors. The fact that the unemployment and out-of-the- 
labour-force shares are substantially lower for these migrants when they are in the U.S. 
than when they are in Mexico confirms that the reason for leaving in the first place was 
to work abroad.
Finally, tables 3.7 and 3.8 tabulate the occupations of employed non-work and work 
migrants, both for the interview just before migrating and for the interview during 
migration to the United States. In table 3.7 the rows with bold numbers refer to those
132
Table 3.8. Main Occupations of Migrant Workers Before and During Migration
Before M igration During M igration Absoulte Change % Change
Construction workers 129 124 -5 -4%
Drivers, pilots and sailors 82 45 -37 -45%
O ther services employees 59 127 68 115%
M&E, M etallurgy, M ineral Products craftsmen and labourers 57 41 -16 -28%
Farm s, forestry & fishing labourers and peasants 52 113 61 117%
Agents, sales representatives, wholesalers, suppliers 49 12 -37 -76%
Machinery operators 41 26 -IS -37%
Clerks and cashiers 37 20 -17 -46%
Food, Beverages & Tobacco labourers 36 57 21 58%
Supervisors & Inspectors 28 14 -14 -50%
Professionals 25 25 0 0%
Wood, Paper & Printing craftsmen and labourers 23 50 27 117%
Electrical & Telecommunications equipment labourers 22 11 -11 -50%
Other manufacturing labourers 21 25 4 19%
Technicians 19 12 -7 -37%
Janitors 18 39 21 117%
Directors, managers & CEOs 18 11 -7 -39%
Street vendors and cash washers 15 9 -6 -40%
G ardeners 9 22 13 144%
Secretaries 8 5 -3 -38%
Domestic servants 8 11 3 38%
Teachers and instructors 6 7 1 17%
Nurses and nursemaids 3 18 IS 500%
Unspecified employment status 1 5 4 400%
Employment 647 696 49 8%
Unemployed 67 109 42 63%
O ut of the labour force 138 43 -95 -69%
TOTAL (individual-quarter cells) 853 853
Source: author's calculations based on the National Survey of Urban Labour (liNlilT). "Before Migration" refers to the quarter immediately before being registered as temporarily absent from the 
household for work reasons. The rows with bold numbets refer to those occupations for which the reported values changed in 10 or more units.
occupations for which the reported values changed in 5 or more units. 138 out of the 
1,024 (13.5% approximately) non-work migrants dropped out of the labour force during 
their migratory experience. The most common occupations both before and during 
migration are Agents and sales representatives; Clerks and cashiers; Construction 
workers; Other services employees and Food, beverages & tobacco labourers. The 
occupations in which the labour force increased the most both in absolute and relative 
terms were Street vendors and cash washers; Machinery operators; and Janitors. The 
occupations in which the labour force decreased the most were Agents and sales 
representatives; Secretaries; Food, beverages & tobacco labourers; Clerks and 
cashiers; and Supervisors and Inspectors. On the other hand, for the case of the work 
migrants, table 3.8 presents the data for the work migrants group. Given that there are 
more dramatic changes than in the previous group, the rows with bold numbers now 
refer to those occupations for which the reported values changed in 1 0  or more units. 
The most common occupations before migration are Construction workers; Drivers, 
pilots and sailors; Other services employees; M&E, Metallurgy and Mineral Products 
craftsmen and labourers; and Farms, forestry & fishing labourers and peasants. The 
most common ones during the stay in the United States are Other services employees; 
Construction workers; Farms, forestry & fishing labourers and peasants; Food,
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T a b le  3 .9 . M o s t C o m m o n  In d u s tr ie s  a n d  O c c u p a tio n s  A m o n g  E m p lo y e d  R e c e n t M e x ic a n  Im m ig ra n ts  fro m  th e  U .S .
C u r r e n t  P o p u la tio n  S u rv ey
In d u s tr ie s
F r a c t io n  o f  E m p lo y e d  
R e c e n t M ex ic a n  
Im m ig ra n ts
O c c u p a tio n s
F r a c t io n  o f  E m p lo y ed  
R e c e n t M ex ica n  
Im m ig ra n ts
E ating  and  d rink ing  p laces 19.8% C ooks 9 .3%
A ll co nstruction 17.0% F arm  w orkers 7 .7%
A gricu ltu ral p roduction , crops 6.1% G roundskeepers and  G ardeners 7 .0%
L andscape  an d  ho rticu ltu ra l serv ices 5 .9% C onstruction  labourers 6 .3%
P rivate  househo ld 3.0% M isc. food p rep ara tio n  occupations 5 .9%
H ote ls  and  m ote ls 2 .9% Jan ito rs  an d  c leaners 4 .9%
M eat p roducts 2.8% L abourers , e xcep t construction 3 .0%
Serv ices to  dw ellings and  o th e r bu ild ings 2 .5% M aids  and  housem en 2 .3%
A ppare l and  accessories 2 .4% W aiters/w aitresses  a ssis tan ts 2 .3%
G rocery  stores 2 .4% S tock  hand lers  an d  b aggers 2 .3%
O ther 35 .2% O ther 49 .1%
Source: author's calculations based on the Basic M onthly Data o f  the U.S. Current Population Survey (NBER). Recent immigration by year, as available 
from the CPS: for 1994 those people entering the U.S. during 1992-1994; for 1995 those entering during 1992-1995; for 1996 those entering during 
1994-1996; for 1997 those entering during 1994-1997; for 1998 those entering during 1996-1998; for 1999 those entering during 1996-1999; for 2000 
those entering during 1998-2000; for 2001 those entering during 1998-2001; and for 2002 those entering during 2000-2002.
beverages & tobacco labourers; and Wood, Paper & Printing craftsmen and labourers. 
Among the occupations with the largest labour force increases, both in absolute and 
relative terms, were Other Services employees; Farms, forestry & fishing labourers and 
peasants; Wood, Paper & Printing labourers; Food, beverages & tobacco labourers; 
Janitors; and nurses and nursemaids. The occupations in which the labour force 
decreased the most were Drivers, pilots and sailors; Agents and sales representatives; 
Clerks and cashiers; M&E, Metallurgy and Mineral Products craftsmen and labourers; 
and Machinery operators. And lastly, for the sake of comparison, table 3.9 reports the 
10 most common industries and occupations among employed recent Mexican 
immigrants, according to the CPS.
To conclude, the statistics for temporary work migrants presented in tables 3.7 and 3.8 
seem to support the findings of previous studies regarding the economic sector 
affiliation and the occupation of Mexican migrants to the United States. The results 
presented in these tables also seem to indicate that in most of the cases there is no 
misreporting of the reasons for migration of the non-work migrants, and that for the 
majority of these individuals, the data collected by the ENEU during their periods of 
absence from the household refers to their occupation back in Mexico. In other words, 
the majority of the people reported as non-work migrant may be travelling to the U.S. 
for holidays or perhaps for business reasons; but not with the purpose of getting a job 
there.
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3.4. The Returns to Temporary Migration
Most of the literature on the economic performance of migrants available to date has 
dealt with how well they do in the host country, compared both to the native population 
and to other immigrants from different countries of origin. For example, apart from the 
studies by Chiquiar, D. and G. H. Hanson (2005), Boijas, G. J. and L. F. Katz (2006), 
Feliciano, Z. M. (2001), and Boijas, G. J. (1982) mentioned in the previous section, 
Boijas, G. J. (1989) analyzes the relationship between earnings and the extent of 
assimilation, cohort quality change, and return migration experienced by the foreign- 
born population in the United States. Using longitudinal data from the 1972-1978 
Survey of Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers, he finds that the rate of 
convergence between the age/eamings profiles of immigrants and natives is relatively 
small, and that there had been a sizable drop in the skills of immigrant scientists and 
engineering cohorts in the 1960s and the 1970s. In addition, return migration was more 
likely among immigrants who did not perform well in the U.S. labour market. Also, 
Dustmann, C. (1991) studies the optimal investment decision of European temporary 
migrants into country specific human capital, and its implications for the evolution of 
the earnings gap between migrants and natives. Using the first wave of the German 
Socioeconomic Panel of 1984 to analyze temporary migration to West Germany, he 
finds that foreign workers in the German labour market receive lower wages than their 
native counterparts throughout their working history, and that the earnings gap between 
these two groups is not closing over time.
On the other hand, there is considerably less evidence on the economic performance of 
migrants relative to when they are in their home country or after return migration. 
Dustmann, C. and O. Kirchkamp (2002) use a survey dataset of Turkish immigrants to 
Germany that returned to Turkey in 1984, and they find that about half of the returning 
population of immigrants becomes active as an entrepreneur after return, and that the 
capital for starting off a business stems from savings and capital acquired abroad. 
Another study is the one by Paulson, A. and A. Singer (2000). Using variation in the 
probability that Mexican immigrants to the U.S. will return and work in Mexico, they 
test the predictions of the permanent income model for savings (i.e. that the higher the 
probability of returning and working in Mexico, the more temporary is the increase in 
wages that the migrant experiences by crossing the border, and therefore his savings rate 
should be higher than for migrants with a lower probability of returning to Mexico). 
Using data from the Mexican Migration Project, they find that a higher probability of
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return is associated with a lower savings rate, but that the interaction between the 
probability of returning and migrant income increases the savings rate significantly. 
Thus, the analysis in this section aims at presenting new evidence from the Mexican 
National Survey of Urban Labour on the effect of temporary migration to the United 
States on earnings, both during and after migration. As in the previous section, work 
and non-work migrants are considered separately and compared to the nonmigrants. 
Given that most of the migrants in the sample where reported as absent from the 
household once and just for one of the interviews (see table 3.2), the analysis is based 
only on this group whenever it is necessary, in order to simplify the exposition of the 
results. To begin, recall that the dynamic labour supply theory (see, for example 
MaCurdy, T. E. (1981)) suggests that the marginal disutility of work is proportional to 
the real wage rate. Therefore, given that real wages are higher in the United States than 
in Mexico, a migrant worker would be expected to earn more and work longer hours 
during his stay in the former country. Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the average hourly 
earnings for work and non-work migrants grouped by quarter of migration and 
compared to the average hourly earnings for nonmigrants in the ENEU data. Two things 
are evident from figure 3.8: first, the increase in earnings during the period of migration; 
and second, the fact that average earnings for work migrants tend to be above that of 
nonmigrants. Less evident is whether earnings after migration are higher than earnings 
before migration, which may be partially due to the length of the observable period, and 
partially due to the length of the migration period. In other words, the observable period 
may be too short to capture any possible change in earnings obtained in Mexico that 
could be attributable to the effect of migration; or alternatively, the duration of 
migration may be too short as to have such an effect. For the case of non-work 
migrants, there is basically no generalized pattern through time. Figure 3.10 plots the 
average hourly earnings for work and non-work migrants that apparently move 
seasonally to the United States (i.e. those that migrate during the first and the fifth 
quarters), against those for nonmigrants. As before, earnings of work migrants are 
clearly higher during these two periods.
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show the average weekly hours worked by work and non-work 
migrants, also grouped by quarter of migration and compared to the average weekly 
hours for nonmigrants. As with earnings, weekly hours for work migrants increase 
during the period of migration and tend to be always above those of nonmigrants. In 
contrast, average weekly hours for non-work migrants decrease during the period of
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Figure 3.8. Average Hourly Earnings for M igrant W orkers by Q uarter of Migration
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Figure 3.9. Average Hourly Earnings for Non-Work Migrants by Q uarter of Migration
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Figure 3.10. Average Hourly Earnings for People that Migrated in the 1st and the 5th Q uarters
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Figure 3.11. Average Weekly Hours W orked by M igrant W orkers by Q uarter of Migration
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Figure 3.12. Average Weekly Hours Worked by Non-Work M igrants by Q uarter of Migration
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Figure 3.13. Average Weekly Hours Worked by People tha t M igrated in the 1st and the 5th
Q uarters
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migration and tend to be always below those of nonmigrants. Figure 3.13 shows that the 
average weekly hours worked by seasonal migrants have a very similar pattern.
Finally, figures 3.14 to 3.16 plot the quarterly employment shares for work and non- 
work migrants against those for nonmigrants. In both cases these shares follow closely 
the behaviour of the average weekly hours worked, as may be expected. The fraction of 
employed work migrants tends to increase by about 5 to 10 percentage points during the 
quarter of migration, while the fraction of employed non-work migrants tends to 
decrease by about 10 to 15 percentage points during the referred quarter. For the case of 
nonmigrants, the share of employment remains constant throughout the five quarters, at 
approximately 53%.
Overall, the graphs suggest that temporary migration should affect both the earnings and 
the labour supply of work migrants. To estimate the effects on earnings, the following 
equation is fitted using fixed effects:
y  it = X  it Px + M it$M + B it<PB + A ifiA + S f + £ t +  eit (3.1)
where y it is the natural logarithm of hourly earnings for individual i at time t, X u is a
matrix of time variant individual characteristics (e.g. a quadratic term on potential 
experience, years of schooling, a dummy variable for marriage, and an indicator for 
informality), and M it is an dummy variable equal to 1 if individual i migrated to the
United States at time t and 0 otherwise. Bit and Ait are vectors of dummy variables 
included to see whether there is a relationship between migration at quarter t and 
earnings in a quarter other than the quarter of migration. Bu is a vector of dummy
variables for the periods before the period of migration, and Au is a vector of dummy
variables for the periods after the period of migration. The time-specific effect s t is
captured by a set of dummy variables for all the quarters included in the sample (from 
the third quarter of 1994 to the fourth quarter of 2002). Given that equation (3.1) is 
fitted using the fixed effects method, all the time invariant individual characteristics 
(e.g. gender or region of origin) and the individual effects et are removed from the
estimation. The estimated (pB,8 M, and 0A s and their standard errors (clustered at the 
individual level) for work and non-work migrants are reported in panel A of table 3.10. 
Column (1) shows that during the quarter of migration, a work migrant earns on average 
112% more than when he is in Mexico, and this effect is significant at the 1%
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Figure 3.14. Employment Share for M igrant W orkers by Q uarter of Migration
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Figure 3.15. Employment Share for Non-Work Migrants by Quarter of Migration
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Figure 3.16. Employment Share for People that Migrated in the 1st and the 5th Quarters
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Table 3.10: Fixed Effects Estimates of the Effect of Temporary Migration on ln(hourly earnings), ln(weekly hours), and Employment
Work Migrants Non-Work Migrants
(1)
ln(hourly earnings)
(2)
ln(weckly hours)
(3)
Employment
(4)
ln(hourly earnings)
(5)
lnfwcekly hours)
(6)
Employment
Panel A. Including Individual O bservable C haracteristics
4 quarters before being in U.S. -0.129 0.104 0.015 0.044 -0.006 -0.004
[0.175] [0.078] [0.048] [0.340] [0.096] [0.029]
3 quarters before being in U.S. -0.111 0.120 -0.016 0.079 -0.029 -0.004
[0.172] [0.074] [0.046] [0.330] [0.087] [0.027]
2 quarters before being in U.S. -0.184 0.108 -0.047 0.140 -0.039 -0.003
[0.171] [0.072] [0.044] [0.326] [0.083] [0.026]
1 quarter before being in U.S. -0.183 0.095 -0.054 0.164 -0.040 -0.020
[0.165] [0.069] [0.042] [0.324] [0.082] [0.025]
During stay in U.S. 0.753 *** 0.177 ** -0.073 0.529 -0.119 -0.103 ***
[0.176] [0.072] [0.046] [0.393] [0.146] [0.026]
1 quarter after being in U.S. -0.061 0.114 * -0.115 *** 0.146 -0.031 -0.051 **
[0.160] [0.067] [0.042] [0.317] [0.076] [0.025]
2 quarters after being in U.S. -0.170 0.123 * -0.074 0.152 0.010 -0.035
[0.166] [0.070] [0.045] [0.324] [0.084] [0.025]
3 quarters after being in U.S. 0.003 0.104 -0.070 0.182 -0.058 -0.040
[0.168] [0.071] [0.048] [0.327] [0.093] [0.027]
4 quarters after being in U.S. 0.008 0.171 ** -0.089 * 0.100 0.048 -0.035
[0.172] [0.074] [0.052] [0.344] [0.117] [0.034]
No. o f  observations 2,826,450 3,182,119 6,271,852 2,824,869 3,180,262 6,272,752
No. o f  groups 782,995 834,179 1,257,181 782,612 833,816 1,257,356
Panel B. Excluding Individual O bservable C haracteristics
4 quarters before being in U.S. -0.114 0.099 -0.012 0.049 -0.012 0.012
[0.174] [0.078] [0.057] [0.343] [0.094] [0.058]
3 quarters before being in U.S. -0.111 0.118 -0.029 0.089 -0.040 0.016
[0.170] [0.074] [0.055] [0.333] [0.085] [0.054]
2 quarters before being in U.S. -0.182 0.107 -0.061 0.143 -0.046 0.019
[0.170] [0.073] [0.054] [0.328] [0.082] [0.053]
1 quarter before being in U.S. -0.183 0.093 -0.072 0.163 -0.042 -0.015
[0.164] [0.069] [0.051] [0.326] [0.080] [0.052]
During stay in U.S. 0.737 *** 0.162 ♦* -0.012 0.530 -0.136 -0.139 ***
[0.175] [0.072] [0.056] [0.395] [0.144] [0.054]
1 quarter after being in U.S. -0.068 0.107 -0.133 *** 0.144 -0.040 -0.051
[0.159] [0.068] [0.050] [0.319] [0.075] [0.052]
2 quarters after being in U.S. -0.175 0.119 * -0.093 * 0.149 -0.004 -0.030
[0.165] [0.071] [0.055] [0.327] [0.083] [0.053]
3 quarters after being,in U.S. -0.001 0.101 -0.092 0.183 -0.068 -0.045
[0.167] [0.072] [0.057] [0.330] [0.092] [0.055]
4 quarters after being in U.S. 0.003 0.166 ** -0.084 0.099 0.039 -0.031
[0.171] [0.075] [0.063] [0.347] [0.115] [0.062]
No. o f  observations 2,877,459 3,236,549 6,352,933 2,875,879 3,234,698 6,353,830
No. o f  groups 795,711 847,178 1,273,093 795,328 846,815 1,273,267
Panel C. Including Individual Observable Characteristics and Excluding Bj,  and A b Dummy Variables
During stay in U.S. 0.886 *** 0.063 *** -0.007 0.390 * -0.088 -0.077 ***
[0.046] [0.015] [0.012] [0.232] [0.106] [0.008]
No. o f  observations 2,876,865 3,235,811 6,351,164 2,875,285 3,233,960 6,352,060
No. o f  groups 795,675 847,144 1,273,081 795,292 846,781 1,273,255
***, **, and * indicate significance al the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include quarter dummies. Individual controls include a quadratic terra on experience, 
years of schooling, marital status, and an informality indicator. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are shown in brackets.
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level. Column (4) indicates that the effect in the case of non-work migrants is much 
smaller and not significant.
The semi-logarithmic model in equation (3.1) can also be used to estimate the effect of 
temporary migration on weekly hours worked. The corresponding results are reported in 
columns (2) and (5) of table 3.10. Column (2) shows that during the quarter of 
migration, a work migrant works on average 19% more hours per week than when he is 
Mexico, and as with earnings, this effect is significant at a 1% level. In contrast, column 
(5) indicates that migrating to the United States does not affect the weekly hours 
worked by non-work migrants.
Finally, in order to estimate the effect of temporary migration on the likelihood of 
employment, equation (3.1) is also fitted for a binary variable which is equal to 1 if 
individual i is employed at time t, and equal to 0 otherwise. The corresponding 
estimates are shown in columns (3) and (6 ) of table 3.10. Column (3) shows that the 
likelihood of employment for a work migrant is lower than for non migrants during the 
period immediately after migration, indicating that these people face an adjustment 
process when they return from the U.S. and try to join the Mexican labour force again. 
Alternatively, it could also be indicating that migrant workers tend to substitute their 
labour supply in Mexico with their labour supply in the U.S. On the other hand, for non­
work migrants column (6 ) indicates that their likelihood of employment is significantly 
lower only during the quarter of migration and the quarter immediately after it.
Panel B in table 3.10 repeats the estimations excluding the time variant individual 
characteristics. The results are very similar to those in panel A, indicating that 
observable characteristics do not play a very important role. Also, F-tests for the joint 
significance of the Bu and Ait variables in panel A were carried out. The null hypothesis
of no significance could not be rejected for the regressions in columns (2), (4), and (5). 
For this reason, panel C shows the estimation results excluding these variables. The 
effect of temporary migration on earnings for work migrants is now larger, and the 
effect on hours is smaller, indicating that Mexican workers increase their weekly hours 
worked by about 6.5% when they are in the United States. For the case of non-work 
migrants, there is now an increase of 48% in earnings, significant at the 10% level, and 
a smaller effect on the likelihood of employment.
The coefficients reported in table 3.10 are estimates of the effects of temporary 
migration within individuals. In order to measure these effects between individuals, 
equation 1 is also fitted using random effects. The results are reported in table 3.11, and
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Table 3.11: Random Effects Estimates of the Effect of Temporary Migration on ln(hourly earnings), ln(weekly hours), and Employment
Work Migrants Non-Work Migrants
(1)
ln(hourly earnings)
(2)
ln(weekly hours)
(3)
Employment
(4)
ln(hourly earnings)
(5)
ln(weekly hours)
(6)
Employment
Panel A. Including Individual O bservable C haracteristics
nonmigrant dummy -0.089 0.058 -0.014 -0.117 0.083 0.074 ***
[0.146] [0.065] [0.044] [0.225] [0.088] [0.027]
4 quarters before being in U.S. -0.020 0.112 0.010 -0.127 -0.003 -0.012
[0.152] [0.072] [0.047] [0.238] [0.101] [0.030]
3 quarters before being in U.S. 0.004 0.126 * -0.018 -0.126 0.012 -0.013
[0.149] [0.067] [0.045] [0.227] [0.090] [0.027]
2 quarters before being in U.S. -0.055 0.116 * -0.047 -0.071 0.003 -0.010
[0.148] [0.066] [0.043] [0.224] [0.088] [0.026]
1 quarter before being in U.S. -0.046 0.101 -0.053 -0.024 -0.003 -0.026
[0.143] [0.063] [0.042] [0.223] [0.087] [0.026]
During stay in U.S. 0.941 *** 0.201 *** -0.068 0.379 -0.063 -0.108 ***
[0.151] [0.065] [0.045] [0.291] [0.134] [0.027]
1 quarter after being in U.S. 0.076 0.119 * -0.110 *** -0.030 0.006 -0.055 **
[0.140] [0.061] [0.041] [0.217] [0.084] [0.026]
2 quarters after being in U.S. -0.046 0.128 ** -0.068 -0.011 0.025 -0.036
[0.144] [0.065] [0.044] [0.226] [0.090] [0.026]
3 quarters after being in U.S. 0.119 0.108 * -0.063 0.017 -0.027 -0.040
[0.147] [0.066] [0.048] [0.228] [0.098] [0.028]
4 quarters after being in U.S. 0.105 0.178 *** -0.081 -0.028 0.017 -0.027
[0.152] [0.069] [0.051] [0.243] [0.124] [0.034]
No. o f  observations 2,826,450 3,182,119 6,271,852 2,824,869 3,180,262 6,272,752
No. o f  groups 782,995 834,179 1,257,181 782,612 833,816 1,257,356
Panel B. Excluding Individual O bservable C haracteristics
nonmigrant dummy -0.196 -0.032 -0.329 *** -0.140 0.137 * 0.164 ***
[0.154] [0.067] [0.053] [0.300] [0.079] [0.053]
4 quarters before being in U.S. -0.038 0.110 -0.012 -0.165 -0.025 0.009
[0.159] [0.073] [0.057] [0.311] [0.091] [0.056]
3 quarters before being in U.S. -0.039 0.126 * -0.030 -0.134 -0.022 0.012
[0.156] [0.069] [0.055] [0.302] [0.080] [0.053]
2 quarters before being in U.S. -0.103 0.117 ♦ -0.061 -0.087 -0.027 0.015
[0.155] [0.068] [0.053] [0.299] [0.079] [0.051]
1 quarter before being in U.S. -0.100 0.101 -0.070 -0.035 -0.022 -0.019
[0.150] [0.065] [0.050] [0.299] [0.077] [0.050]
During stay in U.S. 0.856 *** 0.173 *** -0.006 0.354 -0.111 -0.142 **»
[0.159] [0.067] [0.055] [0.354] [0.127] [0.052]
1 quarter after being in U.S. 0.024 0.110 * -0.127 ** -0.039 -0.020 -0.054
[0.146] [0.063] [0.050] [0.292] [0.072] [0.050]
2 quarters after being in U.S. -0.086 0.126 * -0.085 -0.016 -0.007 -0.032
[0.151] [0.066] [0.055] [0.301] [0.081] [0.051]
3 quarters after being in U.S. 0.093 0.109 -0.082 0.027 -0.056 -0.045
[0.153] [0.067] [0.057] [0.302] [0.089] [0.054]
4 quarters after being in U.S. 0.084 0.178 ** -0.069 -0.025 -0.003 -0.028
[0.158] [0.070] [0.063] [0.315] [0.116] [0.060]
No. o f  observations 2,877,459 3,236,549 6,352,933 2,875,879 3,234,698 6,353,830
No. o f  groups 795,711 847,178 1,273,093 795,328 846.815 1,273,267
Panel C. Including Individual O bservable C haracteristics and Excluding B  u and A u Dummy V ariables
nonmigrant dummy -0.083 *** -0.062 *** 0.046 *** -0.067 ** 0.078 *** 0.104 ***
[0.021] [0.011] [0.009] [0.030] [0.024] [0.008]
During stay in U.S. 0.946 *** 0.079 *** -0.006 0.425 ** -0.066 -0.078 ***
[0.041] [0.014] [0.012] [0.191] [0.094] [0.008]
No. o f  observations 2,826,450 3,182,119 6,271,852 2,824,869 3,180,262 6,272,752
No. o f  groups 782,995 834,179 1,257,181 782,612 833,816 1,257,356
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%. and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include quarter dummies. Individual controls include a quadratic teim on experience, 
years of schooling, marital status, gender, a head-of-bouschold indicator, regional dummies, and an informality indicator. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are 
shown in brackets.
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they are all very similar to the ones obtained under fixed effects. However, across most 
of the specifications, Hausman, J. A. (1978) tests reject the null hypothesis that fixed 
and random effects coefficients are not systematically different, implying that random 
effects are inconsistent and that the individual effects should not be treated as 
independent of the other regressors in the model. Therefore, fixed effects estimation is 
effectively controlling for possible self-selection biases.
To conclude the econometric analysis, equation (3.1) is modified in order to allow for 
interactions between the dummy variable for migration M jt and some of the individual
characteristics X it that could have an effect on the returns to temporary migration to
United States. For example, more experienced and more skilled people may perform 
better in the U.S. labour market, or perhaps people migrating from regions other than 
the traditional sending region (see section 3.3) perform worse due to the lack of well- 
established networks abroad. To see this, the equation becomes:
yn ~ X i tPx + M itSM + (X u x Mit + £ i + £t £u (3-2)
Equation (3.2) is fitted using fixed effects, and the estimated coefficients^ and fi(XxM)
are reported in table 3.12. The results for hourly earnings indicate that the returns to 
temporary migration decrease with years of potential experience and years of schooling, 
particularly for the case of work migrants. It seems to imply that more skilled workers 
can do better also in the Mexican labour market, and therefore the benefits from moving 
to the U.S. are lower for them. Regarding the regions of origin, people migrating from 
the northern states have higher returns, while people migrating from the southern states 
have lower returns. This could be due to either of three factors: first, people form the 
north have more developed networks in the United States than people from the south; 
second, people from the south face higher migration costs due to the distance from the 
border; or third, economic activities and availability of technology in the north may be 
closer to that in the U.S., translating into a comparative advantage of this region with 
respect to the south.
The estimates for weekly hours worked show that, while there are basically no 
differences among work migrants, non-work migrants tend to work more time the more 
educated they are. They also work significantly less hours during the quarter of 
migration if they come from the centre states, and significantly more hours if they come 
from the southern states.
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Table 3.12: Fixed Effects Estimates of the Interactions Between the Temporary Migration Dummy and the Individual Characteristics
W ork Migrants Non-Work Migrants
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(hourly earnings) ln(weekly hours) Employment ln(hourly earnings) In(weekly hours) Employment
migration 1.460 *** 0.029 -0.079 1.691 * -0.728 * -0.197 ***
[0.271] [0.078] [0.066] [0.983] [0.414] [0.038]
experience*migration -0.015 *** 0.002 0.006 *** -0.018 0.006 0.002 ***
[0.005] [0.002] [0.001] [0.024] [0.007] [0.001]
school*migration -0.042 *** 0.005 0.010 *** -0.161 ** 0.073 ** 0.001
[0.015] [0.004] [0.004] [0.075] [0.033] [0.003]
married*migration -0.024 0.017 -0.061 * 0.302 -0.330 0.050 ***
[0.118] [0.042] [0.033] [0.735] [0.241] [0.016]
male*migration 0.021 -0.048 -0.042 0.492 0.142 -0.034
[0.175] [0.065] [0.048] [0.501] [0.168] [0.021]
head household*migration ' 0.075 -0.019 -0.131 *** -0.170 -0.201 0.018
[0.135] [0.047] [0.036] [0.553] [0.189] [0.019]
border* migration -0.116 0.004 -0.018 0.437 -0.136 0.039 ***
[0.122] [0.038] [0.030] [0.504] [0.276] [0.017]
northem’ migration 0.282 ** -0.024 0.062 * 1.011 ** -0.044 0.011
[0.127] [0.040] [0.032] [0.477] [0.165] [0.021]
centre*migralion 0.216 0.048 0.070 (dropped) -1.046 *** -0.002
[0.235] [0.061] [0.047] [0.261] [0.038]
southem*migration -0.440 ** 0.037 -0.028 (dropped) 1.401 *** 0.117 ***
[0.186] [0.068] [0.055] [0.340] [0.048]
No. o f  observations 2,826,450 3,182,119 6,351,164 2,824,869 3,180,262 6,352,060
No. o f  groups 782,995 834,179 1,273,081 782,612 833,816 1,273,255
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include quarter dummies. The missing coefficients correspond to variables dropped 
due to multicollinearity. Robust standard errors clustered al the individual level are shown in brackets.
Finally, the likelihood of employment for work migrants increases with years of 
potential experience and schooling, and it is lower for married workers and heads of 
households. It is also a bit higher for people migrating from the northern states. For non- 
work migrants, the likelihood of employment is higher for married people and for those 
coming from the border and the southern states.
In sum, the evidence in this section indicates that the Mexicans that migrate temporarily 
to the United States for work reasons get significantly higher earnings in the U.S. labour 
market than in the Mexican one during the period of migration. They also tend to work 
longer hours, as suggested by the standard theory on the response of the labour supply 
to temporary positive shocks to real wages. It is also found that this group of workers 
have a higher likelihood of non employment after return migration. Lastly, the effect of 
temporary migration on earnings seems to be lower for more skilled workers and for 
those migrating from the most distant regions in Mexico, relative to the United States.
3.5. Conclusions
Mexican migration to the United States has been a very important issue throughout the 
twentieth century, and its relevance has reached unprecedented levels during the last
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two decades. From the Mexican side, remittances of Mexican workers account for 
approximately 2.3% of the GDP. From the United States side, about 8.3% of the 
employed people in that country are from Mexican origin, and the increasing problem of 
illegal immigration has derived in the approval by the U.S. Congress of the construction 
of a 1,120 kilometers fence along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Even though there is a huge body of literature that analyzes many different aspects of 
this phenomenon, the economic performance of migrants with respect to the Mexican 
labour markets has received very little attention. Thus, the objective of this chapter was 
to fill this gap in the literature by presenting new evidence on the effect that temporary 
migration to the United States has on the earnings of Mexican workers.
The present work used a balanced panel data from the Mexican National Survey of 
Urban Labour (ENEU) for the period between 1994 and 2002, a source that has not 
been used before to answer this question regardless of some noticeable advantages, such 
as its quarterly coverage, its panel structure, and the fact that it contains information 
about migrants during their periods abroad. On the other hand, there may also be some 
concerns about the representativeness of the ENEU survey in analyzing migration. First, 
as the survey covers only the 48 main cities in the country, any estimation based on 
these data may be irrelevant if an insignificant fraction of the migrants comes from 
urban places; and second, the survey captures mainly temporary migration. However, 
the discussion in sections 3.2 and 3.3 provided evidence supporting the importance of 
both the share of migration originating in urban places and the share of temporary 
migration in total Mexican migration to the United States, leading to the conclusion that 
the ENEU is a valuable data source worth using. Thus, the econometric analysis 
developed in section 3.4 indicates that Mexicans that migrate temporarily to the United 
States for work reasons get significantly higher earnings in the U.S. labour market than 
in the Mexican one during the period of migration. They also tend to work longer hours 
and face a higher likelihood of non employment during the period immediately after 
returning to Mexico. Finally, the gains from temporary migration are lower for more 
skilled workers and for those migrating from the most distant regions in Mexico, 
relative to the United States.
It is important to mention some caveats regarding the estimates obtained in the present 
exercise. First, as mentioned above, by using longitudinal data it is possible to control 
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. But this leaves the analysis open to other 
sources of bias, namely time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, it is 
possible that the Mexican earnings of migrants fall prior to migration as migrants get
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ready for the trip to the U.S. If this is in fact the case, then the returns to temporary 
migration calculated in this chapter are an overestimate of the real effect. Alternatively, 
it is possible that the likelihood of migration increases with Mexican income in case 
migrants need to accumulate the cash needed to finance the illegal border crossing. In 
this case the present exercise would be underestimating the returns to temporary 
migration. Secondly, there are also some concerns regarding possible sample selection 
biases. Mexican workers who would earn little in the U.S. do not migrate, and hence we 
do not observe migration episodes for this type of workers. This leads to an 
overestimate of the returns to migration: only those who benefit strongly migrate. 
Another possible source of sample selection bias has to do with attrition. Since the 
estimation in this chapter is done using a balanced panel, it does not include all those 
individuals in the sample that do not return within a quarter. But migrants who earn 
much more in the U.S. than in Mexico are unlikely to return, and given that there is no 
information on U.S. earnings for non-returning migrants, we do not observe migrants 
whose gain in earnings is particularly large. This leads to an underestimate of the 
returns to migration: only those who do not benefit too much are observed. The net 
effect of migration estimated in this chapter could thus be a combination of these biases. 
Since their respective magnitude is unknown, it is impossible to know whether the 
estimated migration effect is an over or under-estimate of the true average gain.
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General Conclusions
The objective of this thesis was to make three original contributions to the existing 
literature on two very important characteristics of the Mexican labour markets: 
informality and migration to the United States. Chapter 1 investigated the relationship 
between trade liberalization and informality in Mexico during the 1990s. The empirical 
analysis found that reductions in the Mexican import tariffs are significantly related to 
reductions in the likelihood of unregistered labour (i.e., the fraction of workers that do 
not have social security or health insurance) in the tradable sectors. This result contrasts 
with the findings of Goldberg, P. K. & N. Pavcnik (2003) for Brazil and Colombia. The 
analysis also indicates that for a given reduction in the Mexican import tariff, 
unregistered labour decreases less in industries with higher levels of import penetration; 
and that for a given reduction in the U.S. import tariff, unregistered labour decreases 
more in industries that are relatively more export oriented. It is also found that trade 
liberalization affects the employment shares and the composition of unregistered labour 
across industries, but it does not seem to have an impact on the size of the labour force 
of firms. Finally, chapter 1 also presented evidence of an increase in industry wage 
differentials and a widening effect of trade liberalization on the registered-unregistered 
labour wage gap.
Chapter 2 studied the relationship between informality and taxes, by analyzing the 
effect of two tax reforms that took place in Mexico between 1989 and 2002: the 
introduction of a 2% asset tax in 1989; and the elimination of the OAD scheme during 
the years 1999 to 2001, which affected firms with investments in regions other than the 
three main metropolitan areas in Mexico. The econometric analysis suggested that the 
response of the likelihood of unregistered employment to changes in the level of 
corporate taxes is heterogeneous, depending both on the particular economic sector and 
the nature of the tax policy in question. For the case of the asset taxation, there was no 
evidence of a significant effect on unregistration, even when different relationships 
across different economic sectors were allowed. For the case of the elimination of the 
OAD scheme, the estimation yielded significant effects on unregistration in some of the 
manufacturing industries. Finally, it was argued that this tax reform would translate into 
an increase in the user cost of capital, and therefore that a positive relationship between 
this variable and the rate of unregistered labour should exist. This hypothesis allowed 
the use of an alternative source of variation to estimate the effect of the OAD reforms 
on unregistration. Even though ordinary least squares estimation indicated that there
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exists a positive and significant relationship between the user cost of capital and 
unregistration, instrumental variables estimation suggested that the variation in the 
former due to the elimination of the OAD scheme does not affect unregistration in a 
significant way.
Lastly, chapter 3 presented new evidence on the effect that temporary migration to the 
United States has on the earnings of Mexican workers. It used data from the Mexican 
National Survey of Urban Labour (ENEU) for the period between 1994 and 2002, a 
source that has not been used before to answer this question regardless of some 
noticeable advantages, such as its quarterly coverage, its panel structure, and the fact 
that it contains information about migrants during their periods abroad. The 
econometric analysis carried out in this chapter indicated that Mexicans that migrate 
temporarily to the United States for work reasons get significantly higher earnings in the 
U.S. labour market than in the Mexican one during the period of migration. They also 
tend to work longer hours and face a higher likelihood of non employment during the 
period immediately after returning to Mexico. Finally, the gains from temporary 
migration are lower for more skilled workers and for those migrating from the most 
distant regions in Mexico, relative to the United States.
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